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1 
NOTE FROM THE FOUNDERS 
 
Justice Louis Brandeis1 
 
hour, and men were fortunate to receive twenty cents an hour. The 
average work week was sixty to seventy hours. During the thirties, 
wages were a secondary issue; to have a job at all was the difference 
between the agony of starvation and a flicker of life. The nation, now so 
vigorous, reeled and tottered almost to total collapse. The labor 
movement was the principal force that transformed misery and despair 
into hope and progress. Out of its bold struggles, economic and social 
reform gave birth to unemployment insurance, old age pensions, 
government relief for the destitute, and above all new wage levels that 
meant not mere survival, but a tolerable life. The captains of industry 
did not lead this transformation; they resisted it until they were 
overcome. When in the thirties the wave of union organization crested 
over our nation, it carried to secure shores not only itself but the whole 
 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.2 
 
 
Labor and employment law is an area of law that impacts every single 
individual in this country, if not all around the world. It addresses some of 
the most important and fundamental issues of law as exemplified by its 
coverage in most, if not all of foundational law school courses.  Labor and 
employment law remains the second-most litigated topic in the Federal 
Courts.  
 
Washington, D.C. is the home of the United States Supreme Court, the 
United States Court of Appeals for both the D.C. and Federal Circuits, the 
Department of Labor, the National Labor Relations Board, the Equal 
                                                          
1.   JOSEPH R. CONLIN, THE MORROW BOOK OF QUOTATIONS IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 48 (1984). 
2.   Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at the Illinois AFL-CIO Convention 
(Oct. 1965). 
FOUNDERS NOTE 2/11/11 2/21/2011  5:58 PM 
2 THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM  [Vol. 1:1 
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Merit Systems Protection 
Board, numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations, 
most if not all of the unions in this country, and the Chamber of 
Commerce.  
 
Yet, as of April, 2010, there were only five student-run legal 
publications that specifically focused on labor and employment law 
nationwide and none in Washington, D.C.  
 
The Washington College of Law was founded in 1896 by two 
women, Ellen Spencer Mussey and Emma Gillett, for the sole purpose of 
providing opportunities for those historically outside the mainstream of the 
legal profession. WCL has a long-standing tradition of educating students 
about the values of dignity, diversity, and equal rights for all. In addition, it 
has a reputation for being one of the preeminent institutions in the country 
for its programs on international law, human rights, business law, and law 
and government. Because of  focus on these areas of law, it is no 
surprise that the school boasts over fifteen professors teaching 
approximately two dozen courses focused on aspects of labor and 
employment law. Furthermore, 
with prominent issues in labor and employment law. 
to the importance of labor and employment law is further exemplified by 
the Labor and Employment Law & Policy specialization within the 
Program on Law & Government Master of Laws (LL.M.) curriculum
  
 
In April, 2010, we sought to help supplement and focus this related 
academic elements already present at WCL by founding the sixth student-
run legal publication in this area The Labor and Employment Law Forum.   
 
The Forum is a novel publication at WCL and serves as an experiment 
looking toward the future of legal publications.  Early on, the decision was 
made to publish in the Digital Commons to provide a forum for thought-
compelling, legal scholarship with an emphasis on shorter, timely works, 
with an emphasis on fast-turn around articles that might otherwise lose 
their relevance, or simply be overlooked by, traditional law reviews. The 
Digital Commons gives us, and we hope our readers, the ability to access 
polished articles in the native format that all legal scholarship is currently 
being read elect -
effective, this format allows us to provide material that often disappears 
into obscurity; transcripts and annotations from events that occur both here 
at WCL and around the Washington, D.C. area that are vital to the 
FOUNDERS NOTE 2/11/11 2/21/2011  5:58 PM 
2011] NOTE FROM THE FOUNDERS 3 
academic discussion of labor and employment law. Finding the balance 
between the quality of editing that authors expect from traditional, 
scholarly legal publications and the necessary rapidity with which the edits 
must be completed, has constantly lingered in the background behind this 
first issue. 
 
Our sincere hope is that we have struck this balance and that it is 
correspondence to us during this process is any indication, we have.  
 
A special thank you needs to be extended to those who we integral in the 
founding of this publication, including Chris Kyle for his support in getting 
this publication recognized by the Student Bar Association and The 
International Law Review, The Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 
and The National Security Law Brief, Joseph Boddicker, and Ian Spear for 
their words of wisdom regarding organizational structure and governing 
policies. Additional gratitude is owed to those individuals who made the 
publication of this first volume possible, including our Editorial Board and 
our entire staff and our faculty advisors.   
 
Lastly, we would like to thank the following individuals for their 
support: Sean Shank for his expertise and wisdom; Justin Shore for his 
enthusiasm, encouragement and assistance; Richael Faithful for her 
knowledge and experience; Susanna Birdsong, Amanda Jane Cooney, 
Mary Francis Charlton, Jessica Clarke, Clifford Clapp, Renee Danega, 
Kyle deCant, Matt Gómez, Ernest Johnson, Pedro de Lencastre, José 
ll for their loyalty and hard 
work; Mary Rich for her guidance; Professor Robert Vaughn for his insight 
and support; Dean Kaufman, Susan Lewis, Adeen Postar, and Mary Rich 
for their expertise and advice.   
 
We would like to thank Professor Susan Carle for serving as our mentor 
and source of invaluable insight throughout this sometimes exhausting 
process.   
 
Lastly, we would like to thank each of the authors for publishing in our 
inaugural issue. Providing our readers with their scholarship is precisely 
why we undertook this endeavor. Labor and employment law is far from 
static. Whether stemming from common law, statutory, or constitutional 
strictures, it is an area of law that is constantly shifting and evolving to 
meet the changing realities of the global workplace. Though the economy 
has stabilized in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, unemployment 
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these uncertain times that the protections provided to workers by law may 
be the only economic security they can depend on as industries engage in 
reactionary and precautionary downsizing. 
  
The articles and the annotated transcript presented here, in our inaugural 
issue, touch upon some of the more dramatic concerns, questions, and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Unlike the ringing endorsement of labor arbitration in the Steelworkers 
Trilogy,1 Granite Rock Co. v. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters2 will neither revolutionize 
arbitration nor change the way courts view Section 301(a) of the Labor-
Management Relations Act 3 at least not in the immediate 
future. However, Granite Rock may become best known for what it did not 
do definitively announce whether tort claims may be brought within the 
gamut of Section 301(a). The rich history of Section 301(a) has afforded 
                                                          
1.   The Steelworkers Trilogy is comprised of the following three cases: United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The Steelworkers Trilogy was 
an historic sea change from the antipathy courts previously manifested toward 
arbitration, to a presumption enthusiastically in favor of arbitration over external 
litigation as the preferred means of dispute resolution in the labor management 
context. Significant law review articles and keynote addresses regarding the Trilogy 
include: Judge Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The 
Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 3 (1988); David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663 (1973); Peter Feuille et al., Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards: Some Evidence, 41 LAB. L.J. 477 (1990); William B. Gould IV, 
Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards Thirty Years of the Steelworkers 
Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 464 (1984); 
Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, As the Enterprise Wheel Turns: New Evidence on 
the Finality of Labor Arbitration Awards, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 193-94 
(2007); Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential 
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to 
Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993); Michael Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits 
on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547 (2005); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review 
of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 
MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977); W. Daniel Boone, Keynote Address at the National 
Academy of Ar
System of Industrial Self-
Keynote Address at the National Academy of Arbitrators Annual Meeting: 
Steelworkers Trilogy After a Half Century (May 27, 2010); Andrew M. Kramer, 
Keynote Address at the National Academy of Arbitrators Annual Meeting: Fifty Years 
After the Steelworkers Trilogy: Some New Questions and Old Answers (May 27, 
2010). 
2.   130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).  
3.   See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 
185(a) (2006) (providing independent federal jurisdiction for contractual disputes 
between employers and labor organizations representing employees).  
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the Supreme Court ample opportunity to interpret its purpose and reach.4  
Section 301(a) confers jurisdiction on federal courts in suits between 
employers and unions.5 
interpretation of Section 301(a) emphasized an additional policy goal 
flowing from the statute: stability in the collective bargaining process. In 
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, the Court found that Section 
federal courts over labor 
should enforce [arbitration] agreements . . . [in order to achieve] industrial 
 6 By interpreting Section 301(a) 
federal courts to fashion a body of federal law to . . . address disputes 
7 the Court took it upon itself to stabilize 
relationships between employers and unions. 
Fifteen years after Section 301(a) 8 contractual stability 
between unions and employers continued to be an underlying concern. In 
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., the Court explained the necessity 
of federal uniformity in collective bargaining disputes to avoid [t]he 
possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings 
under state and federal law [which] would inevitably exert a disruptive 
influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective 
9 Different state and federal interpretations could prolong 
disputes, thereby dissuading contracting parties from including arbitration 
agreements in the first place.10 T
within the collective bargaining process guided its Section 301(a) 
jurisprudence.  
                                                          
4.  See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) 
(recognizing Section 301(a) as an independent grant of federal court jurisdiction 
regardless of amount in controversy or diversity of citizenship in order to fashion a 
federal common law to govern disputes of collective bargaining agreements); see also 
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 14 (1985) (holding state-law based 
claims solely created by a collective bargaining agreement are subject to Section 301(a) 
and preempted by federal law); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 
104 05 (1962) (mandating federal common 
in interpreting collective bargaining agreements subject to federal jurisdiction under 
Section 301(a)).  
5.   See § 301(a), § 185(a); see also Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455 (observing the 
congressional intent of Section 301(a) was more than merely a jurisdictional grant, but 
also to provide legal remedies to the parties of collective bargaining agreements). 
6.   Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455. 
7.   Lueck, 471 U.S. at 209.    
8.   See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), Pub. L. No. 80-
101, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006)) (creating jurisdiction 
to allow for private suits to enforce the substance of collective bargaining agreements 
between employers and unions). 
9.   Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103. 
10.  Id. at 104. 
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Although the pinion in Granite Rock focused more on 
addressing the availability of options Granite Rock might still pursue as 
opposed to explaining why the Court did not endorse the claim for tortious 
interference of contract the Court mad deral 
statutes strike between employer and union relations in the collective-
bargaining arena is carefully calibrated. 11 Consequently, the Court held 
that -law tort cause of action [under Section 
301(a)] would require a host of policy choices that could easily upset this 
12 The majority went no further, finding no need to determine 
whether Section 301(a) represented a Congressional mandate to create a 
body of federal tort law regarding the enforcement of collective bargaining 
agreements.13   
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND/PROCEDURE 
Granite Rock Co. and Teamsters Local 287  were parties to 
a collective bargaining agreement 
April 30, 2004.14 Preliminary negotiations for a new agreement began in 
March 2004, yet the parties were unable to reach a resolution by May 
2004.15 After reaching impasse, Local 287 began its strike of Granite Rock 
on June 9, 2004.16 On July 2, 2004 at 4 a.m., a new four-year agreement 
was allegedly reached containing a broad arbitration clause for the 
-
April 30, 2008.17 The 
parties were not, however, able to reach a separate back-to-work agreement 
that would indemnify Local union members from liability for any strike-
related damages Granite Rock incurred.18 Later that morning, Local 287 
                                                          
11.   See Granite Rock , 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2864 (2010); 
see also NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639 (Local 639), 362 
U.S. 274, 289 290 (1960) (acknowledging that the Taft-
labor). 
12.   Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2864.   
13.   See id. at 2864 65 
law tort under Section 301(a) as premature, given the other remedies available to 
Granite Rock). 
14.    (Local 287 IV), 546 
F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008), Granite Rock Co. 
  
15.    (Local 287 I), 402 F. 
Supp. 2d 1120, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
16.   Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2853. 
17.   Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1171. 
18.   See Local 287 I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1122
the acceptance of the new collective bargaining agreement was subject to reaching an 
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allegedly ratified the new CBA.19 Granite Rock then claimed that George 
ive, called Granite Rock to confirm 
that the Union had ratified the new agreement.20 However, Local 287 
denied that union members ratified the agreement, contending that this 
21 Granite Rock countered that there was an agreement to 
discuss the back to work agreement at a later date, and that the back to 
work agreement was subject to the grievance procedure outlined in the new 
agreement.22 
On July 5, 2004 nstructions from Rome 
Aloise, the administrative assistant to the General President of the 
other members of 
Local 287 to refrain from returning to work.23 Granite Rock alleged that on 
July 6th, 2004, Mr. Netto demanded a back-to-work agreement that would 
protect Local 287 and IBT from liability arising from the strike prior to 
returning to work.24 When Granite Rock refused, the strike continued
which Granite Rock alleged violated the new collective bargaining 
-strike provision.25 The strike continued until September 13, 
2004, and the parties executed their new collective bargaining agreement in 
26   
The parties agreed that the December CBA was a valid contract and that 
it was retroactive to May,27 but they disagreed as to the scope of the 
retroactivity. The oral arguments to the Supreme Court are illustrative: 
MR. MATHIASON [counsel for Granite Rock]: Your Honor, 
in December, 
we signed the agreement of July 2nd. That is critical. If there had 
been no ratification on July 2nd, there would be no contract. And 
when the union signed, they take the position that they signed a 
contract ratified on August 22nd. Those are radically different 
events . . . .28 
                                                          
19.   Id. The basis of the disagreement between Local 287 and Granite Rock 
concerns whether the Local 287 did, in fact, ratify the agreement on July 2, 2004. Local 
287 asserted that acceptance of the agreement was conditioned on Gra
 
20.   Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1171 72. 
21.   Id. at 1172. 
22.   Local 287 I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 23. 
23.   Id. at 1171 72. 
24.   Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1172. 
25.   Id. 
26.   Granite Rock l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2861 (2010). 
27.   Id. at 2867. 
28.   Transcript of Oral Argument at 17 18
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JUSTICE ALITO:  Am I correct that neither you, neither Granite 
Rock nor the Local, thinks that the December collective 
bargaining 
think it was-- 
  
MR. MATHIASON: 29  
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:  So  
December CBA] included the no-strike clause--30 
 
MR. BONSALL [counsel for Local 287]: We contend that it 
would not . . . .31 
The subject of the disagreement was whether the December CBA 
executed the CBA retroactively to the July 2nd ratification vote or the 
August 22nd ratification vote by Local 287. This dispute left open the 
question of whether both parties agreed to arbitrate the July strike a 
dispute requiring judicial resolution.32 
III. LOWER COURT DECISIONS 
A. The District Court 
On July 9, 2004, Granite Rock filed a complaint in United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California against Local 287, alleging 
that Local 287 had participated in an unlawful strike and invoking federal 
jurisdiction under Section 301(a) of the LMRA.33 Granite Rock amended 
its complaint to include a request for injunctive relief through a temporary 
restraining order.34 The court denied injunctive relief and found that the 
new agreement had not been ratified.35 Granite Rock filed another motion 
for a new trial based on new evidence.36 Local 287 responded with a 
                                                          
130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010) (No. 08-1214), 2010 WL 171664. 
29.   Id. at 18 (alteration in original). 
30.   Id. at 25 (alteration in original).  
31.   Id.  
32.   See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) 
(
 (citing AT&T Te
643, 649 (1986))).  
33.   Local 287 I, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
34.   Id.  
35.   Id.  
36.   See generally Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, Motion to 
Vacate Dismissal of the F
Teamsters, Local 287 (Local 287 I), 402 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 04-
CV-02767), 2004 WL 5571934 (arguing that Granite Rock is entitled to a new trial 
GREGORY ET AL. 2/13/11 2/21/2011  1:02 AM 
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request for judgment on the pleadings.37 The court denied the Local 287
motion.38 
In the first of a series of orders, the Di
if so, reserved questions of whether an actual violation of the agreement 
occurred and the amount of damages for arbitration.39 The court denied 
and found 
request to be timely.40  
summary judgment on issue preclusion.41 Local 287 moved for summary 
judgment after the National Labor Relations Board
July 2nd collective bargaining agreement did not exist at the time of Local 
42 However, the court found that Granite Rock had expressly 
[District Court] 43 
On February 14, in its third order, the District Court granted Granite 
defendant.44 The court pointed to documents indicating that Rome Aloise, 
the Administrative Assistant to the General President of IBT, had, among 
                                                          
because of newly discovered evidenc
altered to vacate the dismissal of the complaint). 
37.   Local 287 I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. 
38.   See id. (observing denial of a motion for judgment under FED. R. CIV. PRO. 
12(c) was appropriate because of the underlying factual dispute concerning the 
ratification date of the December CBA by Local 287).  
39.   See id. at 1126 27 (holding that Local 287 was neither estopped from, nor had 
waived its ability of, invoking the arbitration provision of the December CBA since 
time of the dispute 
had always been that if such an agreement was found, the matter should be referred to 
arbitration).  
40.   See id t for a jury trial was made 
FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b)). 
41.    (Local 287 II), 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36048, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2006).  
42.   See id. at *2, *5
binding on Granite Rock). 
43.   See id. at *15. Cf. s (Granite Rock 
decision not to reach the issue of whether Local 287 held a ratification vote on July 2, 
2004, 
 
44.   See  (Local 287 III), 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25606, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2006) (applying DCD 
Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) to allow Granite Rock to 
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a))). 
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other things, encouraged Local 287 to continue to strike.45 
Ultimately, the District Court found that the ratification date issue was 
one for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide.46 After a federal jury found 
that Local 287 ratified the December CBA on July 2, 2004, the District 
Court referred the issues of breach of contract and damages to arbitration 
tortious interference of contract claim 
against IBT.47  
B. The Ninth Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed 
and remanded in part.48 Judge Gould found that the District Court properly 
 interference of contract claim for failing 
to state a claim.49 However, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court 
dress the 
contract formation issue.50 
1.  
301(a) 
Judge Gould, writing for a unanimous Ninth Circuit panel, based the 
opinion on Painting & Decorating Contractors Ass n v. Painters & 
Decorators Joint Committee, Inc.,51 a Ninth Circuit decision from 1983 
outlining the requirements for jurisdiction under Section 301(a).52 First, a 
employer and a labor organization. 53 Second, the resolution of the lawsuit 
[must] 54 The 
claim against IBT for tortious interference was correct because the claim 
did n
                                                          
45.   See id. at *3 4 (couching its decision to allow IBT to be added as a defendant 
on the great amount of assistance that IBT allegedly provided to Local 287 through 
Aloise during and prior to the strike). 
46.    130 S. Ct. 2847, 2855 (2010). 
47.   Id. 
48.   Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008), 
sub nom. Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010). 
49.   See id that FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) 
 
50.   Id.  
51.   707 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1983).  
52.   Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1172. 
53.   Id. (internal quotations omitted).    
54.   Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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Granite Rock and Local 287 reached on July 2, 2004.55 The court further 
noted that other circuit courts also declined to extend a Section 301(a) 
 56  
tort claim was cognizable under Section 301(a).57 The Court of Appeals 
stated that it was bound by Supreme Court precedent interpreting Section 
date to create a federal common law of labor contract 
58 As to satisfying the 
breach of the underlying contract is a necessary element of the tortious 
59 In addition, Granite Rock pointed to the 
that IBT gained by the 60 
held 
support.61 
Unable to persuade the Ninth Circuit on plain language grounds, Granite 
Rock turned to legislative intent, arguing that Congress intended Section 
62 
tortious interference claim under Section 301(a) also proved unpersuasive. 
The cou
63 
                                                          
55.   Id. at 1173.  
56.   Id. at 1174 (citing Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561, 
572 (2d Cir. 1995); 
977 F.2d 895, 897 (4th Cir. 1992); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 
No. 1564 v. Quality Plus Stores, Inc., 961 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1992); Serv., Hosp., 
Nursing Home & Pub. Emps. Union, Local No. 47 v. Commercial Prop. Servs., Inc., 
755 F.2d 499, 509 (6th Cir. 1985); Loss v. Blankenship, 673 F.2d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 
1982); Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 501 
(5th Cir. 1982)). But see id. at 1174
tortious interference claims under Section 301(a) (citing Wilkes-
Newspaper Guild, Local 120, 647 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1981))). 
57.   See Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d assertion that we should 
create a federal common law to reach IBT misinterprets our instructions from Congress 
 
58.   Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985)). 
59.   Id. at 1173. 
60.   Id. at 1173 74. 
61.   Id. at 1174. 
62.  Id. at 1175. 
63.   Id.  
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2.  The Effect of the Arbitration Clause 
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the effect of the arbitration clause 
found in the December CBA.64 The court began by pointing out the 
distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between challenges to arbitration 
clauses and those directed at the validity of the entire contract.65 It noted 
that the arbitrator should consider all challenges to the validity of the 
contract, while only courts may consider challenges to the arbitration 
clause.66 Following this precedent, the Ninth Circuit found that, because 
Granite Rock failed to make an independent challenge to the arbitration 
clause, it 
of contract action.67 Granite Rock again argued that Local 287 should be 
estopped from asserting the arbitration clause in the first place because 
Local 287 disputed that a contract between the parties had ever been 
formed.68 However, the court found that it had already rejected similar 
arguments in Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp.,69 where the Ninth Circuit 
f 
finding for the validity of a contract while ignoring its arbitration 
provision.70 Ultimately, the court found that both parties consented to 
arbitration
containing the arbitration clause, and Local 287 explicitly by asserting the 
 as an affirmative defense.71  
                                                          
64.   Id. at 1176. 
65.   Id.  
66.   See id. 
(alteration in 
original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 46 (2006))).  
67.   See id. 
enough to cover a dispute of contract formation because the claus
omitted) (citing Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 
1142 (9th Cir. 1991))). 
68.   See id. at 1177 78. 
69.   892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1989).  
70.   Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d at 1178 (citing Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 
1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
71.   See id. (conceding that either Granite Rock or Local 287 might have retained 
their right to have a court resolve the date on which the contract was formed had they 
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
A. The Majority  
In a seven to two decision authored by Justice Thomas, the Court 
s decision.72 The 
Court addressed two issues: 1) whether an arbitrator or the District Court 
recognize a new federal cause of action under [Section] 301(a) of the Labor 
73 As to 
the first issue, the Court held that the ratification dispute was for the 
District Court to decide.74 As to the second, it concluded that Granite Rock 
could not bring a tortious interference of contract claim under Section 
301(a) of the LMRA.75 
1.  The Labor Contract Formation Issue 
The Court first addressed if 
agreement to submit their dispute to arbitration was a matter for an 
arbitrator or a judge to decide.76 The specific issue was whether Granite 
Rock and Local 287 agreed to arbitrate the question of when the contract 
was ratified and thereby formed.77 As an initial matter, Justice Thomas 
noted that both parties agreed that the arbitration clause in the contract was 
valid and that certain issues should be arbitrated pursuant to the clause.78 
The initial question in arbitration disputes is whether the parties have 
agreed to arbitrate a particular issue, which often implicates the question of 
contract formation.79 When the question is if a contract has been formed, 
                                                          
72.   See of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2853 (2010) 
(holding that the Ninth Circuit erred by referring resolution of the ratification date of 
the December CBA to arbitration because it should be done judicially, but finding no 
create a new tortious interference with contract 
cause of action under Section 301(a)). 
73.   Id. 
74.   Id. 
75.   Id.  
76.   See id. at 2855 (explaining that courts typically determine whether parties have 
(citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002))). 
77.   See id. at 2855
 
78.   See id. at 2856
and the validity of the . . . arbitration clau  
79.   See id. 
where the court is satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute emphasis 
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that issue goes to a court to decide, because a court cannot require a 
defendant to arbitrate rights and liabilities of a contract to which she is not 
bound. But the Court distinguished Granite Rock as concerning when, not if 
Local 287 had ratified the CBA.80 Granite Rock asserted that the contract, 
which contained a no-strike clause, became binding before Local 287 went 
on strike, which in turn rendered Local 287 in breach of the contract.81 
Local 287 asserted that the contract was not formed before the strike, but 
afterwards therefore, Local 287 argued it should not be held liable for 
breach of contract when it went on strike.82  
Compelling arbitration of a particular issue is appropriate in situations in 
which both parties have already agreed to arbitrate the issue.83 When the 
parties agree to arbitrate a certain issue, they do so with the assumption that 
the arbitrator will decide the ca
contract.84 The parties assume that an arbitrator will use the provisions of 
their contract to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties, 
including when those rights and responsibilities come into existence. 
Before an arbitrator can construe the terms of a contract, however, the 
rights and responsibilities must have already come into existence, that is, 
when the contract is formed. Justice Thomas emphasized that 
purposes of determining arbitrability, when a contract is formed can be as 
critical as whether 85  
Justice Thomas also -
inclusive arbitration clause in the CBA covered the issue of when the 
contract was formed. He noted that 
that this theory of the ratification dispute s arbitrability fails if the CBA 
was not formed at the time the unions engaged in the acts that gave rise to 
86 In this way, the majority rejected the Ninth 
December 
                                                          
in original)). 
80.   See id. ratification vote is not 
usually a requirement for proper formation of a CBA, it was in the instant case because 
both Local 287 and Granite Rock agreed that a ratification vote was a prerequisite).  
81.   See id. at 2854 (explaining that Granite Rock first asked the District Court to 
remedy the breach by enjoining the strike). 
82.   Id.  
83.   See id. at 2856 57 
a way to resolve those disputes but only those disputes that the parties have agreed 
 
84.   See id. at 2859 & n.8 (analogizing the approach courts take in determining 
arbitrability in labor cases to the role of courts in cases governed by the Federal 
Arbitration Act
 
85.   Id. at 2860 (emphasis in original). 
86.   Id. at 2861. 
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date with the arbitrability of the strike claims.87  
Indeed, because the union began its strike on July 6th, but may not have 
ratified the agreement and consequently had not formed a contract until 
August 22nd, there was not necessarily a CBA for the July no-strike 
dispute to arise under. 88 
Court found that issues of formation did not so obviously fall under the 
89  
Because the Court framed the issue as one of contract formation, the 
[December] CBA was not [necessarily] formed at the time the unions 
90 
Finally, Justice Thomas noted that the Ninth Circuit should have read the 
 to determine whether 
the clause covered the formation-date dispute, rather than merely focusing 
on whether the no-
clause.91 In essence, the agreement itself did not contemplate that 
arbitration would answer all issues instead, the arbitration clause, like the 
no-strike clause, were part of the contractual scheme. Justice Thomas 
concluded that Granite Rock did not consent to arbitration merely because 
it sued under the contract that contained the arbitration clause.92  
Th
dispute centered on when, not whether, Local 287 ratified the new 
collective bargaining agreement.93 The Court dispelled Local 287 and the 
he Court had previously set 
forth in arbitrability cases.94 Instead, the Court focused on consent or 
                                                          
87.   See id. at 2861 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit for failing to observe that if, as 
Local 287 contended, the December CBA was ratified in August rather than July, the 
no-
and the matter would not be arbitrable).  
88.   Id. 
89.   See id. at 2862 (couching  conclusion 
a dispute as to the ratification date of the same agreement). 
90.   See id. at 2861 (mentioning the additional procedural requirement for 
mediation prior to arbitration under the December CBA). 
91.   Id. at 2862. 
92.   Id. at 2862 63.  
93.   See id. at 2856. 
94.   
Id. at 2857 (quoting 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)). 
courts must treat the arbitration clause as severable from the contr
challenges the validity of the arbitration clause or the formation of the contract. Id. at 
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rather, the lack thereof.95 Indeed, Justice Thomas ultimately concluded that 
a court [formation-date] disagreement
287 disputed the formation of the December CBA, and thus the arbitration 
clause.96 In short, the Court ruled the presumption in favor of arbitrability 
disputes . . . that the parties have agreed to submit[.] 97 Policy concerns, 
98 
In dicta, the Court explained, regardless of whether the dispute was one 
 
because the ratification date went 
July strike.99 Second, even if the CBA could be interpreted to cover the 
formation dispute, the arbi
indicated that use of the arbitration machinery was expressly limited to 
those disputes between Granite Rock and Local 287 that were affirmatively 
addressed in the other provisions of the CBA.100  
The Court also addressed Local 287 101 Local 
287 argued that because the parties executed a document in December 2004 
that made the CBA effective as of the previous May; 
clause was therefore effective during the July strike period.102 However, 
because Local 287 did not raise this argument in the Court of Appeals, the 
majority found that the argument had been waived.103   
                                                          
2857 (citations omitted). 
95.   See id. at 2856 & n.4, 2857 & n.6 (observing that the parties agreed that given 
the facts of their case, a valid formation of the contract required a union ratification 
vote). 
96.   Id. at 2858.  
97.   Id. at 2859 (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 
943 (1995)) (alteration in original).  
98.   Id. 
99.   See id. at 2862 (distinguishing that th
activity is linked to whether the December CBA had been ratified at the point in the 
time when the complained-of strike actually occurred). 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. at 2861. 
102.  See id. (noting that Local 287 did not argue that the no-strike clause was 
retroactive, however Local 287 did propose the retroactivity of the arbitration clause 
[Ninth 
). 
103.  See id. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Stevens, agreed that a tortious 
Id. at 2866 
view that Local 287 had waived its retroactivity argument. See id. at 2868 69. The 
dispute, in her opinion, should be decided by an arbitrator. Id. at 2868. As to the waiver 
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Concluding its discussion of the first issue, the Court refused to accept 
Local 287 and the finding of the lower court that Granite 
Rock impliedly consented to arbitration by bringing 
no-strike 104 
attempt to seek an injunction of the strike in order to arbitrate the grievance 
did not result in its consent to arbitrate the date at which the CBA became 
effective.105 
related to the strike from the December 
Granite Rock had always maintained was beyond the reach of the CBA.106  
2.  The Federal Tort Claim Issue 
the CBA.107 Granite Rock contended that the Court should reject the 
majority view of the Courts of Appeals on the issue, because to accept their 
industrial peace and economic stability through judicial enforcement of 
CBAs, [as well as] with [the] 
common law of labor contracts is necessary to further [that] 108 In 
addition, Granite Rock maintained that a federal tort claim under Section 
r unavailable or 
109 
contention that failure to allow a federal tortious interference with contract 
claim against IBT under Section 301(a) would place Granite Rock in a 
wholly untenable position.110 
a more flexible light, and pointed out that, while Section 301(a) did create a 
body of federal law to deal with the enforcement of collective bargaining 
agreement issues, allowing Granite Rock to bring a federal tort claim under 
                                                          
make the agreement effective Id. at 2867. As a result, she argued 
that it did not matter whether the parties ratified the CBA in July or in August because 
it was already effective retroactively to May. Thus, in her view 
Id. 
104.  Id. at 2862 (majority opinion) (emphasis in original). 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. 
107.  See id. at 2864 (resting this conclusion on the narrow question that the Court 
felt was before it whether Granite Rock should have augmented remedial avenues 
besides those already available).  
108.  Id. at 2863 64. 
109.  Id. at 2864.  
110.  See id. (characterizing an extension of Section 301(a) to tortious interference 
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this statute would create policy concerns that could upset the balance struck 
between unions and employers under federal labor statutes.111 The Court 
preferred to retain Section 301(a) common law 
contractual remedies and rather than extend its reach to tort claims.112  
Justice Thomas concluded that even if Section 301(a) did authorize the 
federal courts to create a common law claim for tortious interference of 
contract, it would be premature for the Court to decide the issue because 
Granite Rock had not shown that other remedies were unavailable.113 For 
instance, Granite Rock failed to show that state claims were insufficient to 
provide a remedy.114 Granite Rock also failed to show that breach of 
contract or administrative claims, such as those falling under an alter-ego 
or agency theory, against the IBT would fail on remand.115  
 
The Realpolitik of an Experienced Trial Court Judge 
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred with the 
majority that Granite Rock could not bring a federal tort claim under 
Section 301(a), but disagreed that the formation dispute was one for the 
courts, and not for an arbitrator, to resolve.116 While the majority framed 
the formation issue as based on when, not whether, the CBA became 
binding,117 
CBA neatly disposed of the formation dispute.118 
view, the CBA was retroactively effective at a date earlier than dates upon 
which both Granite Rock and Local 287 contended ratification occurred; 
                                                          
111.  See id. d union 
relations in the collective-
omitted)). 
112.  See id. -  
 federal common law to 
effectuate Section 301(a)). 
113.  See id. -law cause of 
action is based on assumptions about the adequacy of the avenues of relief that are at 
 
114.  Id. (espousing the other remedies still available to Granite Rock on remand and 
those that Granite Rock had already availed itself of). 
115.  Id. Justice Thomas noted that the agency or alter-ego claim against the 
 
Id. 
(Granite Rock Co.) 347 N.L.R.B. 339, 340 n.6 (2006)). 
116.  See id. at 2866 67 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(observing that there was no such dispute as to formation because both Granite Rock 
and Local 287 had expressly made the December CBA retroactive to May 1, 2004). 
117.  See id. at 2860 (majority opinion). 
118.  See id. at 2868 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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119 Lastly, Justice argument 
that Local 287 had waived its ability to raise the express retroactivity in the 
formation date.120 
had not raised the issue in either the district court or the court of appeals, 
[the Court] 121   
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The Supreme Court missed an opportunity to settle the true scope of 
Section 301(a). Instead, the Court summarily pronounced any consideration 
of the possible to
would be premature to recognize the federal common law tort Granite Rock 
requests in this case even assuming that [Section] 301(a) authorizes us to 
122 While this Delphic statement will not change how the majority of 
123 it will lend 
                                                          
119.  Id.  
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. 
122. Id. at 2864 (majority opinion). 
123.  See Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d 1169, 1174 75, 1175 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (referring 
to a string of opinions from the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits that all refused to hold a federal tort claim as cognizable under 
Section 301(a)), of 
Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010). 
A decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Court in 1981, Wilkes-Barre 
Publishing Co., is the only decision holding that a tortious interference of contract 
claim may arise under Section 301(a). See Wilkes-  Co. v. Newspaper 
Guild of Wilkes-Barre, Local 120, 647 F.2d 372, 380 82 (3d Cir. 1981). Wilkes-Barre 
-
relevant part, that the International Guild, the newspaper trade unions, the Wilkes-Barre 
Council of Newspaper Unions, and eight other individual defendants had tortiously 
induced a breach of a collective bargaining agreement under Section 301(a). Id. at 374. 
Wilkes-Barre alleged that, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, members 
of the Local Guild created a new publication called the  while on strike. 
Id. 
unions and individuals involved in the  enterprise tortiously interfered 
Id. at 376 (emphasis in original). While the district court dismissed 
the federal tort cause of action for failure to state a claim, the Third Circuit reversed, 
holding that a claim for tortious interference of contract was cognizable under Section 
301(a). Id. reaches not only suits on labor 
Id. at 380. 
Furthermore, the court found its conclusion consiste
Section 301(a) jurisprudence. In his opinion, Judge Gibbons noted that Supreme Court 
of collective bargaining agreements are governed by fe Id. More telling, 
bargaining arena. The Wilkes-Barre court was less concerned with whether the remedy 
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uncertainty to the issue given Third Circuit precedent124 and the lack of 
Congressional action in clarifying the statute. 
The Court, in its attempt to preserve the careful calibration that 
statutes strike between employer and union relations in the collective-
125 may actually have unwittingly achieved the opposite 
effect. The C
approach to the arbitrability issue, an approach that highlighted her 
adherence to the landmark principles of the Steelworkers Trilogy and one 
that more elegantly dealt with the dispute by finding it to be a classic 
126  
The consistent theme in Supreme Court precedent addressing Section 
301(a) is federal uniformity within the collective bargaining sphere. 
However convenient a ruling on this issue would have been, by failing to 
make a definitive decision about whether a federal tort claim is cognizable 
under Section 301(a), the Court strayed from its commitment to stability.   
The Ninth Circuit was also hesitant to recognize such a claim, choosing 
not to intrude into the legislative domain regarding the scope of Section 
301(a). That circuit maintained that it was not the duty of the courts, but of 
Congress to clarify Section 127 Nonetheless, there is no 
evidence that Congress intends to clarify the Act, especially given the 
litany of pressing domestic128 and international concerns.129 The Ninth 
Section 
t the issue back to the circuits 
                                                          
was labeled as one of contract or one of tort; rather, it 
tortious interference with a collective bargaining agreement is not a matter governed by 
federal law would leave open the possibility of lack of uniformity in scope of 
obligation which the [Supreme] Court in Lucas Flour sought Id. at 381. 
Lastly, the Third Circuit 
originates from federal common law governing labor agreements. Id.  
124.  See Wilkes-Barre, 647 F.2d at 381 82 (holding that a tortious interference of 
contract claim can arise under Section 301(a) of the LMRA).  
125.  Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2864. 
126.  Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2867 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
127.  
gap  ign is for Congress and not for us to 
Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008), 
nom. f Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010). 
128.  As of this writing, domestic concerns facing Congress include how to deal with 
a struggling economy, healthcare, and the aftermath of the biggest oil spill in United 
States history. 
129.  Although there are always pressing international concerns, Congress has had its 
hands full with how to deal with the war on terror. 
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unresolved.  
As 2010 marks the 50th anniversary of the Steelworkers Trilogy,130 it 
principles similar to those set forth in 1960. Her language immediately 
brings to mind the principle of deference to arbitration. She invokes United 
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. early in her 
be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration 
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted 
131 In addition, 
ave a 
presumption in favor of arbitrability.132 
Following the Steelworkers Trilogy 
of, and deference to, arbitration became dramatically positive.133 The 
principle of deference rang especially true with Justice Sotomayor. By 
finding that the ratification dispute arose under the arbitration clause of the 
CBA and deferring to the arbitrator, Justice Sotomayor sent a clear signal 
to the majority that the Court should reaffirm an expansive scope of arbitral 
authority, rather than pointlessly complicate an already convoluted subject 
area.  
In addition, by arguing that an arbitrator should resolve the questions 
surrounding the July strike because they are precisely the sort of questions 
that arbitrators are called upon to resolve every day, Justice Sotomayor 
echoed another principle set forth in the Trilogy: the emphasis of stability 
in the collective bargaining process over drafting perfection. In Warrior & 
Gulf
peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration of grievances in the 
134 While Justice Douglas understood that 
a collective bargaining agreement could not hope to outline all disputes that 
may arise between parties, he a
it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen 
                                                          
130.  See cases cited supra note 1. 
131.  Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2866 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part) (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 83 (1960).  
132.  Id. 
133.  William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards Thirty 
Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco, 64 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 464, 465 67 (1984) Steelworkers Trilogy established the proposition 
that substantial deference was to be given to arbitration awards deference more 
considerable than that enjoyed by the Labor Board and by the trial courts 
 
134.  Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.  
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135 
Justice Sotomayor focused on the retroactive effect of the December 
CBA  when as opposed to whether 
formation occurred.136 She wrote that:  
When it comes to answering the arbitrability question, it is 
entirely irrelevant whether Local 287 ratified the CBA in August . 
which 
postdates May 1 which is all 
the arbitration provision requires to make a dispute referable to an 
arbitrator.137   
retroactivity argument are somewhat porous, because such arguments may 
be deeme
raise them in a timely fashion.138 Despite this flaw, she recognized that 
adherence to some of the salient principles of the Trilogy carry greater 
weight in this case than blind commitment to procedure. 
In failing to rule definitively on the tort dimension, the Court not only 
lost an opportunity to clarify a circuit split, albeit a lopsided one, but also 
continued to muddy the water surrounding the precise scope of Section 
301(a). As a result, by 
strike between employer and union relations in the collective bargaining 
arena[,] 139 the Court, ironically, made this balance more difficult to 
maintain. 
The Steelworkers Trilogy provided the federal judiciary with principles 
that became the bedrock of labor arbitration jurisprudence. One of these 
principles is for courts to resolve any doubts as to whether an arbitration 
clause covers a particular dispute in favor of arbitrability.140 Another 
principle is for courts to recognize that drafters of collective bargaining 
agreements often cannot anticipate every situation that might lend itself to 
                                                          
135.  Id.  
136. See Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2867 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) 
 
137.  Id. (alteration in original). 
138.  Id. at 2868.  
139.  Id. at 2864. 
140.  See Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582 83 (providing that a matter should not be 
. 
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arbitration.141 There is an underlying theme in these principles: unions, 
employers, and the federal courts should all be participants in a culture that 
promotes arbitration of disputes. And as an ultimate goal, the principles 
promote federal uniformity and certainty within the collective bargaining 
sphere. 
The Supreme Court in Granite Rock strayed from its ultimate goal. 
the collective-bargaining process federal labor laws were designed to 
142 and that Third Circuit precedent strays from the other courts in 
that it recognizes tortious interference for this type of conduct,143 the Court 
left the tortious interference question unanswered for the sake of judicial 
restraint. Because the Court found it premature to clarify a sixty-three year 
old law, fifty years after the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court has left the 
federal courts with uncertainty.  
At the same moment, the Court failed to recognize that CBAs are more 
than just contracts. CBAs are generalized code[s] to govern a myriad of 
cases which . . . draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. 144 Parties to a CBA 
thus do not merely contract between themselves; they agree to be 
participants in a system that promotes arbitration.  
Unlike the majority, Justice Sotomayor takes a more traditional 
approach. In her opinion, when both parties signed the CBA, which 
essentially predated the July strike, they both agreed to arbitrate any issues 
that might arise out of their agreement no matter how convoluted the 
facts may be. In doing so, she retains the values that the Steelworkers 
Trilogy presents: that no draftsman could have anticipated this dispute and 
that any doubts to arbitration should be resolved in favor of arbitrability. 
Because her opinion is a minority position, the core values of the 
Steelworkers Trilogy do not prevail, and judicial uncertainty remains.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Over the past twenty-three years, both the Ninth Circuit,145 explicitly, 
                                                          
141.  Cf. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 
. 
142.  Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2865.  
143.  Cf. id. 
 
144.  Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578. 
145.  See Local 287 IV, 546 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that assertions 
by Granite Rock that the precedent from other circuit courts refusing to hold a federal 
common law of torts under Section 301(a) is distinguishable based on the close 
in part sub nom. f Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).  
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and the Eleventh Circuit,146 impliedly, have fallen in line with the majority 
of their sister circuits and away from the sole contrary Third Circuit 
Wilkes-Barre Publishing decision. With the congruence of all of the other 
circuits denying tort claims in the Section 301(a) context, the Supreme 
tort claim in the Section 301(a) context at this time was not unexpected. 
Such quick treatment is also puzzling, not because the Court declined to 
recognize an expansion of Section 301(a) but because it used such casual 
upset the balance Section 301(a) has maintained 
between unions and employers, the Court went no further apparently 
rd 
Section 
scope. While the Court may have found it premature given the direction 
and general agreement among the circuits, concluding its discussion on the 
issue in this way left Section 301(a
have wanted.   
This issue of whether a tortious interference of contract claim has a place 
in federal common law will continue to arise in collective bargaining 
disputes similar to the one that occurred between Granite Rock and IBT, as 
Nonetheless, an in depth discussion of whether a tortious interference of 
contract claim is cognizable under Section 301(a) will be reserved for 
another day.147 
                                                          
146.  Cf. Xaros v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 820 F.2d 1176, 1181 (11th Cir. 1987) 
the agreement for the purposes of a Section 301(a) action in federal court). 
147.  Similar to the paucity of courts favoring a federal tort claim, the number of 
articles in support of this expansion of Section 301(a) is also lacking. An extensive 
search on Lexis found one article proposing a tortious interference of contract claim to 
be cognizable under Section 301(a). One article appeared to support that claim given its 
Cf. Elizabeth Z. Ysrael, Note, Federal 
Common Law of Labor Contracts:  Recognizing A Federal Claim of Tortious 
Interference, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1051, 1051 52 (1986) (arguing that the text and 
legislative history of Section 301(a) indicate that Congress only envisioned 
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements between the parties to the agreement, 
rather than the creation of rights against non-parties). 
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PRIVATE ORDERING OF EMPLOYEE PRIVACY: 
PROTECTING EMPLOYEES  EXPECTATIONS OF 
PRIVACY WITH IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT 
RIGHTS 
LINDSAY NOYCE* 
With the growth of technology in the workplace, employee privacy is an 
increasingly significant legal issue. Employees, perhaps irrationally, 
often overestimate the amount of privacy they should expect in 
technological communication.  A United States Supreme Court decision 
in June 2010, City of Ontario v. Quon, highlights the importance of 
privacy in the workplace and emplo  expectations. 
Although various constitutional, tort, and statutory causes of action 
protect employee privacy, each theory has limitations and ultimately 
fails to protect some reasonable expectation of privacy. Some courts 
have recognized an implied-in-fact contract theory in the context of 
employment law, often to protect job security. The implied-in-fact 
contract theory may be a valuable avenue for the protection of 
employee privacy. A court applying an implied-in-fact contract theory 
to protect employee privacy will determine whether the employer and 
employee reached an enforceable agreement, albeit an implied 
expe
reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace, the implied-in-fact 
contract theory may be available as an alternative. To align employer 
and employee expectations, employers should consider this potential 
cause of action when establishing polices and practices bearing on 
employee privacy issues.                                              
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Technology continues to be an increasingly important part of American 
life inside and outside the workplace. E-mail is often the preferred form of 
communication between co-workers. In daily interactions, text messaging 
has taken over as a primary form of quick communication. Anyone familiar 
with technological communication may assume some inherent sense of 
privacy associated with these activities. Even when communicating in fora 
accessible by the public, such as social networking sites, employees often 
do not consider that their employers and co-workers can readily gain access 
to this information. If an employee working entirely from home maintains a 
social networking page on which her privacy preferences permit only 
certain people to view her information, is it reasonable for the employee to 
expect her information will be kept private from her employer and co-
workers that do not have access to her information? Certainly, the 
employee should not expect privacy with respect to those to whom the 
employee has granted permission to view her networking page. There is an 
innate tension between an employee intentionally making information 
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public and feeling that her information is private. Yet, with the expansion 
of social networking, growing use of technology in the workplace, and 
feeble boundari
is a pressing legal issue. A recent United States Supreme Court case, City 
of Ontario v. Quon,1 brought employee privacy issues to the forefront of 
current legal discourse.  
Whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a 
common theme in causes of action protecting employee privacy. When an 
employee accesses a password-protected e-mail account or sends a text 
message on a cell phone, even a company-issued phone, it is 
understandable that the employee instinctively feels a sense of privacy in 
the content of the communication.2 But is it reasonable for an employee to 
expect privacy in the contents of e-mails sent while at work? Is it 
reasonable to expect privacy if the employee is on company time but off 
the work premises? Or in text messages sent using a company phone? Is it 
reasonable for an employee to expect privacy in messages, materials, or 
conversations that refer to off-
life? The circumstances of the workplace and the actions taken by the 
reasonable.3 When an employee does have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and the employer breaches that expectation, the employee might 
assert breach of an implied contractual right to privacy. Where 
constitutional, tort, and statutory causes of action fail to provide a remedy 
privacy, the implied-in-fact contract might fill the gaps left by these other 
causes of action.4  This breach of contract claim may be asserted 
irrespective of any adverse employment action being taken against the 
employee.                 
Whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy is 
important in several causes of action that an employee may assert against 
                                                          
1.   130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
2.   But cf. id. at 2629 30 (hesitating to declare that employees have reasonable 
expectations of privacy vis-à-vis employer-provided technological equipment, because 
courts must have knowledge and experience to weigh such expectations and cell 
phones and text messages are too recent of a development to predict the future 
consequences of a broad holding). 
3.   Cf. id. (noting that an employee s expectation of privacy is also influenced by 
 
4.   See Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private 
Lives, 66 LA. L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2006) (suggesting that an implied contract right to 
privacy might alleviate the potential unfair practice of employers offering privacy 
rights through policy statements but then ignoring such policies when the employer 
finds it convenient to do so). 
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an employer, when the employee claims a protectable privacy interest.5 
Those causes of action, particularly the implied-in-fact contract, and the 
importance of the employe
in the subsequent parts of this Article. Part II will explore the development 
of privacy issues in the workplace and the interaction of employee privacy 
rights with employment at-will.6 Part III will discuss the implied-in-fact 
employment contract as well as how such a contract may encompass 
privacy rights and create protectable employee privacy interests.7 Part III 
will also look at the related doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing that some courts have held is implicit in all employment 
contracts, including employment at-will contracts, and how this covenant 
might protect employee privacy.8 Part IV will explore the Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights of public sector employees, including the recent 
United States Supreme Court case City of Ontario v. Quon, and will 
suggest how the circumstances in Quon could support a successful claim 
for breach of an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy in many states.9 
Finally, Part V will summarize the various sources of privacy rights in the 
employment context and discuss the importance of private ordering.10  
II.  CREATING PRIVACY RIGHTS IN AN AT-WILL WORKPLACE 
With the growing use of technology in the workplace, employee privacy 
rights are an important legal concern for employers as well as employees.  
Before exploring any particular causes of action for employee privacy, it is 
necessary to understand how privacy fits within the law generally and how 
it specifically fits in the employment relationship. Privacy has become a 
common legal issue in various areas of the law, including employment 
law.11 The evolution of a right to privacy began with an 1890 article by 
                                                          
5.   See generally Robert Sprague, Orwell was an Optimist: The Evolution of 
Privacy in the United States and its De-Evolution for American Employees, 42 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 83 (2008) (exploring the difficulties and development of the legal 
right to privacy as it developed in the United States). 
6.   See infra Part II (discussing both the common law and statutory exceptions to 
the at-will employment doctrine).  
7.   See infra Part III.A B.1 (analyzing state court opinions that have sustained 
implied contracts as an exception to at-will employment). 
8.   See infra Part III.B.1 2 (noticing the subtle interplay between implied contracts 
and implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing). 
9.   See infra Part IV (arguing that in some jurisdictions the employee in City of 
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) might have prevailed in protecting his privacy 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
10.   See infra Part V (concluding that when employees have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, causes of action sounding in contract might afford them the 
most flexible legal protection). 
11.   See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
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Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, who urged courts to recognize a right 
to privacy that would protect citizens from intrusions by the press.12  
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.13 Since then, 
privacy has evolved and expanded in the United States, and legal privacy 
rights exist in common law, constitutional law, and statutes.14 Under each 
source of privacy protection, the proponent of the protection must have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.15 An employee asserting a legal right to 
privacy, regardless of the source of that right, must demonstrate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.16   
are 
legitimate business interests. Courts balance these competing interests 
against one another to determine whether an employer violation of an 
unreasonable under the circumstances.17 Academic literature has 
recognize
employment at-will, the default in employment contracts.18 To understand 
                                                          
REV. 193, 195 (1890) (
; See also Selmi, supra 
note 4, at 1038
employment law, in part, because lifetime employment historically facilitated trust but 
mployment environment); James A. 
Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance:  Employer Regulation of Off-Duty Behavior, 
43 GA. L. REV. 133, 137 (2008) (arguing the demand for employers to supply non-
work-related benefits, such as health care benefits, has inv
activities are costing the employer money).      
12.   See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 11 indeed of 
the necessity of some such protection, there can, it is believed, be no doubt. The press 
 
13.   See id. 
the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life the right to be let alone  
14.   See Sprague, supra note 5, at 93 109 (tracing the development of privacy rights 
in the United States).  
15.   See id. at 93 (noting that protecting the home and a reasonable expectation of 
privacy invaded by unreasonable intrusion are common themes in privacy causes of 
action). 
16.   See id. 
claim, but the starting question 
is still whether the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy).   
17.   See id. at 111 13 (discussing how other areas of law may lead some employers 
to intrude too far into monitoring employees in order to detect and stop behavior that 
may subject employers to liability). 
18.   See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 4, Another curious aspect of the privacy 
literature . . . is that . . . it frequently ignores workplace issues . . . [because] how can an 
employee assert a right to privacy when he or she has so few rights to begin with?  
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how privacy issues fit into employment law, it is essential to examine the 
employment at-will doctrine and its exceptions. 
A.  Employment At-Will and Its Exceptions   
The increasing willingness of courts to acknowledge exceptions to 
employment at-will, including the implied-in-fact contract for job security, 
demonstrates that courts are likely to accept the implied-in-fact contract as 
a theory of protecting employee privacy. An implied-in-fact contract for 
employee privacy is an exception to employment at-will for an employee 
reasonable expectation of privacy. It is a well-settled rule of law that, 
absent an express employment contract to the contrary, the employment at-
will doctrine is the default rule in the vast majority of United States 
jurisdictions.19 The employment at- rty may 
terminate the service, for any cause, good or bad, or without cause, and the 
20 The Payne court, often cited for its 
articulation of the at-will rule,21 also held that the cause of termination 
could be morally wrong without attachment of legal liability.22 Although 
                                                          
19.   See Matthew W. Finkin, Shoring up the Citadel (At-Will Employment), 24 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 
restatement on the law of employment as construing the at-will employment rule as a 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
§ 3.01 cmt. a (Discussion Draft 2006))); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Response to Working 
Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Putting the 
Restatement in its Place, 13 EMPL. RTS. & EMP. POL Y J. 143, 154 (2009) (suggesting it 
would be a waste of political capital for advocates of reform to debate whether 
employment at-will is in fact the default rule). But see Montana Wrongful Discharge 
From Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (2009) (abrogating the at-
will employment doctrine by making it a wrongful discharge for an employer to 
terminate an employee without good cause, provided that the employee has completed 
.   
20.   See Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 517 19 (1884) (preferring that 
individual choice regarding whether to work govern the relationship between employer 
and employee, rather than a rule imposed by law), overruled in part, Hutton v. Watters, 
179 S.W. 134 (1915); see also Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will:  The 
Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 653 54 (2000) (defining 
employment at-will as allowing either party to terminate the relationship for any 
reason, without liability).    
21.   See, e.g., Ballam, supra note 20, at 687 (calling the Payne 
-will rule); Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing 
Human Capital: Toward a New Foundation for Employment Termination Law, 27 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 112 n.1 (2006) (citing Payne for the point that 
employers have an unrestricted right to terminate employees who do not have an  
employment contract for a definite term); Nadjia Limani, Righting Wrongful 
Discharge: A Recommendation for the New York Judiciary to Adopt a Public Policy 
Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL Y & ETHICS J. 
309, 313 n.26 (2006) (relying on the Payne at-will 
employment doctrine).    
22.   See Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519 20 (explaining that a threat to discharge is not an 
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most American employees are employed at-will, there are numerous 
common law and statutory exceptions to the doctrine. In fact, a right to 
employee privacy might be characterized as an exception to the 
employment at-will rule.   
Despite employment at-will, common experience demonstrates that 
employers are not, in fact, empowered to terminate an employee for 
absolutely any reason. For example, an employer cannot lawfully terminate 
an employee because of the employe 23 But employees often 
overestimate their legal protections and believe an employer would be 
liable for terminating an employee out of personal animus.24 While it is 
arguably not a sound business practice,25 under employment at-will, 
personal dislike is a perfectly valid reason for terminating an employee.26 
Up against this framework, one might presume that an employer can 
conduct that an employer does not agree with, but the analysis is not so 
simple. The trend in employment law has been to invalidate the legality of 
terminations when there is no good cause.27 Exceptions to the pure 
employment at-will rule are numerous and include federal and state 
statutes, discharges in violation of public policy, and implied contracts.28 
                                                          
illegal act). 
23.   See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2006) (prohibiting employment 
discrimination on the basis of race, as well as color, sex, religion, and national origin).  
24.   See Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong are Employees About their Rights, and 
Why Does it Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 9 (2002) (discussing studies in which 
 of employees 
fire an employee based on personal dislike (citing Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, 
and Law: , 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
447, 456-67, 462 (1997)) ver eighty percent believed that it was illegal for an 
employer to fire an employee in order to hire another willing to do the same job for a 
Id.  
25.   See Erica Worth, In Defense of Targeted ERIPs: Understanding the Interaction 
of Life-Cycle Employment and Early Retirement Incentive Plans, 74 TEX. L. REV. 411, 
411, 415 (1995) (observing that, even in the context of worker productivity and old 
to ease olde
no matter how illegal such an act 
might be).         
26.   See Ballam, supra note 20, at 653 (recognizing that employers are able to 
terminate the employment relationship at their discretion). But cf. Alex Long, The 
Disconnect Between At-Will Employment and Tortious Interference with Business 
Relations: Rethinking Tortious Interference Claims in the Employment Context, 33 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 491, 491 92 (2001) (pointing out that although an employer may be able 
to terminate an employee out of simple dislike, a supervisor 
 
27.   See Ballam, supra note 20, at 687 (predicting an increasing abrogation of the 
at-will employment doctrine in the twenty-first century).    
28.   See Ann L. Rives, 
Discrimination Legislation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 555 (2006) (explaining that 
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The employment at-will rule applies only to the termination of the 
employment relationship, but an employee need not be discharged or 
experience any adverse employment action for the employee to assert a 
breach of an implied contractual right to privacy when the employer has 
such a 
scenario, it is not accurate to characterize an implied-in-fact contract right 
to privacy as an exception to the at-will rule, because this right may operate 
when an employer terminates an employee in conjunction with a breach of 
the employee  privacy rights, such a cause of action essentially acts as an 
exception to employment at-will.           
B.  Employee Privacy Protection as an Exception to Employment At-Will  
The growing concern over employee privacy rights has contributed to 
the erosion of the employment at-will doctrine.29 If an employer could 
terminate an employee for absolutely any reason, it is impossible to discern 
how an employee could successfully exercise any right to privacy. For 
instance, if an employee refuses to submit to a drug test or reveal a piece of 
information to her employer, the employer could simply terminate the 
employee, leaving her without legal recourse.30   
With regard to employee privacy, there are federal and state 
constitutional protections;31 statutory protections, such as off-duty conduct 
statutes prohibiting employers from discharging workers for certain 
conduct occurring outside of work premises;32 common law privacy and 
                                                          
four major public policy exceptions protect employees: refusal to commit illegal acts, 
exercise of statutory rights, whistleblower activities, and performance of civic duties).   
29.   See Ballam, supra note 20, at 685 87 (discussing how the traditional at-will 
doctrine has been tempered through abusive discharge torts, public policy limitations, 
prohibitions on fraudulent inducements, promissory estoppel, and increasing concern 
for privacy rights).   
30.   See id. at 686 87 (suggesting an employee lacks privacy rights if she is unable 
to make free choices because she is fearful of losing her job). 
31. See, e.g. that 
Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the 
 
32.   See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2009) (making it a
employment practice for an employer to terminate . . . any employee due to that 
employee s engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during 
Additionally, there are various federal 
statutes protecting specific areas of employee privacy. See Employee Polygraph 
Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (2006) (banning employer use of 
polygraph testing for pre-employment screening); Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (Supp. II 2008) (foreclosing the 
use of genetic information in employment decisions by employers); Americans with 
, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006) (prohibiting employers from 
inquiring about whether an applicant is disabled unless the inquiry is job-related and 
consistent with business necessity).  
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public policy tort protections;33 and contractual protections.34 It is possible 
to frame these as sources of employee privacy protection or as exceptions 
to employment at-will. The former is probably a more accurate 
characterization because an employer might infringe upon an employee
right to privacy absent termination.35 In the employment context, there are 
three basic kinds of intrusions that may give rise to an employee privacy 
claim: surveillance, such as monitoring e-mail and telephone 
communications; testing, such as drug testing or medical testing; and 
-duty conduct, such as political and 
recreational activities.36 Surveillance and testing involve more of an 
intrusion than inquiry into off-duty conduct, because while perhaps not 
off-duty conduct involves personal facts more 
than it involves private information.               
Privacy protections may be available to employees to defend against 
each of these intrusions. In the employment relationship, one possible 
source of employee privacy protection is an implied-in-fact contract.37 
the employee, the implied-in-fact contract may be available to the 
employee to assert protectable privacy rights. An implied right to privacy 
can protect against each type of intrusion, whether surveillance, testing, or 
inquiry into off-duty conduct, if the employee has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy based upon the circumstances of the workplace. The success of 
                                                          
33.   See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1992) 
discharge contrary to public policy). 
34.   Cf. TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW:  PRIVATE ORDERING AND 
ITS LIMITATIONS 301 (2007) (observing that parties can contractually agree to the extent 
which may be either 
express or implied).     
35.   
reasonable expectation of privacy, thereby violating the employe
regardless of any adverse employment action against the employee. The contract is 
breached by the intrusion of privacy rather than by terminating or disciplining the 
employee. See infra Part III (discussing causes of action based upon an implied 
contract right to privacy).    
36.   Case examples used in this Article will involve situations under each of these 
intrusions. See infra Part III.B-IV.A and accompanying text. 
37.   See Selmi, supra note 4, at 1043 (recognizing that, although privacy 
expectations are generally inconsistent with the employment relationship, an implied 
cies, written 
or implied, and then to turn around and ignore those policies when it is advantageous to 
do so. see also Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment 
Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 715 (1996) (cautioning that proponents of market 
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an alleged implied-in-fact contract right will depend heavily on the 
conduct creates and subsequently violates a  reasonable 
expectation of privacy.         
III.  IMPLIED-IN-FACT EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS:  A LESSER KNOWN 
VEHICLE FOR ENFORCING PRIVACY RIGHTS 
 While it is rare for parties to an employment relationship to bargain out 
of the at-will paradigm, the default rule allows for this opportunity.38  The 
terms of an employment contract are those to which the parties agree, and 
as with other types of contracts, employment contracts may contain implied 
terms.39 According to a 2007 survey, forty-five states recognize the implied 
contract as a common law exception to the employment at-will rule.40  
Differences in the law in this area exist because common law causes of 
action arising under state law differ from state to state. In some states, 
implied-in-fact contract theories can establish a right to job security.41 The 
1981 California case, ,42 is regarded as the 
seminal employment law case recognizing an implied employment 
contract.43   
A.  Implied-in-Fact Contracts for Job Security  
In Pugh, the issue was whether the plaintiff, a long term and loyal 
employee of the company, had an implied contractual right to for cause 
                                                          
38.   See Matthew W. Finkin et al., Proceeding, Working Group on Chapter 2 of the 
Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts: Termination, 13 
EMPL. RTS. & EMP. POL Y J. 93, 110 (2009) (suggesting that the at-will default is likely 
to last because little negotiation occurs at the outset of most employment relationships, 
many workers do not understand or are not aware of the default rule, and there is often 
unequal bargaining power between the parties).  
39.   See id. at 114-15 (discussing the proposed text of a RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
EMPLOYMENT LAW). 
40.   See Sonne, supra note 11, at 160 (noting that common law exceptions to 
employment at-will demonstrate a policy toward modifying the default rule for 
). 
41.   See id. at 159 160 (discussing how many states rely on implied contracts, 
including those found in employer handbooks and manuals and oral representations, to 
limit the at-will doctrine). 
42.   171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981), disapproved of by 
Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000). 
43.   See, e.g., Finkin et al., supra note 38, at 114 15 (illustrating, through Pugh, the 
factors courts consider in determining whether an implied employment contract exists); 
Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 358 (2008) (noting that the California courts first 
addressed the implied employment contract issue four months prior to the Pugh 
decision in Cleary v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980) but that 
Pugh  
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termination.44 The court laid out various factors to ascertain whether an 
implied-in-fact employment contract existed: payment of independent 
consideration; the personnel policies and practices of the company; the 
employer; and industry practice.45  Whether an implied-in-fact employment 
contract exists is a fact-specific analysis that requires considering the 
totality of the circumstances.46 
Pugh court held that the employee had established a 
prima facie case that his employer breached an implied employment 
promotions received; lack of criticism; oral assurances; and employer 
policies.47 In other words, based on their implied-in-fact contract, the 
employer could only discharge Pugh if the employer had good cause.48        
Courts and commentators have recognized that the concept espoused by 
the court in Pugh
continued employment correctly applies general contract principles to the 
employment context.49 Allowing implied-in-fact contract terms in 
                                                          
44.   See Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918 920 (explaining that 
ladder from dishwasher to vice president  
45.   See id. at 925 26 (holding independent consideration consideration other than 
to be but one factor of many 
to consider in the analysis).   
46.   See Foley v. Interactive 
see also Dupree v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 956 F.2d 219, 222 (10th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that the 
inquiry regarding whether an implied contract right exists is normally a factual one); 
Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 857 P.2d 776, 780 (N.M. 1993) (examining written 
representations such as employee handbooks, oral representations, party conduct, and 
the combination of representations and conduct).     
47.   See Pugh, 171 Cal. Rtpr. at 329 (remanding with the instruction that the 
employer had the burden of proving Pugh was terminated for cause); see also Pugh v. 
 (Pugh II), 250 Cal. Rptr. 195, 195, 214 (Ct. App. 1988) (affirming 
 
48.   See 171 Cal. Rptr. at 926
employee occupies a sensitive managerial or confidential position, the employer must 
of necessity be allowed substantial scope for the exercise of subjective judgment.  
49.   See Foley
 
to the general contract principle that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of 
CALAMARI & PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 4-3 (2d ed. 1977))); 
Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924 25 (noting that requiring consideration other than 
continued employment is inconsistent with the general rule for contract formation that 
courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration (citing CALAMARI & PERILLO, 
CONTRACTS § 4-3 (2d ed. 1977))). See also Eales v. Tanana Valley Med.-Surgical Grp., 
663 P.2d 958, 960 (Alaska 1983) (finding the independent consideration requirement 
mutuality of obligation with respect to contracts formed by an exchange of a promise 
for performance. , Fineman, supra note 43, at 362 (explaining that Pugh and Foley 
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employment contracts will not negate the at-will rule; implied contract 
rights arise only when it appears from the circumstances that the parties 
intended to be contractually bound to implied contract terms.50 In practice, 
courts differ in their degree of acceptance of implied-in-fact employment 
contract terms.51 Some courts formalistically require offer, acceptance, and 
consideration, while other courts adopt a more fact-specific approach 
Appeals, applying Colorado law, rejected the argument that an employee 
can aggregate employer-issued documents into a legally binding contract 
without showing the elements of a contract were met as to each 
document.52 In contrast, some courts have held that implied contracts are 
53 
Consequently, the jurisdiction will determine whether the emp
reasonable expectations will be sufficient to recognize and enforce an 
implied-in-fact contract or whether the exchange must formally meet all of 
the elements of a contract.        
 B. Potential for Implied-in-Fact Contracts Protecting Employee Privacy   
Where employer actions and representations create reasonable 
expectations of employee privacy, jurisdictions that recognize an implied-
in-fact employment contract would acknowledge an implied contract right 
to privacy because that right is negotiable and can be altered by contract.54 
                                                          
applied general contract principles to the employment relationship).   
50.   See Foley -in-
fact contract terms does not nullify the at-will rule, it [sic] merely treats such contracts 
 
51.   See Dupree
Ball v. Ark. Dep't of Cmty. Punishment, 10 S.W.3d 873, 
876 (Ark. 2000) (requiring a manual or handbook to contain an express agreement to 
be sufficient to invoke the exception for an implied-in-fact employment contract); 
Adams v. Pre Finish Metals, Inc., No. WD-96-039, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2053, *12
13 (Ct. App. May 16, 1997) (holding that handbooks and manuals will rarely be 
sufficient to create an implied-in-fact contract right if the employee could not otherwise 
establish a promissory estoppel claim based on the same facts).   
52.   See Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 1464 65 (10th Cir. 1994) 
to 
constitute an acceptance). But see Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 
1257, 1268 n.10 (N.J. 1985) (holding that an employee need not rely on or even be 
aware of an employer policy in order to benefit from it and for it to create an implied 
contract right).   
53.   See Fineman, supra note 43 Foley and Pugh] decisions also 
reasonable expectations . . . . This is potentially a different inquiry than whether the 
 
54.   See, e.g., Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 209 F.3d 1122, 1130 31 (9th 
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An implied-in-fact contract claim may arise when an employee has been 
terminated, and feels as though her privacy rights were infringed, because 
conduct and policies.55  claim can be framed as a narrow 
way of arguing that her at-will employment status was negated by an 
implied contract right to privacy.56 The employee, however, need not be 
terminated in order to assert a breach of contract claim for violating the 
contractual right to privacy in the content of text messages sent using a 
company issued phone. If the employer accesses the content of an 
employee could bring suit against the 
employer for breach of contract, even if the employer did not terminate the 
that will determine what actions constitute a breach, and the emplo
reasonable expectations will assist the court in ascertaining those terms.57  
An implied-in-fact contract for employee privacy may become 
enforceable when an employer makes representations to an employee that 
ectation of privacy in some 
aspect of her job or personal life and the employer breaches those 
representations. The employee may assert a cause of action for breach of an 
implied-in-
specific and definite the assurances given by the employer, the more likely 
it is a court will find that the assurances created an implied-in-fact contract 
right.   
In 1992, the Tenth Circuit considered whether an employee acquired 
privacy rights based on an implied contract under Oklahoma law.58 In 
Dupree v. United Parcel Service, two employees were terminated after 
                                                          
the deal struck between labor and employment because consent is usually a defense to a 
privacy action).  
55.   See, e.g., Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(stating that the employee had an asserted expectation to a right to privacy based on 
existing policies), disapproved of by 
2000). 
56.   In fact, a handful of employee-plaintiffs have advanced such an argument.  See, 
e.g., Vasey, 29 F.3d at 1464 (asserting an implied-in-fact contract right based, in part, 
on written representations that the employer would respect the dignity and privacy of 
employees); Dupree, 956 F.2d at 222 (advancing an implied-in-fact contract right 
based on oral and written statements that employees would be treated fairly); 
Greenrock v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 08-CV-404-TCK-TLW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
36360, *1 2 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 28, 2009) (claiming employer actions violated an 
implied-in-fact contract right that employees be treated with respect and dignity).   
57.   See Vasey, 29 F.3d a
concrete expectations of what those assurances meant). 
58.   Dupree, 956 F.2d at 219. 
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word of their romantic involvement spread around the office.59 The 
employees argued an implied contract voided their at-will status by 
creating certain privacy 
60 The Tenth 
Circuit enumerated the following five factors as critical to the evaluation of 
whether an implied contract exists under Oklahoma law: 
implied term, (b) longevity of employment, (c) [provisions in] employer 
statements and company policies and practices, and (e) promotions and 
61 The court acknowledged the inquiry is a factual one 
typically to be decided by a jury, but [i]f the alleged promises 
are nothing more than vague assurances . . . the issue can be decided as a 
62 The statement relied on by the employees in the 
was held by the court to be too vague, as a matter of law, to 
create an implied contract right to privacy.63  
Two years later, the Tenth Circuit approached a similar argument 
applying Colorado law in Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp.64 There, the 
employee worked for the employer for thirty-three years in various 
positions before being terminated in a round of layoffs.65 The court 
discussed the procedural requirements for an implied-in-fact employment 
contract, holding that the employee must prove the employer made an offer 
acceptance and consideration.66 Further, for a handbook or manual to 
                                                          
59.   Id. at 220 21.   
60.   Id. at 222.   
61.   Id. But cf. Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(discussing that some jurisdictions do not require separate consideration and consider 
such a requirement to be contrary to general contract principles against inquiring into 
the sufficiency of consideration), disapproved of by 
1089 (Cal. 2000). 
62.   Dupree, 956 F.2d at 222. 
63.   Id. 
64.   29 F.3d 1460, 1460 (10th Cir. 1994). 
65.   Id. at 1463. 
66.   See id. at 1464 (elaborating that to qualify as an offer, the employer must have 
manifested his willingness to enter into a bargain in such a way as to justify the 
employee in understanding that his assent to the bargain was invited by the employer 
and that the employee s assent would conclude the bargain. ). Dupree and Vasey were 
both decided by the Tenth Circuit, but in Dupree separate consideration was a 
prerequisite to finding an implied employment contract whereas in Vasey the 
employment contract. The difference is due to the Dupree court applying Oklahoma 
law and the Vasey court applying Colorado law. 
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constitute an offer under Colorado law, it must be communicated to the 
employee.67 The employee in Vasey relied on statements in company 
y due 
68 Like in Dupree, the 
indefinite to contractually bind the employer to an implied contract.69 
Another example of a court rejecting privacy assurances in an employee 
manual as too vague is the Oklahoma Supreme Court case Gilmore v. 
Enogex, Inc.70 Gilmore was terminated for refusing to submit to a random 
drug test conducted on all employees.71 Gilmore asserted breach of an 
implied contract right to privacy based on the employee manual which 
provided: [t]he Company will respect the privacy of its employees and 
will involve itself in their personal lives only to the extent that job 
performance or conflict of interest is involved or where assistance 
programs are made available on a voluntary participation basis. 72 The 
court recognized it is possible for an employee manual or handbook to give 
rise to an implied contract, but rejected that the cited provision was 
sufficient to implicate an implied contract right to privacy.73 While 
arguably more specific than the handbook statements in Dupree and Vasey, 
was insufficient because the employee handbook provision did not contain 
74           
                                                          
67.   See id. (
manual or policy indicates the employer did not intend the manual to operate as a 
contractual offer to the employee (citing Kuta v. Joint Dist. No. 50(J), 799 P.2d 379, 
382 (Colo. 1990))). But see Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1268 
n.10 (N.J. 1985) (observing that, with regard to employer policy manuals, 
neither ha[ve] to read it, know of its existence, or rely on it to benefit from its 
provisions any more than employees in a plant that is unionized have to read or rely on 
a collective-  
68.   Vasey, 29 F.3d at 1465. 
69.   Id. 
70.   878 P.2d 360 (Okla. 1994). 
71.   Id. at 362. 
72.   See id. at 368 (emphasis omitted) (looking to the text of the employee manual 
when [his] privacy concerns [were] balanced against 
Enogex legitimate interest in providing a drug-free workplace, his invasion-of-privacy 
claim fails to meet the law's highly-offensive-to-a-reasonable-person Id. at 366
67.  
73.   Id. at 368. 
74.   See id t, while willing to imply the existence of a contract 
and construe the terms, will not imply terms in the context of obscure or ambiguous 
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 Although these cases failed to hold that an implied contract right to 
privacy was created, each of them did accept that such a right may exist 
where there were more definite assurances of privacy protection.75 While 
the Tenth Circuit and the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not give any 
guidance as to what kind of statement would be sufficiently specific and 
definite to give rise to an implied contract right to privacy, these cases 
indicate some courts will require definite and specific promises of privacy 
from employers in order to find an implied contract right to privacy.76 A 
implied contract right to privacy 
can be framed as whether the totality of the circumstances suffices to create 
a reasonable expectation of privacy for the employee.77 For the employees 
in Dupree, Vasey, and Gilmore, the lack of specificity in the handbook 
made those provisions insufficient to create reasonable privacy 
expectations; it was not reasonable for these employees to rely on the 
handbook statements.78 In contrast to the higher threshold required under 
Oklahoma and Colorado law to find implied contract rights with regard to 
employee privacy,79 other courts have been more willing to invoke the 
doctrine.80  
1.  The Implied Contract Doctrine: Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp. 
Contrary to the cases described above, courts occasionally find that an 
implied contract right to privacy exists. Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp. has 
been cited as recognizing an implied contract for certain employee privacy 
protection.81 The Rulon-Miller 
                                                          
75.   E.g., id.  
76.   E.g., Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 1464 (10th Cir. 1994); 
Dupree v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 956 F.2d 219, 222 23 (10th Cir. 1992). 
77.   See, for example, Dupree, 956 F.2d at 222
understanding of employer-issued materials, as well as the representations of those 
materials for determining the existence of an implied contract. 
 78.  
analysis is similar to that of a Fourth Amendment analysis protecting citizens from 
unreasonable searches and seizures by government actors for public employees.  
79.   See id. (referencing the requirement of definite promises in order to create an 
enforceable contractual right (citing Krause v. Dresser Indus., Inc. 910 F.2d 674, 678 
(10th Cir. 1990))); see also Gilmore, 878 P.2d at 368 (explaining the requirements of 
an implied contract). 
80.   See Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 533 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(
contract right to privacy), disapproved of by 
(Cal. 2000). 
81.   See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 4, at 1043
See also Terry Morehead Dworkin, Leave Me Alone: Off-the-Job 
Employee Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 47, 78 (1997) (discussing 
that Rulon-Miller a breach of implied contract rights can be used in the 
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-
Miller worked her way through the ranks at IBM from receptionist to 
marketing manager.82 Before her final promotion, Rulon-Miller was in a 
relationship with an employee of an IBM competitor.83 Rulon-
superiors assured her the relationship was not an issue but later told her it 
, 84 A 
manager told her she had time to think it over, only to terminate her the 
following day.85   
Rulon-Miller, and the court, relied on an IBM memo issued to managers 
-the-job lives.86 
in the outside activities of an employee so long as the activities did not 
interfere with the work of the e 87 While IBM claimed 
-
 
the romantic relationship did not create a conflict of interest.88 The court 
 Rulon-Miller had a right to privacy in her 
89 In upholding that Rulon-Miller had an 
implied contract right to privacy, the court may have also relied on the 
                                                          
context of privacy rights); Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment 
Law: Reflecting or Refracting Market Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 43 n.79 (2001) 
(describing Rulon-Miller -known case that can be understood on contract 
n the private sector . . . workers rarely 
succeed in their claims unless they can show that the employer held out the expectation 
  
82.   Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 527 28. 
83.   Id. at 528.  
84.   Id. 
85.   Id. at 528 29.   
86.   See id. at 529 30 (stating that Rulon-Miller relied on company policies and, 
according to 
the individual, and the essence of this belief is a strict regard for his right to personal 
by the employee in Gilmore. Contra Gilmore v. Enogex, Inc., 878 P.2d 360, 368 (Okla. 
1994) (discussing that the employee actually received and had knowledge of the 
employee manual containing a statement that [t]he Company will respect the privacy 
of its employees and will involve itself in their personal lives only to the extent that job 
performance or conflict of interest is involved or where assistance programs are made 
available on a voluntary participation basis. ). Yet, the California court in Rulon-Miller 
was willing to accept that an implied contract right to privacy existed while the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court was not. This divergence 
acceptance and willingness to invoke the implied-in-fact contract to protect employee 
privacy. 
87.   208 Cal. Rptr. at 531. 
88.   Id.  
89.   Id. at 532.   
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assurances made by Rulon-
not a problem.90 In sum, the court found sufficient evidence to support that 
Rulon-Miller had a reasonable expectation of privacy based on the 
91 
The court clearly affirmed that company policy established that IBM had 
no interest in the off-duty conduct of an employee unless the conduct 
92 Assuming the Rulon-Miller court 
was in fact finding an implied contract right, the court primarily relied upon 
the written policy distributed to IBM managers.93 Conceivably, the court 
could have based this conclusion on the fact that Rulon-
knew of and permitted the relationship when promoting her.94 While a 
written policy will usually be stronger evidence of an implied contract 
right, an implied-in-fact contract takes all of the facts and circumstances 
into consideration in determining whether such a contract right exists.95   
                                                          
90.   See id. at 528 (recounting, in some detail, Rulon-
testimony informing her that he did not have any problem with [her rela
. 
91.   Framing this issue as one of reasonable reliance is similar to a promissory 
estoppel analysis, which allows an employee to recover based upon reasonable reliance 
and nonenforcement would be unjust.  See Estrin v. Natural Answers, Inc., 103 F. 
 (listing the elements of a promissory estoppel claim as: 
reasonable expectation 
that the offer will induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee; 3. which 
does induce actual and reasonable action or forbearance by the promisee; and 4. causes 
Nguyen 
v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 241 (4th Cir. 1995) (defining promissory estoppel as 
recovery even in the absence of consideration where reliance and change of 
position to the detriment of the promisee make it unconscionable not to enforce the 
promise. ) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); see also Coats v. 
Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., No. 78012, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1699, *22 (Ct. App. 
Apr. 12, 2001) (holding summary judgment to be appropriate on a promissory estoppel 
claim where the plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
92.   Rulon-
implicit in employment at-will contracts unnecessarily confusing. Perhaps in a 
jurisdiction that recognizes both causes of action, it is a legal distinction without a 
practical difference. Although it may be immaterial if the result is the same, it is 
unclear whether the court couched its analysis on a breach of an implied contract right 
derived from the circumstances or a breach of an implicit covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. See Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 532. 
93.   See id. 
 privacy). 
94.   See id. 
knowledge of the relationship).   
95.   See, e.g., Dupree v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 956 F.2d 219, 222 (10th Cir. 
1992) (acknowledging that the inquiry [regarding] whether an implied contract right 
 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 388 (Cal. 
1988)   
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While the Rulon-Miller court did not explicitly discuss how the facts met 
common law contract requirements, the exchange even absent the IBM 
policy can fit within the contract definition of a bargained-for exchange 
consisting of an offer, an acceptance, and consideration. Prior to receiving 
the promotion, Rulon-Miller was promised by her superior that her 
romantic relationship was not an issue.96 In offering her the promotion, it 
was an understood condition of her acceptance that she could continue the 
relationship. In accepting the promotion, Rulon-Miller was accepting, as a 
condition of her new employment contract, that she could stay in the 
relationship while working in her new position. Her continued service to 
the company in the promoted position constituted consideration.   
The facts can be analyzed to meet the elements of a contract, but crucial 
to finding an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy 
reasonable expectation. The assurances by her supervisors could induce a 
reasonable expectation that what the supervisors said was accurate, and the 
relationship was not a problem. Based on the representations by her 
superiors, Rulon-Miller did have a reasonable expectation that her 
relationship was not a matter of concern for her employer, and this 
reaso
implied contract right.97 Under the facts of the case, it does seem Rulon-
Miller was treated unfairly by her long time employer. The court indicated 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could provide Rulon-
Miller with relief because IBM failed to afford Rulon-Miller the protection 
of a company policy. Similarly, other decisions have invoked the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to protect employee privacy 
rights.98      
2. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Luedtke v. 
Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.  
The Rulon-Miller court made reference to the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing present in employment at-will contracts.99 The 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is another cause of action an 
                                                          
96.   Rulon-Miller testified her manager stated to 
Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 528.     
97.   See Rulon-Miller, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 528 29 & nn. 2 3 (recounting Rulon-
Mi
management). 
98.   See, e.g., Leudtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1223 24 
(Alaska 1992) (identifying a covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a qualification 
of the at-will employment rule). 
99.   See Dupree, 956 F.2d at 222 (discussing the Rulon-Miller 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 
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employee may assert against an employer to allege infringement of the 
right to privacy.100 Implied contract rights and the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing are similar but distinct theories. 
While forty-five states recognized the implied contract theory as of 2007, 
only nine recognized the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
theory.101 The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing affords the 
employee the protection of employer policies without requiring the court to 
find that such policies created an implied contract.102 Thus, an employee 
rights when a finding of such privacy rights is supported by an employer 
policy. As the name of the covenant indicates, courts often rely on fairness 
principles to determine if an employer violated the implied covenant of 
company policy.      
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. is one case in which a court held 
that the employer violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Luedtke was terminated after testing positive for marijuana.103 The 
Alaska Supreme Court held that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
is implied in all at-will employment contracts, and its breach is determined 
104 
, 
it did not hold that an implied contract right to privacy prohibited the 
employer from drug testing him. Rather, the court held that the employer 
did not treat Luedtke fairly, noting that he was tested for drugs without 
notice when other employees were not similarly tested.105  This analysis 
                                                          
100.  See Sonne, supra note 11, at 145 46 (listing the limitations to employment at-
will with regard to privacy, including implied contract rights and the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing), Rives, supra note 28, at 555 (discussing cause for termination); 
see also Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, 
124 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 2001, at 3, 4 (analyzing the implied contract and the 
covenant of good faith and faith dealing as two of the three major common law 
exceptions to employment at-will, with public policy being the third major exception).    
101.  See Sonne, supra note 11, at 160, n.149 (citing JOHN F. BUCKLEY, IV & 
RONALD M. GREEN, 2007 STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO HUMAN RESOURCES LAW § 5.02 
tbl. 5.1 (2007)).  
102.  See, e.g. WILLIAM E. HARTSFIELD, Wrongful Discharge, 2 INVESTIGATING 
EMPLOYEE CONDUCT § 14:13 n.19 (2010) (surveying decisions recognizing the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing regarding employee privacy), available at 
Westlaw IEMPC.    
103.  See Luedtke, 834 P.2d at 1222 (noting that the employee was given neither the 
opportunity to retest nor any other options). 
104.  See id. at 1223 24 (citing Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 
1983)). 
105.  See id. at 1225
 stated, the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing also requires that the employer be objectively fair. The superior court found 
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rather than fitting the 
circumstances into the requirements of contract formation. Luedtke had a 
reasonable expectation that he would not be tested for drugs because he 
was not given advance notice and no other employees were tested.106  
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing may afford an employee 
protection in some states when the circumstances do not amount to a 
mutually bargained-for exchange within a contract framework, the 
 reasonably causes the employee to expect privacy, and 
the treatment of the employee is manifestly unfair.107 Yet, most state 
judiciaries have rejected the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
in employment contracts based on the justification that such a cause of 
action would deviate too far from the employment at-will doctrine.108 The 
underlying inquiries in an implied-in-fact contract case and an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing case are the same did the 
employee have a reasonable expectation of privacy? Employee privacy 
expectations are central to other causes of action as well; public employees 
are afforded constitutional protection where the employee has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy based on the realities of the workplace.  
                                                          
that Luedtke was tested for drug use without prior notice, that no other employee was 
similarly tested, and that Nabors suspended Luedtke immediately upon learning of the 
results of the test. Nabors does not dispute these findings. We hold as a matter of law, 
 
106.  Id.  
107.  According to a 2000 study, the following states recognized the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment at-will contracts:  Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Idaho, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, Utah, 
and Wyoming. See Muhl, supra note 100, at 4, Ex. 1. The analysis for finding a breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is similar to the implied-in-fact 
rather than strictly requiring that the circumstances meet the elements of contract 
formation.       
108.  See, e.g., 
2005) (recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment 
at-will relationships in Delaware, but qualifying that this exception has a narrow 
(citing Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 401 03 (Del. 2000))); Pittman v. Larson 
Distribution Co., 724 P.2d 1379, 1385 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (declining to extend the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment contracts); White v. State, 929 
P.2d 396, 407 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) 
to the employment-at-will rule which would have implied a covenant of good faith and 
too greatly upon the employment relationship). But see Thomas C. Kohler & Matthew 
W. Finkin, Bonding and Flexibility: Employment Ordering in a Relationless Age, 46 
AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 382 (1998) (noting that an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
-will relationship, according to 
many state courts).     
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IV.  PRIVACY RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE 
For public employees, the analysis can be quite different because the 
government-employer must comply with the protections of the Fourth 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
109 Under the 
implied-in-fact contract analysis, whether the employee had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is a hidden inquiry because courts have not 
explicitly stated what the standard is. In contrast, under the Fourth 
Amendment analysis for public employees, courts expressly inquire 
whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy.110 The 
Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of 
a private employer. The operational realities of the workplace, however, 
may make some employees  expectations of privacy unreasonable when an 
111 
Under the Ortega framework, in order to claim the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment, a public employee must have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, and the government- 112 
Whether the public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a 
threshold analysis to be determined on a case-by-case basis considering all 
113 This 
ad hoc determination may look similar to the analysis of whether an 
implied-in-fact contract exists as both require the court to take account of 
the totality of the 
practices, and representations.114 
A. City of Ontario v. Quon 
Quon exemplifies the similarities and overlap of the privacy rights of 
                                                          
109.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
110.  See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 906 (9th Cir. 
2008) 
be reasonable),  City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). In 
Quon, the Supreme Court distanced itself from the holding that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is a threshold requirement in Fourth Amendment employee 
privacy cases. See 130 S. Ct. at 2628-29. After Quon, it is unclear what the correct 
analytical framework is for a public employee Fourth Amendment claim.   
111.   (plurality opinion) (emphasis in 
original). 
112.  Id. at 725 26. 
113.  Id. at 717 18.   
114.  For discussion regarding the totality of the circumstances analysis for an 
implied contract, see supra note 43 45 and accompanying text.     
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public employees under the Fourth Amendment and a cause of action for 
an implied contract right to privacy. Quon worked as a sergeant for the 
Ontario Police Department and received a two-way pager from his 
employer.115 Quon signed an acknowledgement of a policy regarding 
computer, Internet, and E-mail usage, which stated, in part, 
should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these 
116 Quon was aware that, while there was no official policy 
regarding employer-issued pagers, the pager messages would fall under the 
computer, Internet, and E-mail usage policy.117 When an employee 
exceeded the contracted-for 25,000 character per month allotment, 
for these overages.118 
several times and was told by Duke that so long as Quon paid for the 
overages, the department would not conduct an audit to determine whether 
they were personal or business in nature.119 Quon paid the overages for 
several months and his pager messages were not audited; however, an audit 
superiors found that many of his pager messages were personal and 
sexually explicit.120 The principal harm suffered by Quon was that various 
persons within the department reviewed the content of the pager messages.     
Quon filed suit asserting constitutional protections in the content of the 
pager messages under the Fourth Amendment, and the district court held 
that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages due to 
overuse charges.121 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit agreed and held that, although the employer had a policy purporting 
that there should be no expectation of privacy by employees, the 
                                                          
115.  Quon, 529 F.3d at 895.  
116.  See id. at 896 (reserving for the government-employer the right to review 
however cautioning that such 
systems should not be used for personal matters). 
117.  See id. (observing that, while Quon testified he remembered the meeting where 
the policy was announced, he did not recall his supervisor announcing that the 
-mail policy would cover the pager messages). 
118.  Id. at 897 
. 
119.  Id ange differed. According to Duke, he 
the overage was personal or business unless they wanted me to, because if they said, 
Id. 
Id. 
120.  Id. at 898. The stated purpose of the audit was to determine whether the 25,000 
character allotment was sufficient to cover business use of the pagers. Id. 
121.  Id. at 899. 
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122 The 
he made particularly clear to Quon that employee pagers would not be 
audited if the employee paid any overage fees.123 In addition to relying on 
this informal policy, the court considered the employer practice of not 
 for several months when Quon exceeded 
his monthly character allotment and paid for his overages.124 Thus, the 
court considered the oral representations of the employer as well as its 
policies and practices and concluded Quon did have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the pager messages.125  
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and issued an 
opinion on June 17, 2010.126 One of the questions presented to the Court 
was whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
official employer policy.127 In their respective briefs, the parties agreed that 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test is a fact-specific inquiry but 
differed on which facts they advocated before for the Court. Quon urged 
determined 
based on all the circumstances of the employment relationship and focused 
 informal policy and actual practice of not 
128 The employer, also using a 
                                                          
122.  Id. at 906 07.  
123.  Id. at 907. 
124.  See id
and he had paid for the overages every time without anyone reviewing the text of the 
 
125.  See id
expectation of privacy because he was not a policymaker). Unimportant for the 
purposes of this Article, the Ninth Circuit also held that the search was unreasonable 
See id. at 909 (concluding that 
 
126.  City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).   
127.  See AM. BAR ASS N, Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases:  April 
Cases 2009 2010 Term: City of Ontario, CA v. Quon, Docket No. 08-1332, 
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/april2010.shtml (last visited Nov. 29, 
reasonable expectation of privacy in text-messages transmitted on his SWAT pager, 
where the police department has an official no-privacy policy but a non-policymaking 
lieutenant announced an informal policy of allowing some personal use of the 
 
128.  See Brief of Respondent at 39 41, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 
(2010) (No. 08-1332) (arguing that workplace circumstances are important and that an 
ncement that employees do not have a privacy expectation, without 
considering those circumstances, is not a legitimate regulation). 
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the factors  expectation of privacy, including that the 
-privacy 
policy.129   
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, determin
be resolved by settled principles [to determine] when a search is 
privacy expectations.130 The Court assumed Quon did have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy 131 
whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy and noted that 
132 The 
133 Yet, the Court noted 
that clearly defined employer policies w
reasonable expectations.134       
Because the Court wanted to avoid a broad determination of employee 
                                                          
129.  Brief of Petitioner at 41 45, City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) 
(No. 08-1332). 
130.  Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2624.    
131.  See id. at 2628 29 (sidestepping the two-part framework used in the Ortega 
 of 
After Quon, it is unclear whether 
the Court has rejected the Ortega 
real that the offices of government employees . . . are 
covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter.  But he would also 
-related materials or to investigate 
violations of workplace rules searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and 
normal in the private-employer context Id. at 
709, 731 32 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)).  
132.  See id. at 2629. 
could be taken as announcing a change in OPD policy, and if so, whether he had, in 
fact or appearance, the authority to make such a change and to guarantee the privacy of 
text messaging. It would also be necessary to consider whether a review of messages 
sent on police pagers, particularly those sent while officers are on duty, might be 
justified for other reasons, including performance evaluations, litigation concerning the 
 
133.  See id. at 2629 30 (elaborating that the evolution of technology as it relates to 
in the technology itself but in what society 
treatment of them, will evolve.  
instant case are used to establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, and 
extent, of privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using employer-provided 
Id. at 2629.   
134.  Id. at 2630.   
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expectations of privacy in employer-provided communication devices, it 
assumed Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy and held, more 
narrowly, that the search was reasonable  Fourth 
Amendment rights.135 In discussing whether the search was too intrusive, 
privacy and determined 
completely private in all circumstances was unreasonable.136 The Court 
ultimately held that the Ninth Circuit erred in finding the search 
unreasonable.137   
While the Court did not directly address whether Quon had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the content of his pager messages, it did generally 
state the factors a court should consider when approaching the issue.138 The 
may be persuasive in future breach of implied contract cases. The facts in 
Quon could potentially give rise to an implied-in-fact contract claim for a 
private sector employee for whom a constitutional cause of action is 
unavailable.           
The conclusion by the Ninth Circuit that Quon had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the pager messages is similar to finding that Quon 
had an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy in the pager messages based 
on the oral assurances, policies, and practices of his public employer. The 
C from the Ortega 
opinion139 to refer 
pagers when employees paid their overage fees.140 The use of looking at 
                                                          
135.  Id.  
136.  Id. at 2631 vacy would inhere in his 
messages, it would not have been reasonable for Quon to conclude that his messages 
   
137.  Id. at 2632 33. The Court elaborated 
legitimate reason for 
private- Id. at 2633 
(1987) (plurality opinion)).   
138.  See id. at 2634 35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for its 
and consequences of answering, that admittedly irrelevant threshold que
communicated, and whether they were authorized, as well as the latest trends in 
Id. 2635 36. These are the same fact-specific 
-in-fact contract right to privacy case 
would consider; an 
Justice Scalia fears.      
139.  480 U.S. at 717. 
140.  Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 907 (9th Cir. 2008), 
sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
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rather than diminish it, is unique.141 This reasoning recognizes that the 
actual facts and circumstances of the particular workplace must be 
considered to determine whether an employee has a right to privacy 
predicated on her reasonable expectation of privacy. Under either a Fourth 
Amendment or an implied-in-fact contract framework, the underlying 
inquiry is whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy.142        
B.  An Implied-in-Fact Contract Theory after Quon? 
Because Quon was a public sector employee, he was able to invoke 
Fourth Amendment protection against his employer.143 The Supreme 
employer conduct will be found reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
The Court distanced itself from the analytical framework that inquired, as a 
144 
makes the implied contract theory an important alternative for public 
employees in many states. Depending on applicable state law, a public 
employee in Quon  may be able to assert a successful cause of 
action based on an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy.145 As 
                                                          
141.  Cf. Lynch v. City of New York, 589 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that 
police officers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that would preclude 
the officers were already subject to drug testing as a condition of employment); United 
States v. Esser, an employee did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her purse where a posted policy 
informed individuals that purses were subject to inspection on the property and all 
employees were required to read all posted policies); United States v. Ziegler, 456 F.3d 
1138, 1143 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that the company policy entitling personnel 
sonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of the employee- , 
superseded by 474 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2007).   
142.  Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628.   
143.  Id. at 2627.   
144.  Id. at 2633.   
145.  Public employees in many states can, in addition to a Fourth Amendment cause 
of action, assert a claim based on an implied employment contract. Such a cause of 
action is not limited in its application to private sector employees because public sector 
employees can enter into contracts with their government employers just as private 
sector employees can contract with their employers. See, e.g., Bennett v. Marshall Pub. 
Library, 746 F. Supp. 671, 679 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (finding that the public employee 
had a claim based on the common law implied contract doctrine); Whittington v. State 
just-cause public employees do not have the right to sue their 
governmental employer for breach of an implied employment contra
Thomas, 2010 UT 23, ¶¶ 54 62, 232 P.3d 486, 502 04 (holding that, although the 
plaintiff was a public employee, an implied-in-fact employment contract was created 
based on an existing employee manual).  But see Bernstein v. Lopez, 321 F.3d 903, 
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previously discussed, courts vary greatly from state to state in their 
recognition and acceptance of the implied-in-fact employment contract.146 
Like the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy analysis 
employed by the Ninth Circuit and considered by the Supreme Court, an 
implied-in-fact contract analysis would be fact-intensive and scrutinize the 
reasonable expectation of privacy.147   
In an implied contract analysis, a court would take into account the 
totality of the circumstances, including the oral assurances, policies, and 
practices of the employer.148 The official policy of the police department in 
Quon was that of no expectation of privacy, but the informal policy and 
actual practice of the department was to refrain from auditing the pagers so 
long as the officer paid any overage charges for the pager text messages.149 
Duke orally assured Quon specifically that his pager messages would not 
be audited if Quon paid for the overage charges.150 A court may find that 
Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of his pager 
messages based on these facts the Ninth Circuit reached that conclusion 
under its Fourth Amendment analysis.151 A court that accepts the existence 
of an implied-in-fact contract as an informal, open-ended question might 
find this reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to give rise to an 
enforceable right to privacy in the content of the messages.   
Some courts are more rigid in their implied-in-fact contract analysis, 
requiring the facts to formalistically meet contract formation requirements. 
It is possible the Quon facts qualify as a bargained-for exchange sufficient 
to establish an implied-in-fact contract for privacy in the content of the 
pager messages. Applying the facts to the elements of contract formation, 
152 The terms of 
                                                          
905- -
neither an express nor an implied contract can restrict the reasons for, or the manner of, 
Portman v. 
Cty. Of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 1993))).     
146.  See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing that courts differ in 
acceptance of implied-in-fact contracts).  
147.  The underlying issues in Fourth Amendment and implied-in-fact contract 
claims are quite distinct. Implied contracts are about an agreement albeit an implied 
one between the parties, while the Fourth Amendment is about a fundamental right to 
be free from unreasonable government intrusion. Nonetheless, these theories share a 
common theme in an  
148.  See 
See also supra 
note 50 52 and accompanying text.   
149.  Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2008), 
 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
150.  Id. 
151.  Id. at 906. 
152.  Id. at 897. 
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the offer were: if the employee paid for the overages, then his pager 
messages would not be audited.153 By paying for the overages, the 
employee was accepting the offer.154 Additionally, payment constituted the 
 consideration.155 
auditing the pager messages when the employee met his end of the bargain. 
In some jurisdictions, continued employment could also be 
consideration for the agreement because the arrangement added an 
use continued employment as consideration in this case because payment to 
the employer for the pager overages provided a separate consideration.156 
contract right to privacy in the pager messages prohibited 
his employer from auditing the contents of those messages irrespective of 
any adverse employment action taken against the employee. In other 
words, the employer breaches the contract by reviewing the pager messages 
after the employee has paid the overuse charges, not by demoting or 
terminating the employee because of the contents of those messages.157    
While the facts can be analyzed in terms of offer, acceptance, and 
consideration, a court considers the totality of the circumstances to 
ascertain if an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy exists; an 
 reasonable expectation of privacy is integral to this assessment. 
As with the Fourth Amendment analysis articulated by the Ortega plurality 
and discussed in Quon, a reviewing court takes a fact-based approach to 
determine if a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. In Quon, the Court 
looked at whether the police department issued the pager and had an 
                                                          
153.  Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625. Cf. Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 
1464 (10th Cir. 1994) [s] 
his willingness to enter into a bargain in such a way as to justify the employee in 
understanding that his assent to the bargain was invited by the employer and that the 
employee s assent [will] conclude the bargain.  
Keenan, 732 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
154.  See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625 (noting ld him that 
he would not be audited so long as he paid, Quon paid for the overage charges); 
Fineman, supra note 43, at 382 (explaining that an employee can establish acceptance 
by performing the terms of the offer). 
155.  See Fineman, supra note 43, at 383 (
beyond performance is required on the part of the promisee in accepting a . . . 
 
156.  As discussed in Part III, some courts do not accept continued employment as 
sufficient consideration to find an implied employment contract. Other courts have held 
that requiring separate consideration is contrary to the general contract principle that 
courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. See supra note 46 and 
accompanying text.     
157.  See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626 (mentioning 
Assuming Quon  employment status was 
at-will, the department presumably could have terminated him for the excess pager use 
without auditing his pager and without breaching his right to privacy in the contents of 
the messages.    
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ith regard 
to internet use and E-mail.158 The balancing of these factors will determine 
whether the totality of the circumstances created an enforceable implied-in-
fact contract right to privacy in the pager messages.      
In a jurisdiction allowing an implied-in-fact contract theory for public 
employees, it is possible an employee in Quon  would succeed in 
a cause of action against his employer for breach of an implied-in-fact 
contract right to privacy.159 Although the Supreme Court avoided the 
reasonable expectation of privacy issue in its Fourth Amendment analysis, 
under an implied-in-fact contract theory, the case turns on whether a court 
accepts that the circumstances created a reasonable expectation of privacy 
for the employee.160 This depends on the importance a court places on the 
messages when the employee paid for the overages. In reality, most 
employees probably rely on the actual practice of their employers in 
forming privacy expectations rather than formal policies which most 
employees may have seen only once when commencing employment.161 
This parallels the empirical findings that many employees believe their 
legal protection is greater than what at-will employment affords.162 Where 
constitutional protections are unavailable or inadequate, an employee, 
under circumstances similar to Quon, could argue breach of an implied-in-
fact contract right to privacy.     
                                                          
158.  Quon v. Arch Wireless Oper. Corp., 529 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir 2008), 
sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
159.  The implied-in-fact contract cause of action was unavailable to the Quon 
plaintiffs because California law does not permit such a claim for public employees.  
See Hoesterey v. City of Cathedral City, No. 93-56239, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 23316, 
*11- ibits all contractual arrangements 
  Many 
jurisdictions recognize an implied-in-fact contract cause of action for public 
employees.  See supra note 148 and accompanying text.     
160.  See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 388 (Cal. 1988) 
 
161.  See Justin Conforti, Comment, 
Interests, Technology Survei  
Ortega Test in Quon v. Arch Wireless, 5 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 461, 485 (2009) 
that he could avoid an audit of his messages if he paid the overages himself would 
 
162.  See supra notes 24 26 and accompanying text (explaining that employees tend 
to genuinely believe it is unlawful to dismiss an employee because of the e
personal dislike of the individual). 
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V.  WHAT S NEXT?: THE VALUE OF IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT RIGHTS 
The implied-in-fact contract may serve a gap-filling function to protect 
the privacy of public employees where a constitutional theory fails. While 
private employees do not have the constitutional privacy protections 
right to privacy in the workplace through the public policy exception to the 
at-will employment doctrine.163 R
privacy as a matter of public policy, however, is often narrowly 
construed.164 Where the public policy exception fails to protect employee 
privacy, the employee may have recourse by pursuing a breach of an 
implied-in-fact contract right to privacy. Implied contract, implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and public policy are distinct 
causes of action; some court opinions have, however, merged these theories 
in the context of employee privacy protection. The overlap of these theories 
is exemplified in the Rulon-Miller decision with regard to the implied-in-
fact contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.165 
Another example of blended theories in the employment privacy context is 
Luedtke, where the Alaska Supreme Court recognized a public policy 
supporting protection of employee privacy and opined that an employer 
violation of that public policy could become a breach of the implied 
                                                          
163.  See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 621 23 (3d Cir. 
and highly offensive invasion of the emplo
circumstances are considered, the termination is in violation of public policy and the 
employer may be liable for wrongful discharge); see also Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406 
S.E.2d 52, 57 (W. Va. 1990) (finding a public policy right to privacy whereby an 
ntrude upon this right of his employee absent some showing of 
employee is in an occupation involving the safety of others).  But see Hennessey v. 
Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 589 A.2d 170, 176 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) 
-will employment doctrine). 
164.  See Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States:  The Divine 
Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 74 (2000) (explaining that the public 
policy tort is narrow because it is only implicated when the health or safety of the 
the public sufficiently enough to give rise to a public policy cause of action is a broad 
understanding of the public policy exception, and many state courts have not accepted 
such a broad interpretation. See, e.g., Mercer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 308 F.3d 840, 
846 (8th Cir. 2002) 
well-recognized and clear Iowa public policy protects an at-will employee's privacy 
interest in a romantic relationship with a co-  Hennessey, 589 A.2d at 176 
 
165.  See supra notes 91 103 and accompanying text.   
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing.166 A court might bring the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing into an implied contract or a public 
policy analysis where the court finds that the employee was treated 
unfairly.   
In addition to these common law causes of action, there are statutory 
exceptions to employment at-will that protect certain aspects of employee 
privacy. Like the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, these 
statutes are limited in the scope of employee conduct protected and the 
employer actions prohibited; for this reason, the implied-in-fact contract 
cause of action is an important protection that an employee may assert 
when statutory protections are unavailable.  
A.  An Open Field for Legislation:   
Off-Duty Conduct Statutes and their Limited Impact on  
Employee Privacy Rights 
Some states have attempted to clarify the law in the area of employee 
privacy by legislating for broad employee protection of legal off-duty 
conduct.167 -duty conduct statute, 
which makes it unlawful for an employer to terminate an employee for the 
f-
the conduct creates a conflict of interest or relates to a bona fide business 
purpose.168 The Colorado statute protects a vast range of off-duty activity 
of the 
employment at-will doctrine.169 These broader statutes can be viewed as 
                                                          
166.  Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1992).  
167.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2010) (making it unlawful for an 
employer to discharge an employee for engaging in any lawful activity off the 
occupational requirement or is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest); N.Y. LAB. 
LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2009) (making it unlawful for an employer to discharge an 
products off work hours and off work premises, legal recreational activities outside 
work, or union membership). See also Sonne, supra note 11, at 170 (explaining that 
off-duty conduct statutes were first enacted in the 1990s as protection against 
workplace discipline for off-duty smoking but have evolved in some states into 
sweeping protection of all legal off-duty conduct).   
168.  See § 24-34-402.5(1). 
169.  See generally Jessica Jackson, Comment, 
Statute: A Vast and Muddled Expansion of Traditional Employment Law, 67 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 143, 148 58 (1996) (discussing cases which hold that §24-34-402.5(1) protects 
activities such as sexual orientation, membership in the Ku Klux Klan, and interoffice 
at-
covenant of good faith and fair dealing recognized in other states but rejected by 
Colorado courts).  
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generally have a reasonable expectation to be free from employer intrusion 
and involvement.170 For instance, employees typically expect that their 
participation in lawful product consumption or lawful recreational activities 
outside of work is not  concern when such lawful 
conduct does not impact job performance. Perhaps categorizing off-duty 
conduct statutes as protecting employee privacy is inaccurate.171 Off-duty 
conduct statutes protect personal facts and involvement in personal 
activities that may not exactly be private.172 While the conduct protected 
may b capabilities, whether an 
employee engages in a particular recreational activity is not really a private 
173   
 Regardless of whether off-duty conduct statutes may accurately be 
described as protecting employee privacy, in certain situations, such 
statutes may diminish the need for an aggrieved employee to assert a cause 
of action based on an implied-in-fact contract for privacy.174 Under the 
facts of Rulon-Miller -
duty conduct statute because Rulon-Miller was terminated for engaging in 
lawful, off-duty conduct namely, having a romantic relationship with an 
employee of a competitor company.175 Rulon-
create a conflict of interest or relate to a bona fide business interest of her 
employer.176 Therefore, an employee in Rulon-
-duty conduct statute 
rather than arguing an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy. However, 
Colorado  off-duty conduct statute would not impact an employee under 
                                                          
170.  See id
broad statute was that employers should not be able to tell employees what to do on 
th see also, Sonne, supra note 11, at 172 (stating that statutes were 
 
171.  See Sonne, supra note 11
overbroad and encompass more than privacy abuses). 
172.  For example, whether or not someone smokes is not necessarily private 
information as it might be readily observable during non-work hours. However, 
See Jackson, supra note 
169, at 143 45.   
173.  Stated differently -duty conduct is not as 
intrusive as surveillance or drug testing. 
174.  See Jackson, supra note 169, at 150 52 (discussing that while Colorado does 
recognize an implied employment contract theory based on an employer handbook, this 
theory will protect employee privacy only in rare circumstances whereas the Colorado 
 statute protects a wide range of legal activities). 
175.  Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 527 29 (Ct. App. 1984), 
disapproved of by .  
176.  Id. at 533. 
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the Quon facts -duty.177 
conduct occurred while he was on-duty using company property.178 Even 
the broadest off-duty conduct statutes cannot adequately protect an 
that expectation with respect to on-duty activities.  
Off-duty conduct statutes are also limited in that they only protect 
employees from termination based upon the applicable conduct.179 If an 
employee is merely disciplined, he does not have a cause of action under 
these statutes.180 In contrast, if an employee has an employment contract
express or implied
have a breach of contract cause of action against the employer based on the 
terminated to assert her claim. While state legislatures are providing greater 
statutory protection to workers, there are limitations to these legislative 
protections that can be supplemented by common law causes of action like 
the implied-in-fact contract.    
Due to the problems that the jurisdictional differences of state off-duty 
conduct legislation create for multistate companies, arguments have been 
made for the passage of federal legislation regarding employee privacy 
rights with respect to off-duty conduct.181 While such federal legislation 
                                                          
177.  See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2626 (2010) (observing that 
-duty were 
 
178.  Id. To be sure, some of the conduct probably occurred off-duty because Quon 
had access to the pager during his non-working hours; however, because the pager was 
provided by the employer for business purposes, the conduct would fall under the 
statutory exception of being for a bona fide business purpose. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 
24-34-402.5(1)(a) (2010) (exempting discharges that relate to the furtherance of a 
 
179.  Compare § 24-34-402.5(1) (limiting application to employee 
termination), with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2009) (applying 
off-duty conduct statute to refusals to hire, discharge, and discrimination). 
180.  -duty conduct statute would not protect Quon because he was not 
See Quon, 130 S. Ct. 
at 2626 (establishing that Quon was disciplined as opposed to terminated for his 
actions). 
181.  See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not at Work?:  
Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 
6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 680 83 (2004) (proposing uniform employee privacy 
legislation to address the significant variance of employee privacy issues across the 
country); see also Rives, supra note 28 at 554, 563 64 (calling for specific federal 
-duty conduct that would 
Other commentators have 
opined that state off-duty conduct statutes were enacted prematurely and unnecessarily. 
See Sonne, supra note 11, at 183 84 (citing evidence that employers realize it is 
lives). Additionally, survey data indicates that employers and employees have similar 
expectations with regard to what information is acceptable for an employer to gather 
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would advance the goal of standardizing the protection afforded employees 
in their activities outside of work, it would not p
reasonable expectations of privacy in activities conducted while on-duty. 
Future legislation in this area likely will focus on discrete classes of 
information as most privacy legislation does. There is not a 
comprehensive legislative answer, but the implied-in-fact contract may be 
available to fill some gaps left by attempted legislation that fails to protect 
 
B.  The Limits of Implied-in-Fact Contract Rights  
This Article has proposed that the central theme of employment actions 
brought by public and private employees asserting privacy protection is the 
presence of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Because of this 
commonality, the implied-in-fact contract theory can supplement where 
other causes of action fail to protect employee privacy. In determining 
whether an implied-in-fact contract right to privacy exists, courts look at 
the totality of the circumstances.182 Whether the employee had a reasonable 
assurances, policies, and practices, is important in deciding whether an 
implied-in-fact contract right to privacy exists.183 The question is whether 
privacy; to answer that question, courts look at the circumstances and the 
If the employee cannot demonstrate a 
employee will not prevail.184 An employee that did not subjectively expect 
privacy will be less likely to feel wronged by what might otherwise be 
                                                          
and examine about an employee. Sonne, supra note 11, at 184 85. The lack of case law 
on the issue is probably the best evidence that sweeping, federal legislation would be 
an inefficient endeavor. Id. at 185. Shepardizing COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-
402.5(1)(a) (2010  yields only 23 case results and 66 law review articles, indicating it 
is of greater academic concern that employees receive this protection than a practical 
problem. Statute last Shepardized using LexisNexis on February 21, 2011.   
182.  See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 363, 388 (Cal. 1988) 
 
183.  See Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (Ct. App. 1984) 
 
was treated unfairly), disapproved of by 
2000). 
184.  See Nancy J. King et al., Workplace Privacy and Discrimination Issues Related 
to Genetic Data: A Comparative Law Study of the European Union and the United 
States, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 79, 122 (2006) (explaining that under other privacy causes of 
action which an employee can assert against an employer, such as the tort of intrusion 
upon seclusion, an employer can avoid liability by reducing employee privacy 
expectations). 
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to sue the employer.185   
To avoid liability, empl
expectations of privacy and manage those expectations appropriately. 
When an employer is successful in this endeavor, it will not be subject to 
liability for violating employee privacy rights because the employee will 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy on which to base a claim. If an 
expectations of privacy, courts will be less inclined to find the employer 
liable, and the employee will be less likely to file suit against the employer 
expectations of privacy is the first line of defense against liability for 
alleged infringements of employee privacy; it is also in the best interest of 
the employee if the parties have similar expectations with regard to 
employee privacy.186 Setting clear and definite company policies while 
ensuring that all employees are aware of these policies aligns the 
expectations of the parties and 
from being inflated beyond what the employer intends. Additionally, 
employers may require that supervisors not deviate from the formal 
policies.187   
                                                          
185.  See generally Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective 
Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 293 (2003) (explaining that when terminated or 
laid off employees perceive the process as fair, they are less likely to sue their former 
employer); Ann M. Anderson, Whose Malice Counts?: Kolstad and the Limits of 
Vicarious Liability for Title VII Punitive Damages, 78 N.C. L. REV. 799, 826 27 (2000) 
(asserting that, in the discrimination context, when employer policies are implemented 
in good faith, employees are more receptive and less likely to file suit); Worth, supra 
note 25, at 415 (observing .  
186.  See Eric Krell, Privacy Matters, 55 HR MAG., no. 2, Feb. 2010 at 43, 44 
(declaring that managing employee privacy expectations is an important matter for 
can be severe: lost revenue, lost productivity, legal or regulatory actions, declines in 
legal ramifications, effective management in the area of privacy expectations will have 
benefits to a business in terms of productivity and company value. Human resource 
professionals realize it is important that privacy expectations of employers and 
employees be aligned, and it is a bad business practice for employers to be overly 
intrusive and unnecessarily monitor employee activities. See id. (noting the importance 
of aligning the privacy expectations of employers and employees). See also Declan C. 
Leonard & Angela H. France, Balancing Business Interests with Employee Privacy 
Rights, LEGAL REP. ( for Human Res. Mgmt., Alexandria, Va.), Jun. 1, 2003, at 2, 
available at http://www.shrm.org/Publications/LegalReport/Pages/CMS_005109.aspx 
(explaining that unnecessary monitoring can create poor employee morale, and 
companies should justify all monitoring in terms of protecting a legitimate business 
interest and communicate this to its employees). Effective communication between 
employees and employers is important to accomplishing these goals.  
187.  See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (observing that, 
absent Duke contradiction of 
policy, determining whether Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy would likely 
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It may be in the best interest of the employer in terms of morale and 
productivity to intentionally provide employees with certain expectations 
of privacy. Inevitably, the realities of the workplace and actual practices 
cause managers and supervisors to deviate from formal company policies; 
as in Quon, there will invariably be situations where formal policies differ 
from realities in the workplace. When an employee has a reasonable 
some courts will find that sufficient to recognize an implied-in-fact contract 
right to employee privacy.188 Alternatively, contract rights for employee 
privacy need not be derived from the circumstances;  employers and 
employees can explicitly agree to certain privacy rights in an express 
contract.  
In an employment relationship, private ordering is perhaps the 
preeminent way for the parties to have coinciding expectations about their 
relationship. O
expectations of privacy is through private ordering.189 While employment 
law has moved toward greater government mandates and regulation of the 
relationship,190 
defining their relative rights.191 Private ordering can be accomplished 
through an express contract between the parties and may provide an 
employee with privacy protection. While an express contract right to 
employee privacy is possible, it is unlikely that an employer will expressly 
                                                          
not have been a difficult issue for the Court to decide). 
188.  See Fineman, supra note 43, at 364 (explaining that some courts find that 
 
189.  Private ordering is another term for the freedom of contract, or the ability of the 
parties to define the terms of their relationship. See, e.g., Steven H. Kropp, 
Deconstructing Racism in American Society  The Role Labor Law Might Have Played 
(But Did Not) in Ending Race Discrimination:  A Partial Explanation and Historical 
Commentary, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 397 (2002) (discussing private 
ordering as one means for ending workplace racial prejudice). 
190.  See GLYNN ET AL., supra note 34
employment relationship has developed away from private ordering and toward greater 
government regulation.  
191.  See Kohler & Finkin, supra note 111, at 382 (explaining that employment law 
  
Under Fourth Amendment case law precedent for public employees, private ordering 
 Conforti, 
supra note 167, at [B]ecause an employee s privacy expectation must be 
reasonable before he has any Fourth Amendment protection, and because the Ortega 
framework works on a contextual rather than a categorical approach, private ordering 
has defined workplace privacy. Therefore, employers may alter the context of a given 
workplace to eliminate employee privacy expectations.
Quon to refrain from embracing the 
analytical framework set forth by the Ortega plurality. See supra note 134 and 
accompanying text (explaining that Quon abandoned the Ortega approach).  
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contract to give employees privacy protection.         
When an employer fails to adequately manage employee expectations of 
privacy, the implied-in-fact contract cause of action may be claimed where 
there are no applicable statutory, constitutional, or tort protections. Because 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the interaction of the parties and the 
rights. Naturally, employees acquire expectations based on the day-to-day 
practices of the workplace and reasonably expect that employers will act in 
accordance with prior conduct. If an employer consistently acts in a manner 
contrary to a formal policy, as was the situation in Quon
expectation may reasonably align with the actual practices of the workplace 
rather than the formal policies of the company.192   
When an employer acts inconsistently with prior representations or 
practices, the employer sets itself up for potential liability for breach of an 
implied contract right because the employer  actions may be at odds with 
An implied-in-fact 
contract cause of action is available to employees based on the terms of the 
contract set by the parties, and a court will ascertain those terms by 
considering the circumstances of the workplace and whether the employee 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 Regardless of any statutory, constitutional, or tort protection available to 
an employee, an implied-in-fact contract cause of action may be available 
when the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy based upon the 
circumstances of the workplace. Because the claim is fact-dependant, an 
implied-in-fact contract theory offers an employee more flexible protection 
than other causes of action. In light of the trend toward greater government 
regulation over the employment relationship, it is probable that further 
federal and state legislation will be passed in an effort to provide 
employees with heightened privacy protection. Inevitably, there will be 
gaps in protection afforded by these statutes. Like the off-duty conduct 
statutes, new legislation may only protect employees from termination.193 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the implied-in-fact contract argument is 
available.   
Some jurisdictions may methodically require that the facts meet the 
                                                          
192. See supra Part IV (discussing 
). 
193. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a) (2010) (applying only to wrongful 
terminations). 
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elements of contract formation including an offer, an acceptance, and 
consideration. Even in these jurisdictions, the 
expectation of privacy will be essential in determining whether the parties 
reached an enforceable agreement regarding employee privacy. The 
is determined by 
the circumstances and the realities of the workplace. In Quon, the Supreme 
Court opined as to circumstances creating reasonable privacy 
expectations.194 -
in-fact contract causes of action. In the evolving legal climate with the 
trend toward increasing employee protection and recognizing greater 
privacy protection for all citizens, some courts will likely be more 
accepting of implied-in-fact contracts for employee privacy. When an 
employer fails to manage employee privacy expectations, the implied-in-
fact contract may be the only cause of action available to protect an 
reasonable expectation of privacy.      
 
                                                          
194. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (noting that a court 
must decide if oral assurances contrary to an established employer policy do, in fact, 
override the established policy). 
 





WHEN ONE BOARD REVERSES ANOTHER:  
A CHIEF COUNSEL S PERSPECTIVE 
HAROLD J. DATZ* 
I.  Introduction ........................................................................................... 68 
II.  Background ........................................................................................... 69 
III.  The Statutory Basis for Reversals ......................................................... 70 
IV.  Arguments For and Against the Practice of Reversing Precedent ........ 71 
A.  Arguments For: .......................................................................... 71 
B.   Arguments Against: ................................................................... 71 
V.  Recent Reversals of Precedent .............................................................. 71 
A.   Brown University ....................................................................... 71 
B.   Harbourside Healthcare, Inc ..................................................... 72 
C.   Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia ........................................... 72 
                                                          
*   B.A., LL.B., University of Florida. Mr. Datz joined the NLRB legal staff in 
Washington, D.C. in 1965 as part of the Regional Advice Branch. Two years later he 
was transferred to the Pittsburgh, PA Regional Office (Region 6) as a Trial Attorney. 
He returned to the Advice Branch as a Supervisory Attorney in 1970. In 1971, Mr. Datz 
was appointed Deputy Assistant General Counsel in the Division of Operations-
Management, with supervisory responsibility for seven regional offices. In 1972, he 
was promoted to Deputy Associate General Counsel in the Division of Advice and 
from 1976-1990 served as head of the Division, which provides legal advice on behalf 
s Regional Directors in cases involving novel and 
complex issues and matters of national importance. Subsequently, Mr. Datz served as 
Chief Counsel to Members John N. Raudabaugh (1990 1994), Charles I. Cohen (1994-
1996), John Higgins (1996-1997), and Peter J. Hurtgen (1997-2002). Mr. Hurtgen was 
Chairman from 2001 to 2002. In 2002, he was appointed by Chairman Robert J. 
Battista to serve as his Chief Counsel. Mr. Datz retired from the NLRB in 2007, after 
serving for forty-two years. Mr. Datz is an adjunct professor at Georgetown, George 
Washington, and American University Law Schools. He is co-editor of THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS ACT (John Harper & Harold Datz eds., 2d ed. 1983), has contributed to 
INTERNATIONAL LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWS (1st ed. 1997), and is a contributing 
editor to LABOR UNION LAW & REGULATION (William W. Osborne et al. eds., 2003). 
He is a member of the Governing Council of the ABA Section of Labor and 
Employment Law, Professor Datz is a frequent speaker and lecturer before bar 
associations and labor law seminars. He is also past president of the National College 
of Labor & Employment Lawyers. He is the recipient of the ABA Federal Labor and 
Employment Lawyer award. He is a recipient of a Presidential Merit Award.  
68 THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM  [Vol. 1:1 
D. Alexandria Clinic, P.A. ................................................................ 73 
E.  Saint Gobain Abrasives, Inc. ....................................................... 73 
F.  Crown Bolt, Inc. .......................................................................... 73 
G.  IBM Corp. .................................................................................... 74 
H. Oakwood Care Center ................................................................. 74 
J.  Oakwood Healthcare, Inc. ........................................................... 74 
K.  Toering Electrical Co. ................................................................. 75 
L.  Register-Guard ............................................................................ 76 
M. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. ................................................................... 76 
N.  St. George Warehouse ................................................................. 77 
O.  Dana Corp. .................................................................................. 77 
P.  Tru-Serv Corp.............................................................................. 78 
Q.  MV Transportation ...................................................................... 78 
R.  Allegheny Ludlum II .................................................................... 79 
S. BE & K Construction Co. II ........................................................ 79 
T.  Levitz Furniture Co. .................................................................... 80 
VI. Categorizing the Reversals: Comments and Conclusions ..................... 80 
A. Acquiescing to Adverse Court Precedent .................................... 81 
B.  Sharing the Misgivings of a Court .............................................. 81 
C.  Conflict in Board Precedents ....................................................... 82 
D.  Restoring an Older Precedent ...................................................... 82 
E. Opting for a Different Rule ......................................................... 82 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For 17 years (1990-2007), I was privileged to serve as chief counsel to a 
succession of five members of the National Labor Relations Board 
1 For more than six of those years, I was Chief Counsel to the 
Chairman.2 From this unique perspective, I had an opportunity to observe 
first-hand the process of decision-
3 This Article will address an 
important and controversial aspect of that process the action of a given 
                                                          
1.   I hold the record in this regard. The members and dates are as follows: John 
Randabaugh (1990-1994); Charles Cohen (1994-1996); John Higgins (1996-1997); 
Peter Hurtgen (1997-2002); Robert Battista (2002-2007). Prior to that service (1975-
1990), I was head of the General Cou
General Counsel and Regional Directors on novel and complex legal issues and on 
cases of major national importance. 
2.   I served as Chief Counsel to Chairman Peter J. Hurtgen from 2001 to 2002 and 
Chairman Robert J. Battista from 2002 to 2007.  
3.   See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 69 (2006) (declaring that 
the U.S. government will protect, inter alia, the right of employees to choose whether to 
unionize or not, under a policy of eliminating obstructions to the free flow of 
commerce).  
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set of Board Members to reverse the precedent of a prior set of Board 
Members.  
Each of these reversals has given rise to howls of protest by the party 
who lost and stout defenses by the party who won. Often, the heat of the 
conflict between the two parties is a measure of the importance of the issue. 
In this Article, I have sought to shed objective light where there has been 
only partisan heat. 
I shall begin, in Part III, with a discussion of the statutory basis for 
reversals. Part IV sets forth the arguments for and against the practice of 
reversing precedent. Part V will then list the most important recent 
reversals. Part VI will categorize these cases according to the basis for 
reversals. Finally, I will set forth my views concerning the circumstances 
under which reversals are appropriate or inappropriate. 
II. BACKGROUND 
As background, I note that the Board is composed of five Board 
Members, one of whom is designated as Chairman.4 Each Member is 
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate.5 The 
Members serve for five-year terms.6 Traditionally, the Board is composed 
of three Democrats and two Republicans when the President is a Democrat 
and three Republicans and two Democrats when the President is a 
Republican.7 
8 It is not 
 -versa. However, in 
recent years, this practice has increased markedly. This Article will focus 
on these most recent years.   
 
                                                          
4.   See National Labor Relations Act § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006) (stating 
he President shall designate [one of the five members of the Board] to serve as 
 
5.   Id. 
6.  Id.  
7.   See ERIC N. WALTENBERG, CHOOSING WHERE TO FIGHT: ORGANIZED LABOR 
AND THE MODERN REGULATORY STATE, 1948-1987, at 19 (2002) (describing the 
presidential appointme  
8.  See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Deadlock is Ending on Labor Board, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/01/business/01labor.html (assessing the changes that 
are likely to occur to Bush-era Board precedent recess 
appointments of two union lawyers to the NLRB ). 
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 III. THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR REVERSALS 
The Board has wide discretion to interpret the Act as it wishes.9 The Act 
is written in broad statutory terms.10 
develop and apply fundamental national labor policy . . . . [T]he function of 
striking [the balance between competing interests] is often a difficult and 
delicate responsibility which the Congress committed primarily to the 
[Board] 11 if 
and consistent with the Act . . . even if [the court] would have formulated a 
12 In light of this degree of 
discretion, it is to be anticipated that a given Board will not necessarily 
agree with a prior Board. Further, as noted above, Board Members are 
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.13 
Given political realit
vice-versa. As noted above and discussed below, that process has been 
accentuated in recent years.  
                                                          
9.  See NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, 
(Ironworkers), 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978) (noting that Congress delegated the task of 
effectuating labor policy to the Board and its decision-
see also NLRB v. Ins , 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960) 
he Board 
to resolve the conflicting interests that Congress has recognized in its labor 
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) 
 
difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the 
 
10.   See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ , Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 32 (1944) 
(reasoning that the Board, as a governmental agency, shall interpret the broad language 
of the Act to effectuate the policy and purposes of the Act), superseded by statute, 
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 137 
(1947), as recognized in, NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968). 
11.  Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500 01 (1978) (citing Truck 
Drivers, 353 U.S. at 96).  
Of course, if the Board acts contrary to a specific provision of the Act, a court will 
properly reverse the Board. See, e.g., H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107 08 
(1970) (reversing both a decision of the Board and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit because, even though the Board has broad powers to enforce the Act, its powers 
do not extend to compelling parties to contract).  
12.   NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 787 (2001) (citations 
omitted).   
13.   See National Labor Relations Act § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006). 
2011] WHEN ONE BOARD REVERSES ANOTHER 71 
IV.  ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE PRACTICE OF REVERSING 
PRECEDENT 
A. Arguments For: 
As discussed above, the practice of reversing precedent is consistent 
with, and indeed contemplated by, the broad language of the Act and by the 
appointment process of the Act. Further, a given Board Member is 
appointed with the expectation that she will vote on a case according to her 
conscience and her views as to what is best for national labor policy.14 If 
those views are contrary to extant precedent, it is not unreasonable for the 
Board member to decline to follow the precedent.   
economy may be quite different from that of yesterday. Thus, it may be 
prudent to change a precedent that was formulated at a different time under 
different conditions.   
B.   Arguments Against: 
A reversal of precedent results in instability, unpredictability and 
uncertainty in the law. Employers, employees, and unions cannot act in 
reliance on the law, for it may change. What is lawful today may be 
unlawful tomorrow and vice-versa. Further, lawyers run the risk that their 
best advice will have disastrous consequences based on such reliance. 
Finally, our society prides itself on being a nation of laws. Where precedent 
changes simply because a different political group is in power, the public 
becomes cynical about our ideals and disrespectful of the law.  
V.  RECENT REVERSALS OF PRECEDENT 
A.  Brown University  
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that graduate 
assistants who seek a degree at a university are students and not employees 
under the Act.15 In so holding, the Board reversed a contrary policy in New 
York University.16 It is interesting to note that New York University, had 
                                                          
14.   See NLRB v. West Tex Util. Co., 214 F.2d 732, 741 (5th Cir. 1954) (stating 
that the members of the Board are non-
hear the issues of fact and to apply the Act in matters of the highest importance to all 
, denying enf., 106 N.L.R.B. 859 (1953). 
15.   See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 493 (2004) (diverging from prior Board 
2(3) of the Act, and adopting the view that the collective-bargaining process would be 
counter to the educational process). 
16.   See New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205 06 (2000) (finding that even 
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itself reversed a precedent.17 
B.  Harborside Healthcare, Inc.  
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that a pro-union 
supervisory solicitation of union authorization cards from employees was 
inherently coercive, absent mitigating circumstances.18  Under prior law, 
coercion was found only if there was a promise of benefit or threat of 
reprisal.19  
C.  Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia  
In this case, a Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that 
unlawful on its face.20 In a prior ruling, the Board had held to the 
contrary.21 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce that prior 
ruling.22 In Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, the Board acquiesced to the 
23 le would be unlawful 
only if employees reasonably construed the words as prohibiting Section 7 
activity [the right] to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection 24 In addition, the rule is unlawful if the rule was 
discriminatorily motivated, or if the rule was actually applied to Section 7 
                                                          
though graduate assistants were predominantly students, they remained employees 
within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act). 
17.   See id. at 1217 (reasoning that physics graduate students who were receiving 
stipends for research were not employees under the Act (citing Leland Stanford, 214 
N.L.R.B. 621 (1974))). 
18.   See Harborside Healthcare, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 906, 906 (2004) (reversing the 
prior law that [was necessary] to 
find [the . 
19.   See id. 
were acceptable because they were conducted without threat of reprisal, punishment or 
intimidation (citing Millsboro Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 879, 880 
(1999))). 
20.   Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004). 
21.   See Adtranz, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 291, 293 94 (2000) (holding that the employer 
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a rule that prohibited abusive 
language unless the rule made it clear that the rule was not intended to bar lawful union 
organizing activity), enf. denied, F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
22.   See Adtranz, Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 19, 22, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (vacating the 
decision below 
no support for its contention that a contrary result could ), 
denying enf., 331 N.L.R.B. 291 (2000). 
23.   See Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. at 647. 
24.   Id. at 648 (citing National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)). 
2011] WHEN ONE BOARD REVERSES ANOTHER 73 
activity.25   
D.  Alexandria Clinic, P.A.  
Under Section 8(g) of the Act, a union must give a health care institution 
ten days notice before striking.26 In Alexandria Clinic, P.A., the union gave 
the required notice of day and time, but later delayed the start time for four 
hours.27 No new notice was sent.28 Under Greater New Orleans Artificial 
Kidney Center, 
-day rule.29 In Alexandria Clinic, a Board majority 
consisting of three Republicans held that there must be strict adherence to 
the Act, and thus a new ten-day notice was required.30 
E.  Saint Gobain Abrasives, Inc.  
In this case, a Board majority held that an employer is entitled to a 
factual hearing on whether unlawful conduct by the employer caused the 
employees to file a petition to decertify the union.31 Under prior law, the 
Board would presume that there was a causal nexus, and would dismiss the 
petition without a hearing.32 The new rule would result in a dismissal only 
if, after a hearing, a causal nexus was shown.33   
F.  Crown Bolt, Inc.    
Under prior law, an employer threat to close a plant in the event of 
unionization was presumed to have been widely disseminated throughout 
the facility, and this would taint the election process.34 In Crown Bolt, a 
Board majority consisting of three Republicans placed the burden of proof 
                                                          
25.   See id. at 647 (holding that a rule prohibiting abusive language is not a facial 
interference with Section 7 activity (citing Adtranz, 253 F.3d at 22 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
26.   See § 8(g), § 158(g). 
27.   See 339 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1262 (2003), enfd. sub nom. Minn. Licensed Practical 
. NLRB, 406 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2005).  
28.   Id. 
29.   240 N.L.R.B. 432 (1979). 
30.   See id. at 1263, 1266 (refusing to adopt the precedent of substantial 
compliance ). 
31.   See Saint Gobain Abrasives, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 434, 434 35 (2004). 
32.   C.f. id. at 435 (Liebman dissenting) (
on previous law where an evidentiary hearing was not necessary to determine causal 
nexus and that there was a presumption of such nexus (citing Priority One Servs., 331 
N.L.R.B. 1527, 1527 n.2 (2000))). 
33.   See id. at 434 (majority opinion). 
34.   See Springs Indus., 332 N.L.R.B. 40, 40 (2000) (noting that it was 
traditional position to overturn an election, because of presumed dissemination of the 
most serious threats, such as plant closure). 
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on the union to show such dissemination.35 In doing so, the Board returned 
to the rule of Kokomo Tube Co.36   
G.  IBM Corp.  
In this case, a Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that 
Weingarten rights37 do not apply to non-unionized employees.38 In so 
holding, the Board reversed the prior holding of Epilespy Foundation.39 
The Board returned to the rule of E.I. Dupont & Co.40 
H.  Oakwood Care Center 
Here, a Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that the 
employees of an employer (employer A) may not be placed, in a single unit, 
with employees who are jointly employed by A and another employer.41 In 
so holding the Board overruled Sturgis,42 and returned to Greenhoot, Inc.43 
J.  Oakwood Healthcare, Inc. 
In this case a Board majority consisting of three Republicans revised the 
test for determining supervisory status under the Act.44 The decision was 
                                                          
35.   See Crown Bolt, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 776, 779 (2004) (deciding to overrule 
Springs Industries and all other decisions that presume dissemination of plant-closure 
threats and requiring the objecting party to prove the dissemination and its impact on 
the election by direct and/or circumstantial evidence). 
36.   See 280 N.L.R.B. 357, 358 (1986). 
37.   See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 256 57 (1975) (holding that a 
unionized employee under interrogation by an employer has a right under Sections 7 
and 8(a)(1) of the Act upon request, to union representation). 
38.   See IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (2004) (reasoning that the purpose of 
the Act would be best preserved if the rights recognized in Weingarten do not extend to 
a workplace where, the employees are not represented by a union), enfd. sub nom. 
Schult v. NLRB, No. 04-1225, 2004 WL 259890 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curium). 
39.   See 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 676 (2000), enfd. in part, enf. denied in part, 268 F.3d 
1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Weingarten should be extended to employees in nonunionized 
workplaces to afford them the right to have a coworker present at an investigatory 
interview. Id.  
40.   See E.I. Dupont de Nemours (E.I. Dupont & Co.), 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 630 
(1988) (limiting Weingarten rights to unionized workplaces under the analysis that it 
between the conflicting interests of labor and management). 
41.   See Oakwood Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. 659, 663 (2004) (permitting 
collective bargaining units of solely and jointly employed employees only by consent). 
42.  See M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1308 (2000) (rejecting consent 
requirements for such units and adopting a policy that hinges on the presence of a 
community of interest ). 
43.  See Greenhoot, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 250, 251 (1973) (holding that a multi-
employer unit is not permitted unless there is a consensual basis for such a unit). 
44.   See Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 686 (2006) (following 
 and refining its analysis of 
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significant, because only employees and not supervisors are protected by 
the Act.45 In general, the Board made it easier to show supervisory status.46 
In revising the test, the Board was influenced by the fact that, in two prior 
decisions, the Supreme Court had disagreed with Board tests under which 
the Board had declined to find supervisory status.47  
K.  Toering Electrical Co. 
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans set forth a new 
requirement for determining that an applicant is an employee entitled to the 
protection of the Act.48 The case aros
campaign, i.e., the process in which a union sends union members to at job 
force at that site.49 Prior to Toering, it was not necessary for the General 
Counsel to establish prima facie that the union member was genuinely 
interested in seeking to establish an employment relationship.50 Under 
Toering, that fact 
facie case.51 
                                                          
assessing supervisory status (citing NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706 
(2001))). 
45.   See 348 N.L.R.B. at 687 (explaining that supervisors are excluded from the 
to include Section 
2(11) in response to 
employees for purposes of Section 2(3) (citing Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 
U.S. 485 (1947))).  
46.   See id. at 688 89 (reasoning that because the putative supervisors practiced 
independent judgment and regularly delegated tasks to subordinate employees, such as 
nurses assistants, registered nurses are considered supervisory and thus not covered 
under the Act). 
47.   See NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706, 706 (2001), , 193 F.3d 
444 (6th 1999). Persons 
authority to engage in any [one] of the [twelve] listed supervisory functions, (2) their 
use of independent judgment. e 
employer.  Id. (quoting NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 
573 74 (1994)).  
48.   Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 225, 234 (2007). 
49.   See id. at 225 
union member or members to an unorganized jobsite to obtain employment and then 
organize the employees citing Tualatin Elec., 312 
N.L.R.B. 129, 130 n.3 (1993))).  
50.   See, e.g., Progressive Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 538, 551 53 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (u by rationalizing that it was not necessary to first 
show that the union member was trying to seek an employment relationship before 
finding that the employer had engaged in an unfair labor practice by failing to consider 
to hire a group of union members), enfg., Progressive Elec., Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 426 
(2005).  
51.   See Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 231 (requiring that the General Counsel 
prove that the union member who is claiming an unfair labor practice first prove that 
76 THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM  [Vol. 1:1 
L.  Register-Guard 
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans ruled, inter alia, that in 
order to show employer discrimination in the administration of a computer-
use policy, the General Counsel must show that the employer engaged in 
disparate treatment of similar activity, i.e., the employer permitted some of 
these activities and prohibited others simply because of the Section 7 nature 
of the latter.52 
charitable solicitations and non-charitable solicitations, between 
solicitations of a personal nature . . . and solicitation for the commercial 
sale of a product . . . between solicitation and mere talk, and between 
business-related use and non business- 53 In each of these 
examples, the fact that union solicitation would fall on 
the prohibited side of the line [would] not establish  unlawful 
discrimination.54 In reaching this conclusion, the Board overruled Fleming 
Co.55 and Guardian Industries Corp.56  
M.  Anheuser-Busch, Inc.  
A Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that employer 
discipline imposed after an unlawful Weingarten interrogation was 
nonetheless legal.57 The employer interrogated an employee without 
observing the requirements of Weingarten.58 The employer thereby gleaned 
evidence that the employee had engaged in misconduct, and the employer 
disciplined the employee for this misconduct.59 Under some prior law the 
discipline would be unlawful because it was based on evidence that was 
                                                          
she was legitimately seeking employment). 
52.   Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1118 (2007) (placing the burden on the 
General Counsel when proving discrimination to show such disparate treatment), enfd. 
in part, enf. denied in part, remanded sub nom. 
53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
53.   Id.  
54.   Id. Of course, if the employer was motivated by the desire to assure that the 
union solicitations would be on the prohibited side of the line, that would be unlawful.   
55.   338 N.L.R.B. 192 (2001), enf. denied, 349 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 1995). 
56.   313 N.L.R.B. 1275 (1994), enfd. in part, enf. denied in part, 49 F.3d 317 (7th 
1995) in 
Register-Guard on the ground that the employer did not actually show the distinctions 
, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2009).   
57.   Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 560, 560 (2004), enfd. in part, enf. denied 
in part sub nom. Brewers and Maltsters, Local Union No. 6 v. NLRB, 414 F.3d 36 
(D.C. Cir. 2005). 
58.   See id. at 561. 
59.   See id. at 562 n.9 (stating that the discipline imposed on sixteen employees was 
for unprotected conduct that was in clear violation of plant rules and regulations).  
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unlawfully gathered.60 However, under conflicting precedent, the Board 
had upheld the discipline on the ground that it was for cause.61 The Board 
majority in Anheuser-Busch overruled Tocco62 and Great Western,63 
applied Taracorp,64 and thereby upheld the discipline despite the fact that 
the employee was not allowed to be accompanied by a union 
representative.65 
N.  St. George Warehouse  
In discriminatory discharge cases, the dischargee has the duty to mitigate 
damages, i.e., to search for interim work and thereby reduce the back pay 
award.66 Prior to St. George, the Board placed on the employer the burden 
of going forward with evidence to show that there was substantially 
equivalent work in the area and that the employee failed to seek it.67 In St. 
George, the Board majority consisting of three Republicans placed on the 
General Counsel the duty to show affirmatively that the employee searched 
for relevant work.68 
O.  Dana Corp. 
Under Keller Plastics, the Board held that where an employer has 
voluntarily and legally recognized a union as the representative of 
employees
                                                          
60.   See Tocco, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 480, 480 (1997). 
61.   See Taracorp, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 221 (1984) (overruling prior decisions such as 
Kraft Foods, 251 N.L.R.B. 598 (1980) and refusing to award reinstatement and 
backpay to an employee despite Weingarten violations, reasoning that doing so would 
violate the policy of the Act and would constitute bad policy).  
62.   323 N.L.R.B. 480. 
63.   Great Western Produce Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. No. 17 (1986), enfd. 839 F.2d 555 
(9th Cir. 1988). 
64.   273 N.L.R.B. 221. 
65.   Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 560, 561 (2004), ), enfd. in part, enf. 
denied in part sub nom. Brewers and Maltsters, Local Union No. 6 v. NLRB, 414 F.3d 
36 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
66.   See, e.g., NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 174 n.3 (2d Cir. 1965) 
e is not entitled to 
back pay to the extent that he fails to remain in the labor market, refuses to accept 
equivalent employment, fails diligently to search for alternative work, or voluntarily 
quits alternative employment without good reason ), enf. 140 N.L.R.B. 1710 (1964). 
67.   E.g., Woonsocket Health Ctr., 263 N.L.R.B. 1367, 1370 (1982) (stating that the 
; Steve Aloi Ford, 
Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. 661, 662 (1971) (noting that even though the General Counsel was 
not required to produce an employee for examination, the Trial Examiner should have 
examined witnesses and reviewed evidence in order to render her decision).  
68.   St. George Warehouse, 351 N.L.R.B. 961, 961 (2007). 
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reasonable period of time.69 In Dana, the Board majority consisting of three 
Republicans imposed additional requirements.70 The parties must give 
notice to employees that recognition has occurred and that employees can 
file petitions, within forty-five days, seeking an election to decertify the 
recognized union or to select another union.71 If such a petition is filed, an 
election will be held.72  
P.  Tru-Serv Corp.  
Under prior law, an employer settlement of an unfair labor practice case 
that contained a recognition clause would result in the dismissal of a 
decertification petition, where the alleged unlawful conduct occurred prior 
to the petition.73 In Tru-Serv, a Board majority consisting of three 
Republicans held that the decertification petition and election could still be 
held, absent an admission of a violation by the employer in the settlement 
agreement.74 In so ruling, the Board returned to the rule of Passavant.75 
Q.  MV Transportation  
Under prior law, where a successor employer recognized the union 
would not be challenged for a reasonable period of time.76  In MV 
Transportation, a Board majority of three Republicans and two Democrats 
ruled that the union was not entitled to such immunity.77 The reasonable 
period of time was deemed to have expired under the predecessor.78 In so 
                                                          
69.   Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 586 (1966). 
70.   Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 435 (2007) 
. 
71.   Id. 
72.   Id. 
73.   See Douglas-Randall, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 431, 431 (1995) (affirming the 
dismissal of a petition on the grounds that the showing of interest was tainted by the 
employe  
74.   Truserv Corp., 349 N.L.R.B. 227, 227 (2007). 
75.   See id. at 228 (returning to the rule of prior precedent a settlement agreement 
labor practice, unless an admission is an express part of the agreement (citing Passavant 
Health Ctr., 278 N.L.R.B. 483 (1986))).  
76.   See St. Elizabeth Manor, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 341, 341 (1996) (holding that once 
a successor employer recognizes an incumbent union, the union is entitled to a 
reasonable period of time for bargaining without challenge ).  
77.   See MV Transp., 337 N.L.R.B. 770, 770 (2002) (reverting to a standard where 
 the successor employer is rebuttable). 
78.   Id.   
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ruling, the Board returned to the rule of Southern Moldings.79   
R.  Allegheny Ludlum II 
Under prior law, an employer had to obtain explicit employee consent if 
the employer wished to include images of the employee in an anti-union 
campaign video.80 The Board applied this rule in Allegheny Ludlum I.81 The 
D.C. Circuit denied enforcement because the act of seeking consent might 
itself be unlawful interrogation under Section 8(1)(a).82 On remand, a 
Board majority of three Republicans and two Democrats held that the 
employer can make a general announcement which discloses that the 
pictures will be used, that participation is voluntary, that participation will 
not result in a benefit and that non-participation will not result in reprisal.83 
The pictures can then be used in the video, provided that the atmosphere is 
free from unfair labor practices.84 
S. BE & K Construction Co. II 
In BE & K Construction I, the Board dealt with a completed lawsuit that 
an employer had lost.85 The Board held that the lawsuit was unlawful if it 
was filed for an illegal motive.86 On review, the Supreme Court remanded 
for the Board to determine whether the lawsuit was nonetheless reasonably 
based and, if so, whether that would preclude the finding of a violation.87 
                                                          
79.   See id. (holding that unless the successor employer adopts the existing contract, 
a union only has a rebuttable presumption of continuing majority status (citing S. 
Moldings, 219 N.L.R.B. 119, 119 20 (1975))). 
80.   See Sony Corp. of Am., 313 N.L.R.B. 420, 420 (1993) (upholding the finding 
of the Administrative Law Judge that photographing employees and including their 
photographs in an anti-union video without their informed consent constitutes an unfair 
labor practice under the Act).   
81.   See Allegheny Ludlum Corp. (Allegheny Ludlum I), 320 N.L.R.B. 484, 484 
(1995), enf. denied in part, enfd. in part, 104 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
82.   See Alleghany Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 1354, 1363 64 (D.C. Cir. 
1997), denying enf. in part, enfg. in part, Allegheny Ludlum I, 320 N.L.R.B. 484 
(1995). 
83.   See Alleghany Ludlum Corp. (Alleghany Ludlum II), 333 N.L.R.B. 743, 745 
(2001) (clarifying when employers may lawfully include visual images of employees in 
campaign presentations), enfd., 301 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2002). 
84.   See id. at 745 (specifying that an employer may not, however, lawfully include 
representation, withou  
85.   See BE & K Constr. Co. (BE & K I), 329 N.L.R.B. 717, 717 18 (1999), enfd., 
246 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2001), , 536 U.S. 516 (2002). 
86.   See id. at 726 (holding that the identical claims brought by the company lacked 
merit and had a retaliatory motive in violation of Section 8(a)(1)). 
87.  See BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 536 (2002) (invalidating the 
yet unsuccessful, suits filed with retaliatory purpose). 
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On remand, a Board majority consisting of three Republicans held that the 
suit was reasonably based and that a reasonable lawsuit could not be 
condemned as unlawful, even if it was motivated by anti-union 
considerations.88 
T.  Levitz Furniture Co.  
In this case, the Board majority held that an employer could unilaterally 
withdraw recognition from a union only upon a showing that the union had 
actually lost majority status.89 Prior to that, the Board had said that the 
employer could unilaterally withdraw recognition from a union upon a 
showing that there was reasonable good-faith doubt of majority status.90  
In Levitz
Allentown Mack v. NLRB.91 In that case, the Court had expressed 
misgivings about the Board having a single standard for withdrawal of 
recognition, the filing of a petition, and employer polling.92 However, the 
93  
VI. CATEGORIZING THE REVERSALS: COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this Part, I will categorize the above reversals, and I will then make 
comments and reach conclusions as to the propriety of reversal for each 
category. 
                                                          
88.   See BE & K Constr. Co. (BE & K II), 351 N.L.R.B. 451, 459 (2007) (adopting 
a standard that requires more than just circumstantial proof of retaliatory motive 
(quoting BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 451, 539 (2002) (Souter, J., 
concurring))). 
89.   See Levitz Furniture Co., 333 N.L.R.B. 717, 717 (2001). 
90.   See, e.g., Celanese  Corp. of Am., 95 N.R.L.B. 664, 674 (1951) (concluding 
that in light of the totality of the circumstances, the employer was not required to avail 
representative status in order to demonstrate its good faith).  
91.   See Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. at 717 (
decision in Allentown Mack 
 (citing Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. 
NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 365 66, 373 74  (1998))).  
92.   See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 365 66, 373 74  
(1998) 
majority status).  
93.  See id. 
withdrawals puzzling policy, not so puzzling as to be 
Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. at 717 (holding that an 
employer may only withdraw recognition when the incumbent union has lost the 
efeat a post-
.  
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A. Acquiescing to Adverse Court Precedent 
As discussed above, some of the reversals are because of adverse court 
precedent. In a situation where the Board loses before a circuit court, the 
Board has three options: it can seek certiorari in that case;94 it can adhere to 
the rejected precedent in another case and seek a favorable result in a 
different circuit;95 or it can acquiesce to the view of the adverse court 
decision and make that the new position of the Board. Only the latter 
involves a reversal of precedent.  
In cases where a circuit court has disagreed with Board precedent, it may 
court has a sound basis for its view. This becomes even more compelling if 
the Board loses in circuit after circuit. Of course, it may also be reasonable 
for the Board to stick to its guns. 
turn on the importance of the issues to national labor policy. 
 B.  Sharing the Misgivings of a Court  
As discussed above, there are cases where the reviewing court has 
the position of the Board as within  discretion.96 In these cases 
own precedent.97   
In cases where a court has simply expressed misgivings about a Board 
position, it would seem that the Board can reasonably adhere to its position 
particularly when no other court has expressed such misgivings. However, 
in doing so, the Board may wish to set forth its reasons for not sharing the 
misgivings of the one court. 
                                                          
94.   See, e.g., NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tenn., 415 U.S. 322, 326 (1974) 
(reversing a Sixth Circuit decision and upholding the N
the right of employees embodied in Section 7 of 
the Act). 
95.   If the Board prevails in another circuit, there would be a conflict of circuits, 
thereby enhancing the prospects for Supreme Court review. This is what occurred with 
favorable results in NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tenn., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).  
96.   See Alleghany Ludlum v. N.L.R.B., 104 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(noting that the D.C. Circuit on only when the Board 
 (Electronic Workers) v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 1532, 1536 37 (D.C. Cir. 
1994))), denying enf. in part, enfg. in part, Allegheny Ludlum I, 320 N.L.R.B. 484 
(1995). 
97.   C.f. Oakwood Healthcare Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 687, 687 88 (2006) 
(changing Board precedent to coincide with warnings received in two different cases 
from the Supreme Court that the Board 
narrowly). 
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 C. Conflict in Board Precedents 
As also discussed above, there are some cases where there is a conflict in 
98 In that situation, the Board can adopt one line of 
cases and overrule the other or it can overrule both and adopt a third view. 
reconciled, the Board has little choice but to overrule one line and adopt the 
other, or overrule both and adopt a third line.  
 D. Restoring an Older Precedent  
As discussed above, there are cases where the Board reverses precedent 
in order to return to an even older precedent.99 In those cases, the Board can 
claim that it is simply restoring the law to what it once was.100  
If the original precedent lasted for many years without court disapproval, 
it may be reasonable to reverse the recent precedent and return to the prior 
one. However, in doing so, there is a danger that a subsequent Board may 
reverse it again. The ping-pong match and the instability would continue. 
of each approach, conclude, on balance, why one is better than the other, 
and express the hope that this will finally settle the matter. 
E. Opting for a Different Rule 
Finally, as discussed above, there are cases where the Board simply 
concludes, on its own, that the precedent does not make sense and opts for 
a different rule.101 In these cases where none of the elements set forth in 
A through D above are present the Board simply disagrees with the 
precedent of a prior Board.102 As stated at the outset, changes like these 
lead to instability, unpredictability, and disrespect for the law. Thus, in my 
view, the burden is on the reversing Board to justify the change.  
                                                          
98.   See, e.g., Alleghany Ludlum
, 
 
99.   E.g., Crown Bolt, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 776, 776 (2004) (abandoning the 
precedent of Springs Industries and adopting the prior precedent established in Kokomo 
Tube Co. requiring that an objecting party must prove the impact on the election by 
direct and circumstantial evidence).  
The chain of reversals may go back even further.  Trying to resolve who made the 
-yard fight. 
100.  See, e.g., Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 489
concerns expressed by the Board in  [twenty-five] years ago are 
just as relevant today  
101.  E.g., Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 228 (2007) (grounding  
decision in statutory policy). 
102.  See Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 644 (2007). 
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Ideally, one would hope for empirical data showing that the precedent 
has had undesirable economic consequences or has had results that are 
inconsistent with the policies of the Act. However, under Section 4(a) of 
103 Notwithstanding this, there is nothing to preclude the Board 
from relying on academic or other studies, or to receive and rely upon 
Brandeis briefs. Absent such empirical support, it is my view that the 
Board should be reluctant to reverse precedent in this situation.  
                                                          
103.  See 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006). 
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When President Barack Obama nominated Service Employees 
International Union ( SEIU )  Associate General Counsel Craig Becker to 
serve on the National Labor Relations Board ( NLRB r Board ), some 
commentators argued that he would impose a controversial method of 
recognizing unions, known as card-check or majority sign-up, through the 
administrative process.1 This method of recognizing unions was stalled in 
                                                          
*   J.D. Candidate, May 2011, American University, Washington College of Law; 
M.A. Candidate, International Development, December 2011, American University, 
School of International Service. A special thanks to Gwen and Bill Nutting for 
supporting my education over the years.  
1.   See Editorial, Back Door Card Check, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2010, at A20, 
available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703597204575483882585485368.htm
l (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) (suggesting Becker will push the NLRB to implement the 
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Congress in the Employee Free Choice Act ( EFCA ).2 The current Board 
practice, in general
obligation only if the union has won an NLRB-certified secret ballot 
election.3 Although the Supreme Court has affirmed this interpretation of 
the National Labor Relations Act ( NLRA ),4 the Board retains 
the discretion to change its interpretation under the Chevron doctrine.5  
The NLRB could expand the methods by which a union may be 
recognized as the representative of a bargaining unit with approval by a 
majority of employees.6 It would be wel
power to impose this change using its adjudication process, although it is 
unlikely that the Board will move in this direction.7 Additionally, the nature 
of the Board is such that its membership undergoes a complete turnover 
during the course of a presidential term, and thus there is no guarantee that 
the new rule would remain on the books for long.  
Currently, the Employee Free Choice Act is pending in Congress, but its 
                                                          
Craig Becker: 
, THE FOUNDRY (Mar. 26, 2010, 2:00 PM), 
http://blog.heritage.org/2010/03/26/craig-becker-big-labor%E2%80%99s-big-ally/ (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2010) (denouncing recess appointment of Becker because his past 
reflects a bias against employers and support for the card check); Brad Peck, Craig 
Becker , THE CHAMBER POST (Jul. 25, 2009, 8:48 AM), 
http://www.chamberpost.com/2009/07/craig-becker-card-checks-inside-man.html (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2010) (seeking further scrutiny 
may lead Becker to eliminate the secret ballot through a position on the NLRB). 
2.   See Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009); Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009) (providing an amendment to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
159(c) (2006), to enable the Board to designate a labor organization as the exclusive 
tions designating the 
individual or labor organization specified in the petition as their bargaining 
 
3.   See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 310 (1974) 
(holding, absent evidence of unfair labor practices on the part of an employer, a union 
in possession of authorization cards must commence to an NLRB-certified election).  
4.   National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 69 (2006). 
5.   See, e.g., Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398 99, 402 03 (1996) 
(ap
the reasonableness of the interpretation given the ambiguity of the statutory language 
(citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984))); 
see generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
 
6.   See Mark Schoeff Jr., NLRB Decisions Could Make Card Check a Reality, 
WORKFORCE MGMT. (Jul. 2009), available at           
http://www.workforce.com/section/03/feature/26/5/2/97/265299_printer.html (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2010) (observing, as former NLRB Chairman William Gould, IV 
stated, that the NLRB frequently reverses its interpretation of labor law). 
7.    See id. (noting that the NLRB has other methods of ordering union recognition 
through card-check short of reversing long-standing Board precedent). 
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future is uncertain at best.8 This legislation would provide card-check 
recognition during union organization campaigns, rather than allowing 
employers to demand a NLRB-certified secret-ballot election.9 The 
measure is supported by labor because it will increase union membership.10 
However, those who oppose this legislation cite its undemocratic nature 
and the possibility that unions may use coercion to obtain signed cards.11  
President Obama came under fire for ignoring labor issues during his 
first year in office and his inability to navigate around Republican efforts to 
block new labor legislation.12 A policy shift within the NLRB itself may be 
-labor.13 The controversy over 
the EFCA makes it unlikely for the Board to wait for a statutory 
amendment to implement card-check method.14   
This Article will examine whether the NLRB has the power to make the 
card-check method law through the administrative process. Part II explains 
and defines card-check recognition.15 Part III discusses the statutory 
                                                          
8.   See Daniel Malloy, Labor-Business Class Shifts from Congress, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 17, 2011, A-1, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/11017/1118574-84.stm (observing, given backers of the EFCA were 
 
9.   See Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009); Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009) (mandating, upon passage, the NLRB to determine the substance and procedure 
of adjudicating authorization card validity).  
10.   See Sam Hananel, ABC NEWS, Organized L
What Now? (Feb. 27, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=9963922 
inability to get its goals through the Democratic-controlled Congress).  
11.   See 
of Commerce to S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions (Jul. 24, 2009) 
available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/hill-
letters/090724_becker.pdf -labor views incline 
him to implement portions of EFCA absent congressional passage most notably 
 
12.   See Hananel, supra note 10 (discussing the AFL-
the first year of his administration). 
13.   See Melanie Trottman & Kris Maher, 
Favor of Unions, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2010, at A5, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704804504575606872095817474.htm
l (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) (observing that Republican gains in Congress after the 
November 2010 election effectively killed EFCA). 
14.   See id. (reviewing the Obama- -era 
NLRB decisions). 
15.   See infra Part II (defining card-check and its significance in relation to the 
EFCA). 
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framework for recognition of union representatives.16 Part IV provides a 
historical overview of the development of the law surrounding the union 
recognition process.17 Part V of this Article discusses whether and how the 
administrative process could be used to make card-check the law despite 
Congressional inaction.18 Additionally, Part V argues that although it is 
possible under current administrative and labor law to do so, such a policy 
would be short-lived.19 Part VI concludes that it in the best interest of 
organized labor to pursue passage of the Employee Free Choice Act rather 
than to encourage the NLRB to act on its own.20 
II. WHAT IS THE CARD-CHECK METHOD? 
Put simply, card-check is a way to document majority support for a 
union through signed cards rather than going through a certification 
election.21 Card-check is not an alien concept in American labor law, 
because an employer may choose to recognize a union based on cards and 
opt to never raise a challenge t
actually support the organizational will of employees.22 Once recognized, 
the employer has many of the same legal obligations with respect to that 
union as though the union had won certification after a secret ballot 
election.23 If the employer refuses to recognize the union voluntarily, then 
                                                          
16.   See infra Part III (indentifying and explaining Sections 8(a)(5) and 9(c) in 
 
17.   See infra  from 
accepting a card-check method to a secret ballot election). 
18.   See infra Part V.A (exploring the possibility that the Board could adopt card-
check through adjudication under a Chevron two-step process). 
19.   See infra Part V.B (discussing the problems with and administrative 
adjudication accepting card-check). 
20.   See infra Part VI (stating that an adoption through the EFCA is favored over an 
adjudication by the Board due to the potential political costs and negative 
implications). 
21.   See Hananel, supra note 10 (noting that opponents fear Becker may try to 
impose a policy that subverts majority-rule election with majority-rule authorization 
cards carte blanche without Congressional endorsement for such a complete shift). 
22.   See Mark Schoeff, Jr., NLRB Decisions Could Make Card Check a Reality, 
WORKFORCE MGMT., Jul. 2009, available at 
http://www.workforce.com/section/03/feature/26/5/2/97/265299_printer.html (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2010) (stating the policy regarding card-check authorization for union 
representation is currently in the hands of the employer, who may request a NLRB-
supervised and certified election prior to recognizing a union as the exclusive 
bargaining representative for employees).  
23.   But cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 598 99 & n.14 (1969) 
(allowing employers who have voluntarily recognized a union on the basis of 
to ascertain whether the union still retains a majority of employee support (citing 
Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 75 (1954))).  
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the question of representation must be resolved through a secret ballot 
election, and the cards become moot.24 The card-check measure included in 
the EFCA would make recognition mandatory if a majority of employees 
pronounce their support of the union by signing cards.25 This Article 
obligation to bargain through the use of card-check absent the statutory 
amendments proposed in the EFCA.  
III. THE STATUTORY BASIS OF AN EMPLOYER S OBLIGATION TO ENGAGE 
IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The NLRA contains two provisions that are key to the discussion at 
hand: Sections 9(c) and 8(a)(5).26 Currently, under Section 9(c), whenever 
27 The Board possesses 
Section 9(c)28 Section 8(a)(5).29 Hence, the 
Board could potentially expand the applicability of card-check by adopting 
30   
Sometimes a secret ballot election is impractical.31 Under Section 
certified Section 9(a) 
                                                          
24.   See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation 
Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 513 14 (1993) (observing 
that employee signed authorization cards do not create a statutory duty to bargain with 
in the absence of an NLRB secret 
ballot election is not an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of 
the NLRA).  
25.   Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2009) (proposing an amendment to 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006) to require certification 
n a unit appropriate for bargaining has signed valid 
authorizations designating the individual or labor organization specified in the petition 
 
26.   See National Labor Relations Act,  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006) (making an 
representatives of his employees, 
(requiring the Board to investigate a petition presented by a union to the NLRB to 
representation . . . exists [sic] shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice . 
. . [and] if [the Board] finds that such a  question of representation exists, it shall direct 
an election by secret ballot  
27.   § 159(c)(1)(B). 
28.   Id. 
29.   § 158(a)(5). 
30.   § 159(c)(1)(B). 
31.   See Becker, supra note 24, at 515 18 (noting the difficulties with trying to 
apply the political election process to the workplace environment).  
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representative of its employees is an unfair labor practice.32 Section 8(a)(5) 
has been used to establish a collective bargaining obligation where an 
untainted secret ballot election is impossible and majority support can be 
established on an alternative basis.33  
IV. EVOLUTION OF BOARD PRACTICE 
, the NLRB initially allowed unions to 
become certified based on a variety of evidence demonstrating majority 
support.34 Due to political pressure, the Board shifted away from card-
check and other evidence in favor of secret ballot elections,35 a move that 
was codified in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.36  
The original language of the National Labor Relations Act allowed 
, or 
[the use of] any other suitable method to ascertain [sic] such 
37 
authorization cards, membership applications, petitions, affidavits of 
membership, signatures of employees receiving strike benefits from a 
to resolve questions of representation.38  
In 1939, the Board under pressure from various actors on all sides of 
the political spectrum abandoned its practice of certifying unions without 
a Board-supervised secret ballot election.39 The Taft-Hartley Act codified 
                                                          
32.   § 158(a)(5). 
33.   See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 579 (1969) (stating that a 
union ma
 
34.   See Becker, supra note 24
forms of eviden
majority support, signed authorization cards were primarily relied upon). 
35.   See Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526, 531-32 (1939) (endorsing secret 
elections as the best way to effectuate the National Labor Relations Act). See also 
Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078 (1966) (stating that secret elections are 
-  
36.   See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 9, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 
Stat. 136, 144 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2006)) (amending the 
general language of Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 to limit 
certification to secret ballot elections). 
37.   See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449, 453 
(1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-53, 157, 159 61, 163, 165-67 (2006)). 
38.   Becker, supra note 24, at 508. 
39.   See id. at 508 10 (lamenting that the first several years of the NLRB resulted in 
universal criticism for the Board, including the President, Congress, the press, 
employers, and unions). See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. at 531 32 
(endorsing the use of the secret ballot to select the representative union). 
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this restriction by changing the language of Section a 
question of representation exists, [the Board] shall direct an election by 
40 In Aaron Bros., a case 
decided by the Board in 1966, the Board held 
bargain would not violate Section 8(a)(5) if the union had been selected in 
the absence of an election.41 In 1969, the Supreme Court held, in NLRB v. 
Gissel Packing Co., 
satisfactory indeed the preferred method of ascertaining whether a 
42  
Specifically, in regard to authorization cards, the Board has an 
inconsistent history.43 In 1949, the Board promulgated the Joy Silk 
doctrine.44 
authorization cards did not adequately demonstrate its 
majority status constituted a proper defense to a Section 8(5)(a) unfair labor 
practice allegation.45 Good faith did not apply where, for example, other 
unfair labor practices occurred or the employer failed to provide a reason 
for her doubt.46  
T
For instance, in Aaron Bros., an employer that had no prior bargaining 
relationship with the union was found not to be acting in bad faith when it 
; despite not offering 
compelling reasons.47 In that case, the Board held that to find bad faith, the 
                                                          
40.   § 159(c). 
41.   See 
refusal to bargain must also be in good faith and without other indicia of misconduct).   
42.   395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969). 
43.   See id
three separate phases: (1) under the Joy Silk doctrine, (2) under the rules of the Aaron 
Bros.  
44.   See Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264 (1949) (holding that an 
em
status and in conjunction with a refusal to bargain until such an election happens is a 
violation of Section 8(a)(5)), enfd. as modified, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
45.   See id. 
rejection of the collective barraging principle or by desire to gain time within which to 
see also NLRB v. Gissel 
Pa Joy Silk doctrine], an employer 
could lawfully refuse to bargain with a union claiming representative status through 
majorit  
46.   See Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 592 93 (observing that the Joy Silk doctrine 
did not apply where the employer committed independent unfair labor practices 
indicative of bad faith).  
47.   See Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078 80 (1966) 
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among workers.48  The Board elaborated that a failure to state a reason 
when questioning a majority status is not evidence of bad faith, unless the 
facts and circumstances of the case support that conclusion.49  
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., several unions filed unfair labor practice 
charges against employers although, in some cases, secret ballot elections 
had not taken place.50 The unions argued that employers had violated 
Section 8(a)(5) when a majority of employees, in an appropriate unit, 
signed authorization cards and the employers had committed other unfair 
labor practices that eliminated the possibility of a fair secret ballot 
election.51 The employers argued that their refusal to bargain was 
legitimate, because the authorization cards did not settle the question of 
representation.52 The NLRB issued bargaining orders and reasoned that the 
authorization cards were sufficient to establish that a majority of employees 
in the bargaining unit supported the union as their representative and that 
the employers had ulterior motives rather than good faith doubt in regard to 
majority status.53 Additionally, the NLRB determined that the 
employers had committed unfair labor practices in violation of Sections 
8(a)(1) and (3).54 
decision and bargaining orders with respect to the Section 8(a)(5) claim, 
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) 
claims.55 interpretation of Section 
                                                          
 
48.   Id. at 1079. 
49.   See id. at 1079 (
questioning the union's majority is a determination which of necessity must be made in 
the light of all the relevant facts of the case, including any unlawful conduct of the 
employer, the sequence of events, and the time lapse between the refusal and the 
unlawfu ; see also Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 593 (noting that after Aaron 
Bros
.  
50.   See 395 U.S. at 580 (recounting the various allegations of coercion and 
intimidation that the employers utilized against the unions and their supporters). 
51.   See id. at 580 82 (observing that elections, subsequent to the signed 
authorization cards and the alleged unfair labor practices, either never occurred or 
resulted in victory for the employers).  
52.   Id. at 580. 
53.   See id. at 582
eir violation of Section 8(a)(5)). 
54.   See id. 
unlawful interrogations, surveillance, promised benefits, and terminations of union-
supporting employees). 
55.   NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336, 337 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) 
338 39 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) NLRB v. 
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8(a)(5) and fully enforced the bargaining order56 creating a circuit split.57 
In order to resolve the issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to all 
four c 58  
At oral argument before the Supreme Court in Gissel, the Board 
abandoned the good faith standard and instead relied upon the existence of 
other unfair labor practices to establish an Section 8(a)(5) violation.59 The 
n, regardless 
of his subjective motivation, so long as he is not guilty of misconduct; he 
need give no affirmative reasons for rejecting a recognition request, and he 
60 
However, the Court adde
he knew, through a personal poll for instance, that a majority of his 
61 Because the employers had committed 
unfair labor practices that prevented a fair election, the Supreme Court 
appropriate in cases where there is no interference with the election 
processes 62 Thus, Gissel Packing 
does not include cases where a union collects authorization cards from a 
majority of employees without employer interference.  
The NLRB and the Supreme Court addressed that question in Linden 
Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB in 1974.63 In Linden Lumber, the 
union had obtained authorization cards from a majority of employees, but 
the employer refused to recognize the union.64 The union filed for an 
election pursuant to Section 9(c), to which the employer stated that it would 
refuse to abide by the result. This prompted the union to withdraw its 
petition. Linden argued that two of the employees were actually 
                                                          
Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Gen. Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 
339, 340 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) NLRB v. 
Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575 (1969).  
56.   NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157, 161 62 (1st Cir. 1968), 
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
57.   See id. at 585, 589
interpretation of Section 8(a)(5) in the First and Fourth Circuits). 
58.   See Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 579. 
59.   Id. at 594. 
60.   Id.  
61.   Id. 
62.   Id. at 595. 
63.   See 419 U.S. 301, 302 (1974) (couching that the question presented in Linden 
Lumber Gissel 
Packing). 
64.   Id.  
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supervisors, and their participation in organizing a recognitional strike had 
compromised the reliability of the authorization cards. The only unfair 
labor practice that Linden was charged with was failing to bargain with the 
in violation of Section 8(a)(5).65 The Board 
bor 
practice,66 and the Supreme Court subsequently upheld this policy as a 
67  
Since Linden Lumber
s in which an 
employer denies a demand for recognition.68 It is so broad that Board 
policy essentially always calls for an election as a prerequisite for 
recognition, unless the employer recognizes the union voluntarily or 
commits an unfair labor practice that would taint any election results.69 The 
discretion.70  
V. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
The NLRB is composed of five members, appointed by the President and 
charged with the administration of the NLRA.71 Typically, the Board 
announces rules through adjudication rather than rulemaking.72 As such, if 
the Board is presented with an ideal set of facts for it to re-examine the 
                                                          
65.   Id.  
66.   Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 721 (1971), enf. 
denied sub nom. Truck Drivers Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 
1973),  Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 
301 (1974). 
67.   See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 309 10 (holdi
 
68.   See id. at 310 (placing the burden on unions to follow through with their 
election petitions before the NLRB prior to claiming authorization cards to resolve 
questions of representation). 
69.   See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS ACT:  GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW UNDER THE STATUTE AND 
PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 9 (1997). 
70.   See, e.g., John Cueno, Inc. v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 1178, 1183 (1983) (applying 
Linden Lumber to require a union to demonstrate majority status through an NLRB 
certified election).  
71.   See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006). 
72.   Cf. Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative 
Law Exile: Problems with its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 
DUKE L.J. 2013, 2017 -and-comment 
rulemaking makes it immune to the frequent post-Administrative Procedure Act waves 
of regulatory reform that have focused on the rationalization and coordination of 
 
2011] CAN CARD-CHECK BE UNILATERALLY IMPOSED BY THE NLRB? 95 
question, it can announce a new rule via adjudication.73  To present an 
opportunity to change the current rule, a dispute must arise from an 
has demonstrated, through signed authorization cards, that a majority of 
employees within an appropriate bargaining unit have requested 
representation. The representative would have to file an unfair labor 
practice charge against the employer for violating Section 8(a)(5).74 Then, 
the Board could rule on the question of what is required to show that a 
union has been selected as the representative under Section 8(a)(5).  
The Board could then announce a new interpretation of Section 
8(a)(5)
collecting signed authorization cards from a majority of employees in an 
appropriate bargaining unit, even if there are no other allegations of unfair 
labor practices and a fair election would be possible. In doing so, the 
NLRB could change the policy of 
under Section 9(c) wherever the employer disputes such representation, and 
implement a more restrictive approach that would require the employer to 
show cause an allegation that the 
cards were invalid because they were collected over too long of a time 
period or some evidence of fraud rather than just the absence of an 
election. Representation could exist where a union has demonstrated that a 
majority of employees have signed union cards, and the union could avoid 
a secret ballot election.   
An employer would probably appeal such a sweeping change in Board 
policy.75 Upon ultimate review, the Supreme Court might uphold the policy 
authority. The only insurmountable legal restraints on the Boa
rulemaking authority are embodied in statutes enacted by Congress and 
from rulings of the Supreme Court.76 Indeed, the traditionally preferred 
method of rulemaking by the Board rules made through adjudication
                                                          




74.   29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) (2006). 
75.   See 
final order of the Board . . . may obtain a review of such order in any Unites States 
court of appeals in the circuit [where personal jurisdiction exists over a party] . . . or, in 
 
76.   Cf. Michael C. Harper, 
of Chevron and Brand X, 80 B.U. L. REV. 189, 191 92 (2009) (arguing that courts can 
rulemaking power). 
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are rightly subject to challenge in subsequent adjudications even if the 
rules are of general applicability.77 On the other hand, because the Board 
has complete turnover every five years and it is not required to rely on 
principles of stare decisis, it is often criticized for the uncertainty 
surrounding the policies that it promulgates.78 The next section will discuss 
whether such a policy change should survive judicial review.  
A. Argument to Uphold Card-Check Unilaterally Imposed by the NLRB 
Under Chevron, judicial review of agency decision-making is a two-step 
process.79 First, the Court must ask whether the statute in question has a 
clear meaning.80 If the relevant statute is ambiguous, then step two requires 
reasonable.81 From the current language of Section 9(c), there is no 
ambiguity under Chevron step one as to whether a secret ballot is necessary 
to certify a bargaining representative 
.82 ret 
ambiguous provisions of the Act either broadly or narrowly.83 Therefore, 
what constitutes a question of representation may be validly subject to the 
Board  interpretation under Chevron step one because the NLRA is 
ambiguous as to what constitutes a question of representation.84 In Linden 
                                                          
77.   See Claire Tuck, Note, Policy Formulation at the NLRB:  A Viable Alternative 
to Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2005) (noting 
 
78.   See id. at 1118, 1120 (observing that both employers and unions are sometimes 
reluctant to comply with Board decisions if the decision is controversial and may be 
overturn by a later Board). 
79.   Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
80.   See id. at 842
dire  
81.   See id. at 843 (holding that a reviewing court must not supplant its own 
statutory construction, but
  
82.   See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
83.   See, e.g. 32 (1944) 
workers to help effectuate the policies of the NLRA), superseded by statute, Labor 
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), as 
recognized in NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968); see also Jamison 
F. Grella, Comment, From Corporate Express to FedEx Home Delivery: A New Hurdle 
for Employees Seeking the Protections of the National Labor Relations Act in the D.C. 
Circuit, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL Y & Law 877, 901 02 (2010) (arguing that 
courts should give the NLRB the most deference when it is interpreting the scope of the 
NLRA). 
84.   See 
question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall 
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Lumber, the Supreme Court did not determine that the Gissel Packing 
approach requiring an election in the absence of voluntary recognition or 
substantial unfair labor practices was the only acceptable approach.85 
Rather, Justice Douglas explained,  
In light of the statutory scheme [of the NLRA] and the practical 
administrative procedural questions involved, we cannot say that 
fusal to recognize the 
authorization cards was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of 
discretion.86  
This decision occurred before Chevron, but the Court understood its role 
was not to mandate an interpretation, but to oversee the process used to 
reach that interpretation.87   
Having satisfied the first step, the next question is whether a narrower 
interpretation would be reasonable under Chevron step two.88 A narrow 
construction of what constitutes a question of representation neither need 
be confined within the statutory language, nor would it be arbitrary and 
capricious.89 The current policy is very broad, and allows an employer to 
question representation without cause.90 It need not be so extreme indeed, 
a policy limiting the reach of this provision to situations in which there is a 
legitimate question of representation may be more reasonable than its 
predecessor. By limiting the application of Section 9(c), Section 8(a)(5) 
would apply only when 
of Section 8(a unions can 
obtain the status as the representative independent of their certification 
through secret ballot election.91 Congress easily could have changed the 
                                                          
85.   See Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309 10 
discretion not a search for the best policy). 
86.   Id. 
87.   Id. at 310. 
88.   Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
89.   See, e.g., INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 46 (1981) (holding that the 
ly encroached on the authority which the 
[Immigration and Nationality] Act confers on the Attorney General . . . [to determine] 
§ 1254(a)(1)). 
90.   See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 310. 
91.   See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575, 599 600 (1969) (declaring that 
Section 9(c)(1)(B) does nothing to relieve the bargaining obligation on employers 
practices disruptive of the Board  
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contrary result. Section 8(a)(5) stands on its own as an unfair labor 
practice, and nothing in the statutory context implies that it must be 
accompanied by another unfair labor practice for an uncertified, but 
majority-supported, union to invoke it.92 Thus, it is permissible to define 
these labels differently, 
enabling unions to establish representative status through card-check rather 
than secret ballot elections. Card-check is already a legitimate means to 
establish majority support where the employer consents, and if the NLRA 
extended that to situations where the employer does not raise a legitimate 
o 
be a reasonable interpretation of the NLRA.   
B. Argument to Reverse Card-Check Unilaterally Imposed by the NLRB 
Proponents of reversal could first argue that the statute is not ambiguous 
under step one of Chevron.93 If a statute is not ambiguous, and the Supreme 
agency discretion in changing the rule.94 Since the Supreme Court has 
already ruled on Section 8(a)(5) specifically where 
unions, supported by authorization cards where no other unfair labor 
practices occurred that prevent a fair election, cannot claim there is a 
Section 8(a)(5) bargaining obligation the Board
is curtailed.95   
If the Court, however, finds that the statute is ambiguous, then it will 
proceed to step two of Chevron.96 Here, opponents can argue that the 
proposed new interpretation is unreasonable in light of congressional 
intent. For instance, they could argue that the Taft-Hartley amendments to 
the NLRA intentionally excluded the card-check as a means to become a 
the Taft-
representation either or through 
97 The 
                                                          
92.   See id. at 597 98 (stating that unions may establish their majority status, for 
-called strike or a strike vote[,]  in 
addition to possession of authorization cards).  
93.   Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 43. 
94.   See id. at 843 
construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear 
 
95.   See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 309 10. 
96.   Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 43. 
97.   See Becker, supra note 24, at 505 06 & n.39 (alteration in original) (quoting 
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 9(c), Pub. L. No. 198, 29 Stat. 449, 453 
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 9(c) (2006))). 
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Taft-Hartley Act amended this language and omitted the language 
permitting other suitable methods in favor of secret ballot elections.98 In 
light of the statutory revisions, no permissible interpretation of the statute 
allows using authorization cards to determine a question of representation. 
The fact that a representative is not certified or voluntarily recognized is 
sufficient to raise a question of representation, and it would be counter to 
congressional intent if the Board promulgated such a rule through a back 
channel such as adjudication.  
Section 8(a)(5) from 
ployer 
or certified as such [(through an election)] under [Section 9(a)] 99 was 
intended to extend protection to representatives whose majority support 
could not be determined in a fair election as a result of unfair labor 
practices.100 It was not meant to provide to unions where the only proof 
of their majority support is authorization cards signed by employees the 
statutory right to bargain with employers mandated by Section 8(a)(5). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Both sides have strong legal arguments in their favor. As a legal matter, 
if the NLRB maneuvered the card-check method into the regulatory 
scheme regulating labor relations, that decision would likely survive 
judicial review. Congress intended that the NLRB determine what raises a 
question of representation, who is representative, 
and how majority support can be demonstrated where no question of 
representation exists.101 The NLRB is supposed to interpret the Act, 
including Sections 8(a)(5) and 9(c), even if the issue has previously been 
decided.102 Allowing the card-check method to suffice as evidence that an 
employer has an obligation to enter into collective bargaining is a 
reasonable reading of Section 8(a)(5), and limiting the scope of questions 
of representation that have legitimate bases in fact is a reasonable reading 
of Section 9(c).  
                                                          
98.   See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006). 
99.   See H.R. 3020, at 21 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 31, 51 (1959, 1985 prtg.) 
(emphasis added).  But cf. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(a)(5), 
Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(5) (2006)) (stating, for purposes of Section 8(a)(5), that employers must bargain 
 
100.  See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575, 599 600 (1969). 
101.  § 159(c)(1)(B). 
102.  See § 156 (giving the Board the power to engage in any rule or decision-
making activities permitted by the Administrative Procedures Act in order to effectuate 
the NLRA).  
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While legally sound, such a policy shift may have too many political 
costs and long-run negative implications for the Board and the labor 
movement. These implications may be far-reaching. For one, the debate 
over the EFCA has been abandoned, thus preventing card-check from 
whims of subsequent Boards. Additionally, if commentators who opposed 
-check would be approved by the 
may have an even more difficult and prolonged confirmation process than 
Becker, who was ultimately given a recess appointment. Memories of a 
short-lived card-check measure may compel a future more-conservative 
Board should not pursue this measure through the administrative process 
despite their legal ability to do so, because the long-term outcome may be 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Conflict resolution is a crucial part of any country s sustainable 
industrial relations system.1 It is essential to find a balance between core 
labor rights and employment market flexibility, because both are necessary 
ingredients for healthy economic and social development.2 One important 
tool in promoting the amicable development of these interests is effective 
dispute resolution. It is necessary to settle labor disputes through 
framework procedures designed to bring about effective, efficient, and 
equitable resolutions for the benefit of involved parties and the greater 
economy.3 Without the use of effective dispute resolution methodologies, 
disputes will increase and ultimately undermine national workplace 
productivity.4 This possibility is especially troubling, because a changing 
economy threatens to make relied upon and originally effective 
methodologies obsolete.5 
The world is becoming increasingly intercontinental. Companies are 
transforming into multinational operations, which execute work in different 
cities, countries, and continents. There is now a global economy that 
functions to internationalize many aspects of the traditional employment 
relationship.6  
                                                          
1.    See Paul Teague, Path Dependency and Comparative Industrial Relations: The 
Case of Conflict Resolution Systems in Ireland and Sweden, 47 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 
the institutions 
and practices used to help solve workplace and other industrial relations problems and 
 
2.    See, e.g., Mark Anner & Teri Caraway, International Labor Standards and 
, 45 STUD. COMP. 
INT L DEV. 151, 152 (2010) (juxtaposing how the IMF and World Bank favor labor 
market flexibility with how labor rights advocates instead favor greater protection for 
worker benefits and union rights). 
3.    See, e.g., John Budd & Alexander Colvin, Improved Metrics for Workplace 
Dispute Resolution Procedures: Efficiency, Equity, and Voice, 47 INDUS. REL. 460, 
461-63 (2008) (arguing that instead of measuring the success of dispute resolution 
techniques through the traditional criteria of speed and subjective party satisfaction, 
evaluations should focus on efficiency, equity, and party participation). 
4.    Cf. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (acknowledging 
obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these 
 
5.    See generally Matthew Bartmes, Interest Arbitration in the New Economy 
(2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/academics/plel/Interest-Arbitration-in-the-New%20Economy-
Matthew-Bartmes.pdf) (discussing how the shock of the 2008 U.S. economic collapse 
has affected arbitration awards). 
6.    See James B. Boskey, The Resolution of Disputes in Transnational 
Employment: Arbitration and its Discontents, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 189, 
192 (1999) (explaining that transnational employment agreements often limit the role 
of national courts); Eric D. Green, International Commercial Dispute Resolution: 
Courts, Arbitration and Mediation - Introduction, 15 B.U. INT L L.J. 175, 178 (1997) 
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Employees, many represented by unions that continue to act as their 
exclusive representatives for collective bargaining purposes, are 
increasingly entering into agreements with employers located in different 
legal jurisdictions.7 Collective bargaining is the process by which unions 
meet, discuss, and negotiate work conditions with employers.8 Such 
bargaining normally results in a written contract called a collective 
bargaining agreement, which sets wages, hours, and other conditions of 
employment for a stipulated period.9 While such contracts usually include a 
dispute resolution provision that describes which kind of dispute resolution 
method the parties will use in case of conflict, the expansion of global 
economic borders sometimes challenges the efficiency and effectiveness of 
relying on these provisions.10 
This Article first defines labor disputes in the context of a global realm.11 
It considers the history of labor arbitration and mediation methodologies in 
the United States and compares them to those utilized by countries 
affiliated with the European Union.12 Next, this Article seeks to evaluate 
                                                          
transnational] disputes ). 
7.    See Reynald Bourque, International Framework Agreements and the Future of 
Collective Bargaining in Multinational Companies, 12 JUST LABOUR 30 (2008) 
(studying the emergence of negotiated International Framework Agreements between 
international labor and multinational companies). 
8.    See, e.g., BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY 299 (9th ed. 2009) (defining collective 
bargaining 
employees to determine the conditions of employment, such as wages, hours, discipline 
and fringe benefits.  
9.    See e.g., id. (noting that collective bargaining agreements are 
between an employer and a labor union regulating employment conditions, wages, 
benefits, and grievances.  
10.   See Rosetta Ellis, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Collective 
Bargaining Agreements: The Case Against Barring Statutory Discrimination Claims 
from Federal Court Jurisdiction, 86 VA. L. REV. 307, 308 (2000) (observing that it is 
estimated that over ninety-five percent of private-sector collective bargain agreements 
negotiated in the United States in 1990 contained mandatory arbitration provisions); 
Jeff Faux, Founding President & Distinguished Fellow, Econ. Policy Institute, 
Rethinking the Global Political Economy, Address at the Asia-Europe-U.S. Progressive 





11.  See infra 
realm, see, for example, 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (2006), defining 
controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the 
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, 
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the 
 
12.   See infra Part IV V (studying alternative dispute resolution forms in the United 
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the use of these methodologies in resolving labor disputes.13 Finally, this 
Article concludes with a description of potential ways to make these 
methodologies more effective and efficient at addressing international labor 
disputes.14 
It is certain that national legal regimes must provide for the effective 
resolution of transnational labor disputes, in order to promote global 
economic stability.15 Otherwise, an ineffective legal regime risks 
undermining the ability of companies to remain competitive and viable in 
an increasingly cutthroat, international marketplace, and any nation 
fostering such an ineffective legal regime risks a downward economic 
spiral.16 
II. DEFINING INTERNATIONAL LABOR DISPUTES 
 
The first step toward defining international labor relations is to define the 
  Practitioners and scholars currently 
lack a common definition.17 Bob Hepple, a prominent professor in the 
realm of law, politics, and sociology, states that the definition of the word 
international  varies from state to state and even among different 
international institutions.18  
Professor William W. Park provides more clarity. He asserts that there 
                                                          
States and the European Union). 
13.   See infra Part VI (arguing for negotiated international legal uniformity). 
14.   See infra Part VII (concluding that flexibility remains an important supplement 
to uniformity). 
15.   See, e.g., Kerry Rittich, Rights and Flexibility: Labor Law in 
an Uncertain World, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 565, 567 (2010) (asserting that, to be 
successful, any revised understanding of the social contract must preserve certain basic 
values such as collective action, shared workplace governance, and a guarantee of some 
basic economic security and prosperity for workers). 
16.   See id. (warning that a failure to incorporate certain essential social contract 
values would consign any new or transitional legal regime to short-lived instability). 
17.   Cf. BUREAU FOR WORKERS  ACTIVITIES, INT L LABOUR ORG., Definition of 
International Law, http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-
english/telearn/global/ilo/law/lablaw.htm#Definition_of_international_law (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2010) (explaining international labor law in terms of its history and general 
international law concepts, instead of directly defining it). 
18.   See Bob Hepple, Mapping International Labor Disputes: An Overview, in 
LABOR LAW BEYOND BORDERS: ADR AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LABOR 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 35, 45 he Permanent Court of Arbitration 
l labor law is that it applies 
international labor standards and dispute mechanisms not only to transnational 
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are two possible principal factors to take into account: the residence of the 
parties to a transaction and the nature of the transaction.19 Generally, when 
parties are citizens of two different nations and their transaction relates 
either to the sale of goods and services across national borders, or to some 
contractual agreement concerning the rights of those providing such 
transnational goods or services, the dispute is international in scope.20 
 
The definition of labor disputes  is far less varied. According to 
Law Dictionary, labor disputes are controvers[ies] between an employer 
and its employees concerning the terms or conditions of employment, or 
concerning the association or representation of those who negotiate or seek 
to negotiate the terms or conditions of employment. 21 A collective 
bargaining agreement often dictates the terms of employment. These 
disputes often center on the conditions of employment and whether 
discipline was progressive and imposed for just cause.22 In Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies, 
Roger Blanplain defines international labor relations as those relations that 
exist between [employers with] headquarters in one country and 
employees in one or more other countries. 23   
Thus, international labor disputes arise in an internationalizing 
marketplace when an employer has its headquarters in one country and 
oversees employees residing in another country. These disputes, much like 
domestic labor disputes, also focus on the terms and conditions of 
employment.24 
                                                          
19.   See William W. Park, Why Courts Review Arbitral Awards, 16 MEALEY S 
INT'L. ARB. REP. 5 (2001). 
20.   But see id. -
 
21.   BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (9th ed. 2009). 
22.   Cf. Roger Blanpain, Comparativism in Labour Law and Industrial Relations, in 
COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET 
ECONOMIES 3, 5 (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 8th rev. ed. 2004) [hereinafter Blanpain] 
rent national 
jurisdictions has become a normal fact of life.  
23.   Id. 
24.   See INT L LABOUR ORG., HIGH-LEVEL TRIPARTITE SEMINAR ON THE 
SETTLEMENT OF LABOUR DISPUTES THROUGH MEDIATION, CONCILIATION, 
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III. THE CONTEXTS IN WHICH INTERNATIONAL LABOR DISPUTES OCCUR 
Global markets permit greater access to economic opportunity for both 
multinational employers and international workers to take advantage of 
more and larger markets around the world. Because they exercise greater 
geographic flexibility in hiring their workforce, employers may now face 
labor disputes that are both domestic and international, even if both 
ultimately involve the same issues found in domestic labor disputes 
including wages; benefits; leave; and other terms, conditions, and/or 
benefits of employment.25 
To address the growing global economy, unions are transforming into 
international forces with a presence on multiple continents.26 As a 
condition of obtaining employees, an employer may have entered into a 
labor contract with a group of unionized workers and may have vowed that 
they will provide an agreed amount of wages and healthcare and that she 
will discipline only for just cause. Thus, disputes may mirror traditional 
domestic labor disputes and relate to disciplinary issues or conditions of 
employment like wages, hours, and health and pension benefits.27 Such 
agreements deal with individual rights 28  
For instance, the United Steelworkers of America (USW), an American 
union headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, affiliates with the 
International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers  
Unions (ICEM), which represents twenty million workers on a wide variety 
of continents.29 Both of the unions represent Goodyear workers. This 
structure is premised on the understanding that deteriorating labor relations 
in one locale could affect Goodyear s negotiations with unions representing 
workers in all corners of the globe.30 
                                                          
25.   Cf. id. at 4 5 (providing a case study example in which conflict concerned 
 
26.   See The ICEM  Who We Are, What We Do, INT L FEDERATION OF CHEM., 
ENERGY, MINE & GEN. WORKERS  UNIONS (Sept. 22, 2010), 
http://www.icem.org/?id=12&doc=1225 [hereinafter ICEM  Who We Are] (revealing 
 
27.   Cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/810 Art. 23 (Dec. 10, 1948) (promulgating aspirations for universal working 
rights). 
28.   Cf. id.  
29.   ICEM  Who We Are, supra note 26; see ICEM Calls for Support of Striking 
USW Goodyear Workers, RELIABLE PLANT MAG., 
http://www.reliableplant.com/Read/2926/icem-calls-for-support-of-striking-usw-
goodyear-workers (last visited Dec. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Goodyear Workers]; Who 
We Are, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AM., http://www.usw.org/our_union/who_we_are 
(last visited Nov 16, 2010). 
30.   See Goodyear Workers, supra note 29; see also Global Agreements, INT L 
FEDERATION OF CHEM., ENERGY, MINE & GEN. WORKERS' UNIONS, 
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Unions, like the ICEM, focus on negotiating and monitoring 
multinational compliance with global agreements on workers  rights; 
equality at work; and the promotion of high standards of health, safety, and 
environmental protection worldwide.31 They also network with trade union 
representatives within global corporations and coordinate solidarity and 
support for members during labor disputes.32 They seek to actively 
organize strong unions in countries where unions are weak or non-existent 
in order to provide strength to all international workers employed by a 
particular employer.33 In 1999, at the ICEM s Durban Congress in South 
Africa, the ICEM made it a priority to achieve negotiated Global 
Framework Agreements with multinational companies. 34 
Similar to the ICEM, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
has adopted a global approach. SEIU is in the process of constructing a 
21st-century global union to help ensure that workers, not just 
corporations and CEOs, benefit from today s global economy. 35  Like the 
ICEM, SEIU is working with unions in similar industries across the globe 
to challenge multinational employers to provide comparable wages and 
benefits and to allow workers in every country the freedom to form 
unions. 36 School bus drivers in the United States, with the help of SEIU, 
have formed a transatlantic partnership with the Transport and General 
Workers Union in the United Kingdom in order to hold accountable their 
common employer FirstGroup and its U.S. subsidiary, First Student on 
both sides of the Atlantic.37 
Global unions also act to provide information and expertise on topics 
ranging from collective bargaining to health and safety standards. They 
function to represent workers  interests within similar sectors of the global 
                                                          
http://www.icem.org/en/69-Global-Framework-Agreements (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) 
[hereinafter ICEM  Global Agreements] (discussing how ICEM creates global 
agreements with local affiliates in order to supplement  local collective bargaining by 
whether or not those st  
31.   See, e.g., ICEM  Who We Are, supra note 26.  
32.   Id.  
33.   Id.   
34.   ICEM  Global Agreements, supra note 30. 
35.   -Growing Union, SERV. EMPS. INT L 
UNION, http://www.seiu.org/a/ourunion/a-closer-look-inside-labors-fastest-growing-
union.php (last visited Oct. 5, 2010). 
36.   Id. 
37.   See Mike Link, SERV. EMPS. INT L UNION, Skilled Bus Drivers Keep Kids Safe, 
http://www.seiu.org/2008/09/skilled-bus-drivers-keep-kids-safe.php (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2010); see also Our Company, FIRSTAMERICA, 
http://www.firstgroup.com/north_america/our_company/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2010) 
eyhound). 
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economy and to promote a global economy that is sustainable in its focus 
and works for all international laborers. 
As a result of the growing international presence of labor unions, it is 
increasingly common to have employers in one country and union-
represented employees in another country.  Disputes over the terms codified 
in collective bargaining agreements, therefore, lead to strikes with greater 
frequency than they have ever before.38 
Still, methods for resolving labor disputes vary greatly across the United 
States and the countries belonging to the European Union; these methods, 
however, may fail to sufficiently address the changing times.39 
IV.  RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL LABOR DISPUTES IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States, there are two primary methods of resolving labor 
disputes: labor arbitration and labor mediation.40 Use of these methods 
applies for disputes with ties to the United States, regardless of whether the 
dispute is international in scope.41 In practice, parties often use labor 
arbitration to resolve labor disputes.42 The American court system favors 
                                                          
38.   See generally Economic News Release, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkstp.t01.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2010) (accounting 
for all work stoppages, also called strikes, involving more than 1,000 workers from 
1947-2009); Strike and Lockout Statistics, FED N OF EUROPEAN EMP RS, 
http://www.fedee.com/strikes.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2010) (detailing strikes and 
lockouts among major European Union countries, on average, for the past three years). 
39.   See generally Richard Block et al., Comparing and Quantifying Labor 
Standards in the United States and the European Union, 19 INT L J. COMP. LAB. L. & 
INDUS. RELATIONS 441 (2003) (quantifying labor standards in both the United States 
and the European Union and concluding that the European Union has much higher 
labor standards). 
40.  Cf. Julius Getman, Was Harry Shulman Right?: The Development of 
Arbitration in Labor Disputes, 81 ST. JOHN S L. REV. 15, 16 (2007) (restating Dean 
s preferable to litigation, because an arbitrator 
is more familiar with the disputing parties and can therefore more easily foresee the 
consequences of their decision); Arbitration and Mediation, REFERENCE BUS., 
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/A-Ar/Arbitration-and-
Mediation.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2010) (differentiating between labor mediation and 
submit their disputes to an independent neutral third party, known as an a
 involves the active participation of a neutral third party whose role 
is to facilitate the dispute resolution process and to suggest solutions to resolve 
bitration, mediation is a process whereby the parties 
involved have to solve the dispute, although the mediator does suggest various 
proposals to help the parties find solutions).   
41.   See generally Getman, supra note 40, at 16 (proffering that labor arbitration has 
increased due to the fact that arbitrators are able to understand the common goal of 
uninterrupted production and understand the particular needs of an organization or 
challenges in a dispute). 
42.   Cf. Ann Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation of American Labor 
Unions, 69 MO. L. REV. 
contain grievance and arbitration procedures designed to resolve disputes about the 
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labor arbitration.43 On the other hand, parties also use labor mediation, and  
in some employment industries, mediation is a becoming more common.44 
Still, the overall objective of national labor law alike is to promote 
industrial peace among employers and unions and to punish party actions 
that jeopardize and work to thwart collective bargaining.45 The settlement 
of industrial disputes through peaceful means is both an end in itself and a 
basic means for achieving industrial peace.46 
A. Arbitration 
L ny 
controversy or dispute . . . select [a third party decision maker] of their own 
involved.47 Labor arbitration usually involves a sole arbitrator instead of a 
panel.48 If the parties decide that the arbitrator should follow precedent, the 
arbitrator may apply the law of the jurisdiction in which they sit or 
whatever law the parties agree is applicable.49 But the arbitrator does not 
have to follow established law, and rules of evidence typically do not apply 
                                                          
 
43.   See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, No. 09-497, slip op. at 2 (U.S. 
June 21, 2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissent separately paginated), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/09-497.pdf (explaining, under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, arbi
limited role for courts asked to stay litigation    
44.   See, e.g., Hodges, supra note 42, at 384 (observing that, in the past twenty 
years, there has been a resurgence in mediation because it resolved disputes with far 
less cost and resources and has seemed to increase party satisfaction). 
45.   See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (stating that 
friendly methods of organization and collective bargaining promote and encourage the 
flow of commerce). 
46.   See id. 
industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working 
conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and 
 
47.   Gates v. Ariz. Brewing Co., 95 P.2d 49, 50 (Ariz. 1939).  
48.   See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Internationalization of Labor Disputes: Can ADR 
Mechanisms Help?, in LABOR LAW BEYOND BORDERS: ADR AND THE 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF LABOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003) (
see also FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI, 
HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 3 5 (Alan M. Rubin et al. eds., 6th ed. 2003) (providing 
some historical examples of famous arbitrators).   
49.  See generally Jessica Thorpe, A Question of Intent: Choice of Law and the 
International Arbitration Agreement, 54 DISPUTE RESOLUTION J. 16 (1999) (discussing 
the power of parties to select their applicable choice of law for purposes of arbitration 
and studying how far such a power can extend to procedural issues). 
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in full.50 
Arguably the biggest stimulus toward using arbitration to resolve labor 
disputes and industrial grievances occurred during World War II, and was 
instigated by the National War Labor Board.51 This entity had the power to 
resolve labor disputes and regularly ordered that arbitration clauses be 
included in new collective bargaining agreements when the parties were 
not able to agree upon their own grievance procedures.52 While fewer than 
ten percent of collective bargaining agreements in the 1930s provided for 
arbitration, seventy-seven percent of labor contracts included arbitration 
provisions by 1944.53  
In many U.S. states, either statutory or common law rules permit 
voluntary arbitration.54 State arbitration statutes fit into three categories: (1) 
general statutes used in commercial disputes but often adaptable to labor 
disputes; (2) statutes designed specifically for labor disputes; and (3) 
statutes that promote arbitration by directing state officials to encourage its 
use.55  
In 1955 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws promulgated a proposed Uniform Arbitration Act, based on the New 
York Act, which itself applied contractual arbitration provisions to labor-
management agreements.56 By 2003, thirty-five jurisdictions adopted the 
Uniform Arbitration Act.57 
                                                          
50.  See id.; ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 48, at 2 3 (distinguishing between 
arbitration and judicial proceedings). 
51.  See Calvin W. Sharpe, Introduction to Symposium, An Oral History of the 
National War Labor Board and Critical Issues in the Development of Modern 
Grievance Arbitration, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 505, 508 09 (1989) (pointing out that 
although some believe the National War Labor Board instigated modern grievance 
arbitration, modern grievance arbitration actually began as early as 1871). 
52.  See generally id. (discussing the evolution of arbitration brought about by the 
National War Labor Board). 
53.  See SUMNER S. SLICHTER ET AL., THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON 
MANAGEMENT 739 (1960); see also Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American 
Labor Arbitration: The Maturing Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 557, 576 (1983) (noting 
that because of the lack of recordkeeping prior to World War II, it is unclear as to how 
many contracts contained arbitration clauses, but it is estimated that between sixty-two 
percent to seventy-six percent of agreements before World War II contained these 
clauses). 
54.   See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 48, at 95-101 (explaining the relationship 
between statutes and common law in the arbitration process); see also CLARENCE M. 
UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS 23-26 (3d ed. 1972) (analyzing how 
arbitration works under the common law and state statutes). 
55.   See OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, DEP T OF LABOR, LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER 
STATE STATUTES 3, 6 (May 29, 1943). 
56.   See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT., 7 U.L.A. 1A, 2 (2000) ( [T]he primary purpose of 
the 1955 Act was to insure the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate in the face of 
. 
57.   See id. (stating that as of 2000 forty-nine of the states have arbitration statutes, 
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Since state arbitration statutes tend to be general, common law rules fill 
in the gaps.58 The United States Department of Labor summarized these 
principles: 
Common law arbitration rests upon the voluntary agreement of the 
parties to submit their dispute to an outsider. The submission 
agreement may be oral and may be revoked at any time before the 
rendering of the award. The tribunal, permanent or temporary . . . 
must be free from bias and interest in the subject matter, and may 
not be related by affinity or consanguinity to either party.59 
Further, [t]he parties must be given notice of hearings and are entitled 
to be present when all evidence is received  but the arbitrators have no 
power to subpoena witnesses or records. 60 An award can either be oral or 
written; but if it is written, all of the arbitrators must sign it and such an 
award must dispose of all relevant issues.61 
Even the United States Supreme Court has recommended the use of 
labor arbitration to resolve labor disputes and has stated that while 
 . . . [labor] arbitration is 
the substitute for industrial strife. 62 Despite judicial recognition of the 
rights of employers and unions under collective bargaining agreements, 
court procedures are often prolonged, technical, and costly, and are not 
necessarily the best vehicle to rectify labor disputes.63 Arbitration saves 
time and expense.   
Unsurprisingly, parties rely on arbitration more often than upon court 
proceedings to resolve labor disputes. Arbitration clauses dominate 
American collective bargaining agreements.  In fact, one study led by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revealed that within over 1,500 collective 
bargaining agreements, ninety-seven percent provided for arbitration of 
disputes, particularly for grievances occurring during the duration of the 
                                                          
and of these forty-nine states, thirty-five have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act and 
the other fourteen have adopted similar legislation).  
58.   See OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, supra note 55, at 3 (articulating that the common 
law rests on a principle that the parties submit voluntarily to resolution of their dispute 
by an arbitrator, who must be neutral and free from bias). 
59.   Id. 
60.   Id. 
61.   Id. 
62.   United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
578 (1960). 
63.   See generally Charles B. Craver, Symposium on Labor Arbitration Thirty Years 
After the Steelworkers Trilogy: Labor Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective 
Bargaining Process, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571 (1990) (arguing that the grievance 
arbitration process is a superior dispute resolution strategy compared to judicial 
proceedings or strikes). 
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union contract.64 Today, thousands of labor disputes settle in binding, 
voluntary arbitration without either party resorting to the use of economic 
pressure or appeals to the public.65 Arbitration allows employers and 
unions to have greater self-regulation because it is a private rather than a 
governmental proceeding.66  
There are two basic categories of labor arbitration. First, arbitration can 
settle labor disputes over the substantive terms and language used in a 
collective bargaining agreement.67  This type of arbitration is an arbitration 
of interests and is primarily a public sector tool to help parties resolve 
questions over collective bargaining agreements.68  
The other main category of labor arbitration, grievance  arbitration, is 
an arbitration of rights that deals with labor disputes arising over the 
duration of a contract.69 The arbitrator acts in such proceedings as a quasi-
without adding to or deleting from its terms.70 The decision of an arbitrator 
is binding unless it does not derive its essence from the collective 
bargaining agreement; the arbitrator acts outside of the scope of her 
contractual authority, or the award runs contrary to public policy.71     
                                                          
64.   See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 1957, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 94 (1981) 
(demonstrating that of the 1,514 agreements of 1,000 workers or more as of July 1, 
1975, 1,496 of them provided grievance and arbitration provisions, equaling 
approximately ninety-seven percent). 
65.   See CLARENCE M. UPDEGRAFF & WHITLEY P. MCCOY, ARBITRATION OF LABOR 
DISPUTES 149 150 (2d ed. 1961) (explaining how union and employer arbitration 
interactions avoid strikes and economic pressures in the public utility sector). 
66.   See Craver, supra note 63, at 573 (positing that both unions and management 
can avoid costly and time-consuming procedures by participating in arbitration). 
67.   Cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 119 20 (9th ed. 2009) (classifying labor 
arbitration as including 
llective-  
68.   See id. (specifying that interest arbitration is a separate entity from grievance 
arbitration because it involves settling the terms of a contract while the contract itself is 
being negotiated). 
69.   See Charles C. Killingsworth, Standards of Arbitral Decision, in THE LAW AND 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 228, 230-31 (Univ. of Mich. ed., 1951) (providing 
provisions that provide her with the authority to interpret the agreement). 
70.   See id. 
[her]. In grievance arbitration . . . the arbitrator must turn to the agreement for 
  
71.   See 
(2001) (per curiam) (expressing doubts about the permissibility of an arbitrator to 
effectively United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960))); see also 
E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000) 
(observing that a collective bargaining agreement can be contrary to public policy and 
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Arbitration proceedings in the United States work in this way regardless 
of whether the union-represented employees and employer are both 
residents of the United States. 
B. Mediation 
In America, labor mediation is different from labor arbitration because it 
allows for more procedural control by the parties.72 Mediation creates a 
larger forum that allows the parties to discuss everything affecting their 
relationship, instead of resolving a particular dispute.73 
Thus, mediation focuses on evaluating all of the wants of the parties
including what is important to them in their lives and business operations. 
Mediation encourages the parties engaging in a labor dispute to reach an 
agreement through their own initiative with the facilitation of a neutral 
third party.74  
Mediators function as intermediaries between the parties.75 They lead the 
parties through an exploration of the issues.76 The process opens with both 
parties first seeking to understand the issue or problem.77 Next, they 
identify their underlying interests and positions.78 Then, they can generate 
options to determine solutions together; they become, in essence, joint 
problem solvers.79 Mediators probe and challenge the parties to assess the 
durability of their agreement, with the underlying assumption that the 
partnership should focus on creating a stable, viable work environment.80 
                                                          
therefore unenforceable  
(1983))). 
72.   See MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELE S.G. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION 25 
fig.1- (detailing the stages of the 
mediation process to include intake; contracting; information gathering and issue 
identification; agenda setting; resolving each issue; reaching and drafting the 
agreement). 
73.   See id. at 25 27 (examining and describing the steps involved in the mediation 
process). 
74.   See id. at 26 (providing that mediators help assist the parties in gathering 
information, identifying the issues in the dispute and agenda setting for mediations). 
75.   See id. at 27 ( [M]ediators frame the issues in neutral terms which define the 
 
76.   See id. (noting that mediators seek to obtain a full description of the issues, 
based on statements from the parties themselves). 
77.   See id. (identifying the issue and framing the issue in neutral terms allows for 
the mediator to present the issue to the parties in dispute). 
78.   See id. (describing the facts, perceptions, feelings and reactions from the parties 
allows for the mediator to fully understand all aspects of the issue at hand). 
79.   See id. (organizing and prioritizing the issues in dispute between the parties). 
80.   See id. at 29 (questioning whether or not tentative agreement would be 
realistic). 
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 Labor mediation often resolves impasses reached in the process of 
negotiating a collective bargaining agreement. However labor mediation 
may directly resolve grievances as well.81 Most collective bargaining 
agreements provide for grievance procedures, traditionally culminating in 
arbitration should more informal procedures fail.82 Grievance mediation 
is a voluntary step, often taken prior to arbitration, and provides an 
opportunity for a neutral third-party to assist the parties in reaching a 
resolution of the dispute, before an arbitrator decides for them.83 
In grievance mediation, the parties create their own solution.84 The 
mediator does not make a binding decision but instead helps them to 
determine a mutually acceptable solution. While grievance mediation is not 
a substitute for a contractual grievance procedure in a collective bargaining 
agreement, it can function to supplement such procedures, or it can act as 
part of a larger program to help the parties focus on their joint interests.85 
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) is an 
independent agency of the United States government which was founded in 
1947. FMCS helps mediate labor disputes around the country.86 FMCS 
offers its services upon request or in disputes affecting interstate 
commerce, and parties must notify FMCS within thirty days of the 
expiration of a contract when either side proposes modification or 
termination of their existing collective bargaining agreement.87  
Through their direct knowledge and experience with labor disputes, 
FMCS mediators supplement their skills by enhancing communication 
between the parties and by building confidence that an agreement is 
                                                          
81.   See 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 19:16 (3d ed. 
2010) (suggesting that unions and employers could utilize a mediator in order to 
resolve disputes and grievances), available at Westlaw ADR. 
82.   See What is Grievance Mediation?, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., 
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=46&itemID=15885 (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2010) ( [G]rievance mediation is a completely voluntary step, prior to 
arbitration, which provides an opportunity for a third-party neutral, such as an FMCS 
 
83.   Id. 
84.   Id. 
85.   Id. 
86.  FMCS: Who We Are, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., 
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=21&itemID=15810 (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2011) . 
87.   See Filing a Notice to Mediation Agencies (F-7) with FMCS,  FED. MEDIATION 
& CONCILIATION SERV., 
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=127&itemID=19661 (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2010) (explaining that the National Labor Relations Act also requires 
written notice to the other party covered by a collective bargaining agreement within 
e expiration date of a proposed termination or modification of a 
collective bargaining agreement  
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 diligence.88 Mediators, however, usually lack 
the authority to impose binding settlements in labor mediation and instead 
operate to facilitate the parties to arrive at a resolution.89 
The FMCS is not the only governmental branch created to help facilitate 
labor disputes through mediation. The Railway Labor Act (RLA) is a U.S. 
federal labor law that governs labor relations in the railway and airline 
industries.90 The RLA also created the National Mediation Board (NMB), 
which operates as a mediating agency dealing primarily with interests-
related disputes.91  
The NMB has three ultimate goals: es arising 
out of the negotiation of new or revised collective bargaining agreements; 
2. The effectuation of employee rights of self-organization where a 
representation dispute exists; and 3. The resolution of disputes over the 
interpretation or applicatio 92 
Mediation might not work in every circumstance. Typically, if informal 
negotiations do not culminate in an agreement, before either party can 
exercise self-help, the law requires the parties to submit their dispute to 
the NMB for mediation.93    
V. RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL LABOR DISPUTES IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
Members of the European Union frequently have their own, unique 
legislative rules or policies that provide for labor dispute resolution.94 In 
                                                          
88.   See Who We Are: What Can a Mediator Add to Collective Bargaining 
Negotiations, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., 
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=22&itemID=16485 (last 
visited Oct 15, 2010) (describing improvement of communication between parties as 
rephrasing statements, to mediator supposals and meeting off of the record to 
 
89.   See What is Grievance Mediation?, supra note 82 (stating that the parties are 
ultimately responsible for coming to a resolution of the issue and that the mediator 
merely assists in guiding them to a resolution). 
90.  See Frequently Asked Questions: Mediation, NAT L MEDIATION BD., 
http://www.nmb.gov/mediation/faq-mediation.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) (noting 
that the RLA only governs collective bargaining agreements in the airline and railroad 
industries). 
91.  See NMB and RLA Fact Sheet, NAT L MEDIATION BD., 
http://www.nmb.gov/mediation/factsheet_thru-fy10.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2011) 
(detailing that the NMB was created in 1934 as an amendment to the 1926 RLA in 
order to minimize work stoppages in the railway and airlines industries).  
92.  FY 06 National Mediation Board Annual Performance and Accountability 
Report, NAT L MEDIATION BD., 4, available at 
http://www.nmb.gov/documents/nmb_ar06_web.pdf  (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
93.  NMB and RLA Fact Sheet, supra note 91, at 1. 
94.  Cf. ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 9 (detailing the differences 
between individual EU countries that legislate dispute resolution methods). 
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Hungary, the framework is incorporated in the 95 
Meanwhile, in Lithuania and Slovenia, the rules are scattered across a host 
of different statutes, regulations or decrees governing labor relations. 96 
Still other countries, which include Bulgaria, Latvia, and Poland, adopt a 
sole piece of legislation that governs their labor dispute resolutions.97 And 
while some European countries have extensive legal rules on the subject, 
other countries like the Netherlands have no specific provisions pertaining 
to labor dispute resolution.98 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is a specialized agency of 
the United Nations that deals with labor issues; its main objectives are to 
promote rights at work, encourage decent employment opportunities, 
enhance social protection, and strengthen dialogue on work-related 
issues. 99 Its main instrument to aid dispute prevention and settlement is the 
Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation, 1951 (No. 92), 
assist in the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes between 
100 It also recommends the equal representation of 
workers and employers and indicates that parties should not engage in 
strikes or lockouts while conciliation procedures are underway, although 
the Recommendation does not limit the right to strike.101 The ILO also runs 
an Administrative Tribunal, which meets twice a year at the headquarters 
of the ILO in Geneva.102 
Despite differences in legislative procedure across the countries of the 
European Union, the ILO attempts to bring uniformity to the approaches 
E.U. countries take to resolve labor disputes. In the international forum, 
there are essentially three common extra-judicial options: conciliation, 
mediation, and arbitration.103 
                                                          
95.   Id. 
96.   Id. 
97.   Id.  
98.   Id. at 10. 
99.  About the ILO, INT L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 
2010).  
100. INT L LABOUR ORG., Recommendation No. 92, Voluntary Conciliation and 
Arbitration Recommendation, ¶ 1 (Apr. 29, 1951) [hereinafter ILO Recommendation 
No. 92], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R092 (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2010).  
101. See id. at ¶ 6 (suggesting that the parties engaged in a dispute should refrain 
from strikes and lockouts while the matter has been submitted to arbitration).   
102. The Tribunal, INT L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribunal/about/index.htm (last updated Oct. 28, 
2010). 
103.  See ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 2, 17 (noting, however, 
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intervention of a third party; it is the degree of intervention that 
104 
A. Arbitration 
In the European Union, labor arbitration largely resolves labor disputes 
that fall into the same two categories confronted in American labor 
arbitration interests and rights.105 An interest dispute occurs when a 
collective bargaining agreement does not exist or the agreement is being 
renegotiated, and there is disagreement over the contractual obligations that 
a collective bargaining agreement should impose or when there is a 
disagreement over modification of such obligations during a renegotiation 
of an agreement. To the contrary, a rights dispute occurs when there is a 
disagreement between the parties over the implementation or interpretation 
of statutory rights or the rights in an existing collective agreement.106 The 
European Foundation notes that many countries only associate arbitration 
with rights disputes, even though arbitration is also relevant, if not always 
suitable, in resolving interest disputes.107 
Many countries provide procedures for resolving labor disputes through 
arbitration. For instance, arbitration exists in at least twenty-four of the 
twenty-six E.U. member states, although it is not widely used.108  
Conciliation and mediation are the more popular means for resolving 
collective disputes.109 Indeed, arbitration is generally an option of last 
resort.   
The ILO supervisory bodies, through the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations and the Committee on 
Freedom of Association, have established specific principles for arbitration 
in the context of collective bargaining.110  The ILO Committee of Experts 
                                                          
 
104.  Id. at 3. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id.  
107.   Id. at 10 n.18 (citing András Tóth & László Neumann, EIRO Thematic Feature 
on Collective Dispute Resolutions in an Enlarged European Union-Case of Hungary, 
EUROPEAN FOUND. FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING & WORKING CONDITIONS, 
(2005), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/08/word/hu0508102t.doc (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2010)). 
108.  Id. at 17.  
109.  See id. typically follows after attempts at 
mediation between the parties have proven unsuccessful. ). 
110.  See generally Eric Gravel and Chloé Charbonneau-Jobin, The Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations:  Its Dynamic and 
Impact, INT L LABOUR ORG. (Jan. 1, 2003), 
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/information-resources-and-
publications/publications/WCMS_087808/lang--en/index.htm (providing an analysis of 
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has said that arbitration should be optional but that, if chosen, an 
 should bind parties.111 Compulsory arbitration is 
agreements established in Convention No. 98, and thus the autonomy of 
112 There is an exception for its imposition, however, 
in cases involving essential public services, when their interruption would 
endanger the life, personal safety, or health of the public.113  
Some E.U. countries do not allow for arbitration to resolve labor disputes 
in whole or in part. For instance, Danish law fails to provide for the 
resolution of collective interest disputes through arbitration.114 Rather, the 
ruling principle is that interest disputes should be resolved by negotiation 
and bargaining between employers and unions only.115  Where these efforts 
do not succeed, an interest dispute can then serve as a legitimate basis for 
industrial action, and arbitration can be used where the parties are unable to 
resolve their differences after a prolonged strike or lockout.116 
On the other hand, rights disputes, arising where parties have a collective 
agreement and have a dispute over its implementation or interpretation, are 
perceived differently.117  
                                                          
the Committee of Expert on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
since 1977).   
111.  ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 8. 
112.  ILO, 1994, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: Promotion of 
Collective Bargaining, ¶ 256 57 (1994), available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&document=11&chapter=25&query=%2
8%23docno%3D251994G*%29+%40ref&hightlight=&querytype=bool&context=0 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2011). 
113.  See, e.g., Freedom of Association, Digest of Decisions and Principles of the 
Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO, at ¶ 570-71 (5th 
ed. 2006),  available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/23e2006.pdf (allowing a 
g
suspension of strikes in event of a national security or public health crisis but also 
indicating that an independent, non-governmental body should have responsibility for 
deciding whether to order such suspensions). 
114.  See OLE HASSELBALCH & PER JACOBSEN, LABOUR LAW DENMARK §§ 745, 746 
(1999) (stating that  
the Dutch resort to resolving disputes through strikes and lockouts, due to the desire to 
preserve their right to fr
 
115. E.g., id. at § 741 (observing that collective agreements are limited 
agreement between an organization of wage earners and an organization of employers . 
 
116.  See id. at § 747 (providing that if no solution can be reached through the 
established rules of settlement then the matter is referred to arbitration, in instances 
where local disputes of interest are common). 
117.  See id. 
the conclusion of a collective agreement has the effect of making the initiation of 
collective agreement has the effect of making the initiation of collective industrial 
action illegal within the period of validity of the agreement, because attempts to gain 
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requires the parties first attempt to resolve the conflict through negotiation 
at the local level.118 Where unsuccessful, workplace mediation transpires.119 
If, however, the dispute goes unresolved, most remaining cases go to either 
an industrial arbitration tribunal or the Labor Court.120   
Unlike Denmark, in Bulgaria, when other modes like conciliation and 
mediation fail to resolve a labor dispute, the parties may voluntarily agree 
to arbitration.121 Before reaching a legally binding determination, the 
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators listens as both the union and employer 
present their versions of the underlying events.122 Alternatively, during the 
arbitration process, the parties may instead sign an agreement, which has 
the same legal effect as an arbitration decision, although parties freely 
choose it.123 
To the contrary, in the Czech Republic, parties must try to resolve the 
labor dispute first through mediation, before mutually agreeing to use 
arbitration to resolve their labor dispute.124  Mutual agreement to arbitrate, 
however, is unnecessary if a dispute arises in a workplace where strikes are 
prohibited or if it concerns the fulfillment of commitments under a 
collective agreement, either party may request the appointment of an 
arbitrator. If the dispute is an interest dispute, the a
amounts to the conclusion of a collective agreement and is not subject to 
appeal. In the case of a rights dispute, the parties may appeal the decision 
of the arbitrator, which can be reviewed by a court at the request of one of 
the parties.125  
Under this arbitration scheme, neither the union nor the employer pay to 
use the arbitration process. Instead, the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs pays the cost for arbitration and mediation in order to make these 
options more economically advantageous compared to pursuing a strike or 
lockout.126 
                                                          
improvements on the stipulations of the agreement and the perquisites of the 
 
118.  See id. at § 673 74, 745 47 (defining a peace obligation and construing that 
such peace obligations provide that disputes should be resolved by mediation and 
negotiation by the organizations involved the wage earners and the employers). 
119.  See id. at § 757 (explaining that the Conciliation Service exists to assist the 
parties in resolving collective bargaining disputes). 
120.  See id. at § 486, 487 (discussing the procedures and jurisdiction of the Labor 
Court).   
121.   ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 17. 
122.  Id. at 18. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. at 16. 
125.  Id. at 18. 
126.  Id. 
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The process also differs in Lithuania. Arbitration occurs through a Third 
arbitrators appointed by the parties to the dispute 127 This Court is quite 
different from most courts in that it is not permanent; rather, ad 
hoc body where the parties each appoint one or several arbitrators who 
have fourteen days to resolve the dispute 128 While most members of the 
E.U. have arbitration provisions, there is great variance among the nations 
as to how it works. 
B. Mediation 
Some European Union nations fail to differentiate between mediation 
and conciliation.129 
does not make any sugge 130 
Like arbitration and conciliation, mediation is a popular means of resolving 
labor disputes.131 Unsurprisingly, how mediation is used to resolve labor 
disputes continues to vary across countries.  
In the Czech Republic, there is an informal, pre-mediation stage:  
in the presence 
if the mediator is unable to resolve their dispute, are employees able to 
resort to economic pressure.132  Strikes and lockouts are unlawful until this 
mediation has transpired.133  
Mediators can either be party-appointed through a process which the 
union and employer mutually agree to employ, or the parties can select 
134 The union and 
employer can only move on to arbitration if mediation is unsuccessful, 
[thirty] 135 
                                                          
127.  Id. at 18. 
128.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
129. See id. at 14 (stating that between the E.U. nations there seems to be no 
preference between the two dispute resolution methods and that certain countries do not 
even differentiate between the two methods). 
130. Id. 
131.  See id. at 16 (noting that mediation is the most widely used dispute resolution 
method); see also Christian Welz & Mike Eisner, EIRO Thematic Feature on 
Collective Dispute Resolutions in an Enlarged European Union, EUROPEAN FOUND. 
FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING & WORKING CONDITIONS, 18 (July 26, 2006),  
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2006/42/en/3/ef0642en.pdf (last visited Oct. 
7, 2010) (comparing the incidence of mediation, arbitration, and conciliation 
throughout the European Union and determining that mediation is the most popular 
method of interest dispute resolution). 
132. ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 16. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. 
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only method for industrial dispute resolution 136 
The statute creates the position of a Public Mediato
a three 
selecting local mediators . . . and for managing mediation services between 
137  
The mediation process in Hungary differs from that in the Czech 
Republic and Estonia. In Hungary, labor law does not regulate mediation 
 
Mediation and Arbitration Service (MKDSZ) . . . [and then] the internal 
rules of [the] Service apply. 138 The union and employer must jointly 
decide the scope and nature of the mediation process if they choose to 
appoint a non-MKDSZ mediator.139 Regardless of how parties structure 
mediation, all reached agreements are legally binding.140  
 In Poland, the process for mediation is different still; illustrating the 
wide variation across the European Union in the use of mediation. 
Mediation occurs only after private negotiations between the parties have 
failed to resolve a collective dispute. The union and employer, after 
reaching an impasse in collective bargaining, have five days to select a 
mediator, or else one may be appointed by the Labor of Ministry.141 
Mediation often occurs preemptively to forestall full-fledged disputes.142 
and intervene to resolve situations that threaten 
143 Mediation is one popular form of labor dispute 
resolution among the nations belonging to the European Union, but, as with 
arbitration, there is great variance in how mediation works across countries. 
C. Conciliation 
As a form of alternative dispute resolution, conciliation differs from both 
arbitration and mediation, though the overal to 
bring the parties together and assist them in arriving at a mutually agreed 
                                                          
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. 
138.  Id.  
139.  Id.  
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. at 17. 
142. Id. (citing European Industrial Relations Observatory On-Line, Collective 
Agreements in 2004 Examined, 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/08/feature/pl0508106f.htm). 
143.  Id.  
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solution. 144 Out of the three forms, conciliation is the least formally 
structured and often occurs without the involvement or intrusion of 
government.145 Still, this form also varies greatly across the European 
Union. 
interest disputes are supposed to be settled 
first through conciliation, which is initiated by written submission from one 
party to the other setting out the grounds of dispute. 146 Resolutions of 
labor disputes through this process become legally binding.147 This process 
has shifted before 1999 the government, through the Hungarian Labour 
Code, mandated that unions and employers undergo pre-court conciliation 
at the company level  as a first step in resolving the labor dispute.148 The 
modern trend, however, is a lack of government intervention, as union and 
employer may optionally incorporate mandatory company level 
conciliation in their agreements, although such provisions are 149  
In contrast, practice in both Latvia and Lithuania often involves a form 
conciliation commissions. 150 These 
commissions resolve interest and rights disputes and are often a mandatory 
step in the labor dispute resolution process. The members of commissions 
are union and employer representatives; the union and the employer each 
select an equal number of representatives to voice their positions and 
advocate on their behalf.151 Any agreement reached in conciliation 
commissions is legally binding.152 Where a commission cannot reach a 
resolution, however, the dispute proceeds as prescribed in the collective 
bargaining agreement or, where not specified in the agreement, to other 
fora, such as to arbitration or a judicial proceeding.153 Similar to arbitration 
and mediation, conciliation varies greatly across the nations belonging to 
the European Union. 
VI. IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
While the United States relies largely on uniform labor arbitration and 
labor mediation procedures employed by the states across the country, the 
                                                          
144.  Id. at 14. 
145.  Id. at 15. 
146.  Id. 
147.  Id. 
148.  Id. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id.  
151.  Id. 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id. 
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nations affiliated with the European Union use a wide variety of dispute 
resolution practices and approaches.154 The ILO continues to try to bring 
increased uniformity to labor dispute resolution in the European Union155 
Still, most of the affiliated countries operate in their own unique 
fashions.156 Thus, the means by which international labor disputes are 
addressed depends largely on the part of the world in which they occur and 
on dispute resolution provisions in party contracts. 
Allowing flexibility of choice for international labor dispute resolution 
may contribute to securing and preserving industrial peace and to 
preventing and resolving labor disputes.157 But it may also spark confusion, 
which is likely to increase as employers and unions in different countries 
enter into work relationships. These parties might not be versed in the 
specific dispute procedures in place in each country. Such different 
perceptions about dispute resolution and can lead to problems in drafting, 
executing, and enforcing dispute resolution provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements.   
Labor disputes can undermine international economic stability, 
productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness, and, as such, each nation has a 
stake in the development of a sustainable, effective resolution process 
aimed at international labor disputes.158 Uniform standards and procedures 
for addressing international labor disputes would be most beneficial. The 
United States and the European Union should work with the ILO to 
advocate that, at least in the case of international labor disputes, nations 
adopt identical standards for handling these issues as they arise.  Once 
these three parties work together to design uniform standards, they should 
                                                          
154. See ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 2 (analyzing the 
similarities and differences between resolving labor disputes among E.U. member 
states). 
155.  Cf. id. at 19 (noting that while there is not a best way to resolve disputes, there 
See generally Getman, supra note 40 
(explaining that labor arbitrations in the United States has increased due to the fact that 
arbitrators are able to understand the common goal of uninterrupted production and 
understand the particular needs of an organization or challenges in a dispute). 
156. See, e.g., Manwel Debono, EIRO Thematic Feature on Collective Dispute 
Resolutions in an Enlarged European Union  Case of Malta, EUROPEAN FOUND. FOR 
THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING & WORKING CONDITIONS (2005), 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/08/word/mt0508103t.doc (last visited Oct. 
7, 2010) (surveying Malta, one of the newest members of the European Union, and its 
unique system of dispute resolution).  
157.  Cf. ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 19 (concluding that the 
best way to maintain industrial peace is to have flexible methods of resolving 
international labor disputes). 
158. See id. (finding that because labor disputes can contribute to instability, it is 
important for countries to have transparent and effective dispute resolution systems).  
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draft legislation that codifies the process and seek to get as many 
signatories as possible.159 
Unfortunately, each nation may favor its own ways of handling labor 
disputes and may resist adopting new standards. After all, current 
160 
While uniform standards should be the long term goal, the ILO, at the very 
least, should appoint neutral third parties that can help explain the specifics 
of resolution procedures employed by certain countries and help employers 
and unions take them into account when drafting labor dispute procedures 
in their collective bargaining agreements.161 A special area on the ILO 
website should publish these specifics where parties can easily access them. 
Confusion about dispute resolution will prolong labor disputes, increase 
economic instability, and undermine the operations of business enterprises 
around the world.162 Uniform standards are one way to eradicate 
confusion.163 Publicizing the dispute procedures applied to resolve labor 
issues in each country is another step in the right direction. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Work  binds us together regardless of the continent on which we reside. 
The global economy internationalizes many components of the 
employment relationship; it simply must provide for the effective 
resolution of transnational labor disputes through arbitration, mediation, 
conciliation, and/or additional forms of alternative dispute resolution. 
While it may be possible for arbitration, mediation, and conciliation to 
resolve labor disputes, the wide variety in procedure and practice may 
serve to disadvantage non-locals and make it harder for parties to arrive at a 
resolution. Allowing the parties to determine where disputes will be 
resolved and how they will be resolved is important, but there is still a need 
                                                          
159.   Cf. St. Antoine, supra note 48 (finding that international commercial arbitration 
has become an effective form of dispute resolution, especially as the world has become 
increasingly more global).  
160.  See generally Debono, supra note 156 (highlighting Malta, one of the newest 
members of the European Union, and its unique process of labor dispute resolution). 
161.  Cf. ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra note 24, at 19 (concluding that a lack 
of transparency in dispute resolution can contribute to industrial instability). 
162. See generally Blanpain, supra note 22 (comparing a variety of different 
confusion for international labor transactions). 
163.  But cf. ILO SEMINAR ON SETTLEMENT, supra 
has developed its own practices based on distinctive policy priorities, the unique labour 
market and industrial relations landscape of each country is a fundamental 
consideration in designing a dispute resolution framework and accounts for the variety 
of approaches taken by different countries. . . . there is perhaps no one size fits all 
solution  
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for international organizations like the ILO to make these procedures easily 
understood by all the parties and more uniform in their approaches. 
Resolution methods already used must respond to a new international 
role. As global economic interdependence continues to progress rapidly, 
such methods must become adept at addressing labor disputes on an 
international scale. 
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ANNOTATED TRANSCRIPT  
STEVE VLADECK: 
Steve Vladeck, Professor of Law 
here at American University Washington College of Law ( ) 
Beyond the Log Cabin Republicans Injunction and the Defense 
Authorization Act. 
We have a pretty jam-pack
, ( DADT )1 has a prominence and a significance 
today, perhaps that only rivals its . . . significan[ce] when it was first 
promulgated early in the Clinton Administration on two distinct fronts.2 
Then, last year, [we saw] a lot of movement on DADT with regard to a 
potential repeal by Congress or the [Obama] Administration.3 [In addition 
                                                          
1.    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, 
107 Stat. 1670 (originally codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006)), repealed by Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010) (to be 
codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654). Attempts to repeal the 1993 policy began in 2005 with the 
Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 1059, 109th Cong. (2005) and was 
continued in 2007 through the Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 
1246, 110th Cong. (2007), and again in 2009, Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 
2009, H.R. 1283, 111th Cong. (2009). Then, on May 27, 2010 Representative Patrick J. 
Murphy of the 8th District of Pennsylvania, introduced H. Amdt. 672, 156 CONG. REC. 
H4055 56 (daily ed. May 27, 2010) (statement of Rep. P. Murphy) to amend the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, H.R. 5136, 111th Cong. 
(2010), in order to repe
including: (1) Pentagon's Comprehensive Review Working Group would submit 
recommendations on how to implement a repeal of DADT by December 1, 2010, and 
(2) the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and President would certify 
that repealing DADT would be both consistent with military effectiveness, 
cohesiveness, and preparedness; and second, that the Department of Defense would 
prepare all policies and regulations necessary to institute a repeal. The Bill, including 
the Murphy Amendment, passed in the House on May 27, 2010 and was introduced in 
the Senate as S. 3454, 111th Cong. (2010). The bill was filibustered on September 21, 
2010. 156 CONG. REC. S7246 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2010). On December 9, 2010, the Act 
was filibustered during the lame duck session. 156 Cong. Rec. S8683 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 
2010). After the second filibuster, a stand-alone resolution the 
Repeal Act of 2010 was introduced by Sens. Lieberman and Collins in the Senate. 
ng. (2010). And a 
simultaneous b
2010, H.R. 2965, 111th Cong. (2010). The bill passed the House on December 15, 
2010, with a vote of 250 to 175. 156 CONG. REC. H8410 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2010). On 
December 18, 2010, in a special Saturday session, the Senate vot k, 
-31. 156 CONG. REC. S10666 67 (Dec. 18, 2010). 
President Obama signed the Act into law on December 22, 2010. 156 Cong. Rec. 
H8992 9002 (Dec. 29, 2010).    
2.    See Kenneth Williams, Gays in the Military: The Legal Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 919, 921 (1994) (d lift the 
). 
3.    See Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2010, S. 3065 (2010) (introducing 
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to] the lawsuit by the Log Cabin Republicans culminating [in] the 
injunction of DADT by a federal district judge in California.4 
That injunction of course is now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.5 So one 
might actually wonder if the question with regard to DADT is not so much 
whether it will be repealed and/or struck down, but when. [In order] to try 
and answer that question, to get at the underlying basis for the policy, to 
talk a little about the history of it and where we are today, we [have] 
brought together four true experts to talk about these issues and so our 
format for today is going to be as follows: 
give opening statements derated back-
and-
questions from you [all]. You may notice that at the ends of each row there 
are slips of paper. The student organizers have asked that if you have 
questions, please write them 
& A. Finally, Dean [Anthony] Varona . . . will give some closing remarks. 
, we have a great line-up. We have people who 
know of what they speak, o get out of the way and turn it 
over to David Rittgers. Thank you. 
 
DAVID RITTGERS: Thank you for coming here. 
Reserves Judge Advocate, so I served as a Reserve Military Lawyer [and 
now] one weekend a month and a couple of weeks in the summer I do this 
stuff for a living.   
So we heard about this controversy about DADT in the courts, and if I 
were to give a title to what [is going on] it would be status quo ante, the 
way things were before.   
You may not have that impression from the news, but just to recap what 
the courts have done. On September 9, Judge Virginia Philips, a District 
Judge in the Central District of California, declared the policy of DADT to 
be unconstitutional, and then October 12, she granted a worldwide 
immediate injunction against the enforcement of the policy by the 
Department of the Defense. On October 19, the Military Recruiters were 
told [they could] openly accept gay applicants, and on October 20, 
Lieutenant Daniel Choi, an openly gay man who had previously been 
                                                          
an amendment to 10 U.S.C. § 654 
 
4.    Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  
5.    Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. 10-56634, 2010 WL 4136210, at 
*1 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2010). 
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discharged under DADT, re-enlisted.6 However, that lasted for a little more 
than a day I think. Anyway, [as of] November 1 . . . there is a temporary 
stay on [the injunction], so now the recruiters have to go back to the old 
language. [On] November 1, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals . . . stayed 
the worldwide injunction and now the service chiefs have advised service 
der DADT
 
So a little bit of history: where did DADT come from? How did it come 
to be? What does it mean to servicemembers who are serving right now? 
So [DADT] started in the beginning of the Clinton Administration. Right 
after Clinton came into office, 
on gays serving openly in the military. There was a lot of controversy about 
this and he compromised [and in] came . . . the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 1994,7 which codified the exclusion policy for the 
military, and it said that you can be kicked out of the service under three 
conditions: statements, acts, , and 
ave to have 
: 
statements, acts, or marriage. If you were to tell someone in your chain of 
command or provide, somehow, evidence that you had engaged in 
homosexual acts or you had married or attempted to marry someone [of the 
same sex] while you were in the military, then you can be kicked out of the 
service. 
Now when I say kicked out of the service, you may not have exposure to 
the military justice system. [Being kicked out of the service is] not actually 
a punishment at trial; this is an administrative separation.8 Sometimes what 
we call ad-sep,  
being  [for 
which] they can separate you from the service. This is Chapter 10, and this 
 
They conduct a hearing. I -attorneys, but will 
often have a legal advisor appointed who will rule on admissibility of 
evidence. However, the Military Rules of Evidence, which parallels the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, that you have or will learn about do not apply. 
                                                          
6.    See Troops Discharged for Being Gay Line up to Reenlist, NATIONAL PUBLIC 
RADIO (October 20, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130704683.  
7.    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, 10 U.S.C. § 654 
(1993).  
8.   DEP T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS 
(Dec. 21, 1993). 
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So, [it is based on] very loose rules of evidence and the burden of proof is 
 preponderance of the evidence. 
So . . . -one percent sure we should kick this person out of the 
service is the bottom line. 
There is an exception written in at the end of the statute and applied in 
the regulations that [if] the government finds that such acts are a departure 
from the soldier s usual behavior, [that] they are unlikely to recur, were not 
accompanied by a use of force, coercion or intimidation, . . . that retention 
a propensity 
to engage in any acts in the future then they can keep you in the service. I 
f the policy where that happens.  
 probably very, very rare.   
[T]his is a really unique situation with this policy, because this is an 
in on a policy within a span of about two months. This almost never 
happens on one issue. So you had a legislative action pushing to change the 
folks on the panel. [Then] [t]he Executive Branch, in the form of the 
military, is currently conducting a review of the policy.9 The feedback from 
this review of policy is due to the Secretary of Defense by December 1st. 
[W]hile at the same time, Congress is going to be in a lame duck session, 
 waiting, as I mentioned before. So this is really [a] 
convergence of all three branches of government and yet the policy remains 
the same. 
of course, 
ve heard about the legislative [proposals] or will hear more about them. 
of using an Executive Order to change the policy.10 
So how would this happen? There are two laws that [are] in the Federal 
Code, Title 10, that pertains to the military; two portions of that law one 
pertaining to enlisted separations, policy for promotion, and retirement; and 
then one for suspending officer personnel laws during a time of war or 
national emergency that allow the President to stop [the separation of 
individuals from the service].11  This is what we know colloquially as the 
                                                          
9.    DEP T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE ISSUES 
ASSOCIATED WITH A REPEAL OF ON T ASK, DON T TELL  (2010) [hereinafter DOD 
REPORT], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_gatesdadt/DADTReport_FINAL_20
101130(secure-hires).pdf. 
10.   See AARON BELKIN ET AL., PALM CTR., UNIV. OF CALI., SANTA BARBARA, HOW 
TO END ON T ASK, DON T TELL  A ROADMAP OF POLITICAL, LEGAL, REGULATORY, 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL STEPS TO EQUAL TREATMENT 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.palmcenter.org/files/active/0/Executive%20Order%20on%20Gay%20Troo
ps%20-%20final.pdf.  
11.   10 U.S.C. § 12305 (2006). 
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While people are deploying to fight ove
a national emergency, . . . 
of the Army, because the country needs you. [A]nd the President 
conceivably could use this power, and I think along with a statement of the 
sort [that] retentionism in the best interest of the service
written into the exception at the end of the policy to stop administratively 
separating gay service members. 
And I should also note that there are criminal charges for certain sexual 
acts in the Uniform Code of Military Justice the criminal law 
for the Armed Forces[, that are] still on the books.12 [A]rticle 125 of the 
UCMJ, continues to criminalize sodomy.13 [B]ut in light of the 2003 
Supreme Court decision, Lawrence v. Texas,14 the Court of Appeals for the 
an as applied law. 
Army Lawyer 
that talks about . . . the application of the sodomy article of the UCMJ.15 It . 
. . basically compares it to the statement of Miracle Max 
character in The Princess Bride our friend here is only 
mostly- difference between being mostly-dead and 
all- - 16   
So when you conduct a survey of the prosecutions under this provision 
of the [UCMJ], 
[A]dultery is still commonly 
prosecuted under the [UCMJ].17 
contact between a superior and a subordinate, which we view in the 
military as prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the force and 
rosecutable offense is barred by the fraternization policy and 
still prosecutable if it involves sodomy under this article of the UCMJ. Also 
to note in 2005, the Joint Services Committee on Military Justice 
recommended a complete revamping [of this Article].18 They 
recommended not doing anything to the sexual misconduct laws in the 
military, but Congress took the second option and revamped it all. And 
                                                          
12.   10 U.S.C. § 925 (2006). 
13.   Id. 
14.   539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
15.   See generally, Maj. Joel P. Cummings, Is Article 125, Sodomy a Dead Letter in 
Light of Lawrence v. Texas and the New Article 120?, ARMY LAW., Jan. 2009, at 1. 
16.   THE PRINCESS BRIDE (20th Century Fox 1987).  
17.   10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006). 
18.  See DEP T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CODE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY 
JUSTICE 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/annual/FY05AnnualReport.pdf. 
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then against the advice of the Joint Services Committee on Military Justice 
kept the sodomy law intact. 
the rest of the sexual misconduct laws within the [UCMJ], and so once 
again, where are we? Right where we started. Included in that story of right 
ecdotal case the case of 
Sergeant Darren Manzella. 
Darren Manzella was a combat medic at Fort Hood. After a combat tour 
in Iraq he began to live as an openly gay service member. His chain of 
command knew about it. With another tour in Iraq pending, his chain of 
command . . . investigated the claim that he was gay. He provided them 
a good sergeant; 
evidence of He had given them plenty of evidence, right. 
harged. Now his subsequent 
appearance on 60 Minutes telling [his] story gave the chain of command no 
choice, and he was discharged.19 But I think that [as] part of  . . . where we 
are and where we have been traditionally, gay service members during 
times of conflict are generally allowed to serve. 
 
out of the service en masse, and I think that . . . with cases like Sergeant 
Manzella and with the number of Arabic translators that have been kicked 
out, I think it continues to damage our services and I knew that the 
Servicem has some more current numbers. 
 
 
persuaded by the experience of other militaries: including the British, and 
the Israelis, to maintain highly effective combat forces while allowing gays 
to serve openly. So I look forward to a change in the policy. 
 of the firm belief that it has to come from Congress. 
wrap it up there in case I forgot to say it earlier, my comments are mine 
only, and not those of the Army or the Department of Defense. All right, 
thank you. 
 
STEVE VLADECK: Thank you, David. Michelle  
 
                                                          
19.   60 Minutes: Is Military More Tolerant of Gay Members in Wartime? (CBS 
Television Broadcast Dec. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/12/13/60minutes/main3615278.shtml. 
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MICHELLE MCCLUER: Thank you. 
some facts that may surprise some of you based on what you see in the 
media  
accurate view of things.  [I also want to] leave you with some food for 
thought as to when there is [a] repeal and I believe there will be a repeal 
of DADT.  
The first thing I wanted to point out is that at least in the Air Force, I 
ver called 
Certainly not in the legal community. 
ual. It goes much beyond 
that; iage [or an] attempt to marry. It 
is as  you kicked out 
of the military and you could be fired but we never called it DADT 
because it was a much broader policy than simply if everyone stays quiet 
 
How many folks can give a percentage of the numbers of females [that] 
were discharged for the homosexual conduct policy from the military in the 
last few years what percentage would you say would be female? 
give you a little bit of a hint to help you out. The military itself overall has 
about fourteen percent female population so [do] you think [the number 
of women discharged for homosexual conduct] would be higher or lower 
than [the amount of women in the military]? 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Higher? 
 
MICHELLE MCCLUER: 
fifty. I see somebody saying lower.  hearing twice. 
along the lines of forty-six to forty-eight percent of individual service 
members who are being kicked out of the military for homosexual conduct 
that [overall] that 
[consists of] a third of [the total population of the military].20 
You also hear a lot about witch hunts . . .   that there 
are some of these. We have, and the other panelists can certainly talk about 
this, [heard of] some horrendous cases of harassment, and abuse, and even 
death.  [For example] the Winchell case,21 from a number of years ago. But 
what percentage , 
                                                          
   20.     US Military Policy on Homosexuals Forces Kansas Women to be Discharged, 
THE GUARDIAN, (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/19/usa-
military-policy-homosexuals. 
21.   See United States v. Fisher, 58 M.J. 300 (2003). 
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discharges [until] after the law changed in 1993 [is] simply estimates. 
somewhat accurate, but say you have 14,000 or so who have been 
discharged for homosexual conduct under the policy. The vast majority of 
those individuals are actually self-identifiers. I can talk about a few specific 
cases that I was involved in as the defense counsel or as the government 
representative on the other side of these cases. 
And often what happened was that these were individuals were 
wonderful performers, [who] never had a speck of any sort of misconduct 
on their record. Oftentimes they were [non-combat officers,] had been 
serving for ten or more years, [and had] great careers in front of them no 
indications of any future issues. But, they simply had reached a point, and 
they would write[,] a very short statement usually saying: 
ve 
realized that I need to, as part of being honest with myself, acknowledge 
that I am homosexual.  I want to be able to act on that and I realize that 
And so rather than 
continuing to try to hide their sexuality or have somebody out them later, 
[they left not under] their own terms. Oftentimes and [in] the vast majority 
, these are individuals who have reached 
always be in fear of what if somebody sees me?  or What if somebody 
finds something out? Or, a lot of the cases that you see, that are not the 
self-admissions, are the spurned lover or ex-lover. Or in the case of one 
individual who is quite familiar to those of us who worked in this area, 
Major Margaret Witt, [where] the husband of her love interest wrote a 
scathing E-mail and sent it all the way . . . to the Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force [and said: H
M 22 Those two instances
the self-admission and the spurned individuals outing others are probably 
the vast majority of individuals.   
otect as far as 
being able to keep your job, homosexual conduct. There are policies that, 
with varying degrees of ability, combat potential bad acts that are in place 
to prevent harassment. 
  
And I would argue [that] there is [a] D H
books, partly because we have so many civilians who work with the 
military, oftentimes deploying with the military. And these individuals 
                                                          
22.   See Witt v. Dep t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008).  
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combat zones or even [in] daily life around the base. And in order to keep a 
ientation is, there are ways that 
[harassment] can be punished under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
The services have individual policies on this that can be punished under 
Article 92,23 which is failure . . . to obey a lawful general regulation as well 
as under Article 93,24 depending on what the level of the individu
position is. So there are some things in place already and for the most part, 
t of my remarks for questions. 
useful thing for the audience. Thank you. 
 
STEVE VLADECK: Thanks Michelle. 
McKean. 
 
DAVID MCKEAN: Thank you very much. Well I have a couple of 
things that I wanted to talk about. 
elaborating on a couple of things that the previous speakers have said. Just 
so 
types of conduct, the SAM acronym statements, acts, and marriage. A 
statement is a statement of your sexual orientation or words to that effect. 
Anytime, anywhere, to anyone, before you were in the military, after you 
things . . . to a friend, in confidence, [such as,] .  
If that friend turns that information over, that can constitute a statement 
under the regulation. D T
D Tell 
Anyone.  [I] 
  
negative impact on their job. Secondly, with respect to [acts]
defined very broadly, so that investigations can be opened on the basis of 
holding hands, hugging. We had two hugging cases in a couple of years so 
these things are very, very broad. 
One case was started one investigation at least when a photo of a 
service member in his locker depicted him with his arm around another 
guy. [T]hat other guy turned out to be his cousin he was not gay there 
was nothing there, but nonetheless he endured a couple of months of 
questioning and scrutiny of his life. 
 
                                                          
23.   10 U.S.C. § 892 (2006). 
24.   10 U.S.C. § 893 (2006). 
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provision. othing in the law itself, 
the Statute, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006)  At the end of 
sense of Congress  provision that 
peop
in the course of their daily lives, between friends: 
What did you do this weekend? , What are you going to do for 
Thanksgiving? things like that. That people have to make a decision; 
who they went and saw a movie with. 
The other things I would like to mention are the statistics that Michelle 
referenced, in terms of women, mirrors our numbers as well. It should also 
be pointed out that of that percentage of women, women of color make up 
the larges
women of color are some of the most disproportionately impacted people 
with respect to DADT. 
Finally, I would just like to comment on the statement that Michelle 
made about harassment. I think that is true. There are very stringent 
harassment on a number of issues. Part of the issue with that, we find, is 
he basis of sexual 
 
So going into your supervisor your commanding officer and saying 
H
ay. T
and, more likely than not, that will result not in the reprimanding of the 
people in the unit, [a]lthough it might, but it will also lead to your 
discharge or a potential discharge under DADT. 
So you have to walk people through having them go into their 
being harassed on the basis of my perceived sexual orientation.  I am not 
making the statement one way or the other regarding my sexual 
orientation.
especially i -old. [Y]ou want to . . . keep that straight in 
can lead to the end of their job. 
In terms of t
with the court cases that are happening now; Major Witt, who Michelle 
touched on earlier . . . was basically the case that laid the foundation for the 
Log Cabin Republicans c one in the room is familiar 
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with it.  
s case was in the Ninth Circuit; [i]t is [now] in the [United 
States District Court of the Western District of Washington]. [O]riginally 
her case was dismissed because the judge found that she was properly 
d
to the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit articulated a standard that said, 
[they] believed that the burden should be on the military to demonstrate 
that Major Witt was in fact becoming a problem for unit cohesion, good 
moral, good order and discipline and things like this justifications for this 
law
on the basis of your justifications for the law, th[en] DADT was 
unconstitutionally applied to her. 
There was a trial, after the standard was articulated. It was remanded 
back to the court. There was a trial, and a number of people testified as to 
[how] . . . excellent [of a] nurse that she was . . . [and] [t]he good impact 
that she had on her unit, and in fact, the District Court judge, under the 
standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit, really had no choice but to order 
her reinstatement. 
reinstatement to take place as soon as practicable. The Justice Department 
has sixty days from the date of that order to file a notice of appeal. 25 That 
deadline is approaching on November 24th, just a couple of weeks away. If 
he case and Major Witt will be 
reinstated. If they do file a Notice of Appeal, they can either decide to file a 
Notice of Appeal by itself, in which case Major Witt will be reinstated, 
pending the appeal of the case, or they can file a Notice of Appeal and a 
petition for a stay of the order . . . if they prevail on that stay, [Major Witt 
will] not be reinstated pending appeal. 
tment decides to do with 
that. ed by the Ninth 
Circuit that the judge in the Log Cabin Republicans case, Judge Virginia 
Philips, 
, because the Ninth Circuit 
 reference to an as applied challenge. 
Whereas the Log Cabin Republicans case was a successful facial 
challenge, but the judge in the District Court in the Log Cabin case used the 
standard that the Ninth Circuit had articulated for an as applied challenge to 
rule on her facial challenge. We hope that the 
Ninth Circuit, when it hears [the] pending appeal of the Log Cabin case, 
                                                          
25.   The Department of Justice filed an appeal on this case on November 29, 2010 
in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, W , No. 10-36079 (9th 
Cir. filed Nov. 29, 2010).  
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adopts a standard for the facial challenge as well. We think the judge was 
lso pending appeal. 
Many of you people have been familiar with the stay 
Log Cabin [Republicans] last week filed a petition . . . to the Supreme 
26 Justice Kennedy has 
asked the government to provide a response [and] that deadline is today. 
Either way, whether or not the stay is lifted or the stay stays firm, the 
merits of the case will be moving forward on appeal I believe sometime 
early this spring. en set on the calendar, so 
 
27 One of our clients, 
Victor Fehrenbach, is a nineteen-year Air Force aviator. 
decorated too many times to count and his performance evaluations . . . use 
we can get into the facts of this case if you ask questions. [B]ut in order to 
at twenty [years] 
ngs like that with retirement. 
We filed a suit to enjoin his discharge from moving forward, because it was 
 of waiting in limbo while his case moves 
forward. 
I would be happy to take any questions about the litigation after Ty 
speaks about what we can expect from the Congress. 
 
STEVE VLADECK: Our last panelist is Ty Cobb.  
 
TY COBB: My name is Ty Cobb. [I] work for the Human Rights 
Campaign.  in the U.S. 
with over 750,000 members and supporters. We work on LGBT equality 
issues at the state level and at the federal level, and, although we do not do 
direct litigation, we are involved in filing amicus briefs and tracking 
litigation occurring in the courts. 
direction and talk about the legislative process 
happened this year . . . and leave some time for us to di
going from here.   
                                                          
26.   First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Log 
Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F.Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. CV04-
8425), 2006 WL 2314141. 
27.   Complaint, Fehrenbach  (No. 
2010cv00402).  
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was going to work with Congress to repeal DADT this year.28 
how the year started out. We then moved into Senate hearings where both 
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
DADT.   
I brought one of the quotes from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff because I liked the quote. A
have put into the record of a Senate hearing . . . from the person that chairs 
the [four] branches of the military. 
fact we have in place 
a policy which forces young men and women to lie about who they are in 
29 it comes 
30 This is 
a great quote that describes what this policy is, what it does, and what it 
says about our military to have such a policy in place. 
At these hearings, the Secretary [of] Defense announced that he was 
going to put together a Pentagon working group to study DADT . . . and, 
not [so] long after that, he announced a Pentagon working group, tasked 
with looking at how to implement a repeal of DADT. The directive from 
the Secretary to the working group often gets mischaracterized as a review 
of whether or not to repeal DADT, but the working group was instructed to 
review how to implement repeal. The directive asks the working group to 
look at what needs to be changed, what policies need to be revised, how to 
extend benefits to the partners of same-sex couples, and what barriers exist 
that block open service. And, that study, which began in the earlier part of 
31 And, on 
December 1st, when it lands on his desk, he will have a complete review of 
how to implement a repeal of the law and what needs to be done once [the] 
law is repealed. 
At the same time as the Pentagon working group was formed in the 
spring, there was a bill introduced in Congress called the Military 
Readiness and Enhancement Act. Later in the spring, the Defense 
Authorization Bill, which authorizes funds for the Defense Department, 
                                                          
28.   President Barack Obama stated during the State of the Union Address that 
w that 
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address.  
29.   Anne Flaherty, 
, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/02/mike-mullen-calls-for-rep_n_446067.html. 
30.   Id. 
31.   DOD REPORT, supra note 9. 
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was amended in both the House and in the Senate Arms Services 
Committee to include repeal legislation. So, the repeal legislation was 
attached to a larger bill that was moving forward. The House passed the 
Authorization Bill in May they did their part to move forward on repeal. 
The Senate, however, did not act on the Defense Authorization Bill until 
September. In September, the Authorization Bill moved forward in the 
Senate, but was blocked by filibuster led by Senator McCain. 
Right now, we are at a point where the President has 
committed to signing repeal legislation. 
President will sign repeal legislation. The House has passed repeal 
legislation an The Senate goes back in 
session on Monday for the lame duck session . . . and it will be in session 
for a week before they leave for Thanksgiving.  Then, it will be in session 
for at least two more weeks in D This is our 
window of opportunity for legislative action in the Senate. 
During all this legislative action, we had, as my other colleagues on the 
panel were talking about, the Witt case and the Log Cabin case moving 
forward in the courts. There was a temporary time where the military was 
enjoined from enforcing DADT. This created an up-and-down ride where 
the policy was enjoined from enforcement one day and then back in place 
another day.   
ssed, but should address, is whether 
it would be better for the courts to find DADT unconstitutional; or whether 
it would be better for there to be a administrative action prohibiting the 
enforcement of DADT. Or whether it would be better for Congress to 
repeal the law. While it would be important for the courts to articulate that 
DADT is unconstitutional, I think the answer to that question is to get the 
law off the books now. I think the best way to do that is through 
Congressional action, and our last chance to do this in 2010 is during the 
lame duck session in the Senate.   
 
STEVE VLADECK [the] moderated Q & A 
part of the program. Ty, you sort of stole my thunder there at the end, 
because my first question to all of our panelists is, I suspect that we can all 
agree that Congress has the Constitutional authority to repeal a statute as 
enacted, right? 
at Congress could repeal DADT. 
certainly true that the court could strike down DADT. 
curious for each of you, if you would be willing to speculate what do you 
think is most likely to happen in light of the election in light of the way 
the litigation stands? [I]f you had to predict the future, what would the 
Giants do at the Super Bowl? L]eaving aside 
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other end of the panel, you [all] are a lot more in tune [to] ng on 
in the halls of Congress. I thought it was a done deal and then I started 
reading the papers this morning, and . . . I guess the[re is a lot of] pressure 
[on] Senator Carl Levin . . . both one way and the other . . . to repeal, [or] 
not to repeal.32 
[F]or forty-eight years the Congress has consistently passed the Defense 
Authorization [Act]. I . . . the core task of Congress to do that, and so 
 from both sides to pass [it] the way each side 
wa  stated what I think should happen. I think it should be 
repealed, but I think that it should be Congress that does it. 
  I would like to 
-fifty chance that Congress does it, and we 
ad nauseam for . . . the 
next year and a half or so. 
 
MICHELLE MCCLUER: I agree with all the other panelists that it 
should be Congress who does the overturning. 
going to happen and, to take a little step back, the National Defense 
Authorization Act is the defense spending bill. It is what keeps the military 
running. It [totals] trillions of dollars, or at least a tri
pass it there is no budget and there is no money for the military except 
through these things that they call continuing resolutions, which is what we 
. . . find ourselves under [every year at this time of year] because the fiscal 
year started about a month and a half ago and we can never pass the budget 
by then. 
So th[e] National Defense Authorization Act is extraordinarily important 
for everyone in Congress to make sure that we can still fund our military, 
s that much political will in Congress. 
 [not] 
procedural rules that you can use in the Senate to prevent certain things 
from being passed. 
Maybe this is my pessimism coming through. Unfortunately I think [that 
it will probably] be this very piecemeal, interim court-
                                                          
32.  See Scott Wong,  THE 
POLITICO (Nov. 9, 2010, 8:37 am), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/44913.html. 
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going to ricochet back and forth for quite some time. 
case but[,] aside from the Constitutional reasons, it should be Congress that 
does the change in the law. It was Congress that passed it in the first place, 
So it should be Congress that does the repeal. That 
would also allow an orderly [transition and] it would give a timetable. 
There would be guidelines [that] would come out of Congress if it happens 
that way. 
If it comes from the courts and they just  
. T
incremental changes or whatever adjustments that need to be made. 
 
TY COBB se Authorization 
Bill as well. The bill is huge. As Michelle said, it authorizes around a 
trillion dollars in funds. DADT repeal is such a small piece of it. If 
Congress does not pass the National Defense Authorization Act this year, it 
will be the first time in I believe forty-eight years they have not passed that. 
So there is pressure on Senator Levin to get this bill through the Senate for 
reasons beyond repealing DADT.   
As to the original question, Congress is in the position to make the most 
immediate change to DADT. They could make that change next week 
when they go back into session. They could make that change in three 
weeks when they get back in session after Thanksgiving. Litigation in the 
courts is going to be an up-and-
year. This kind of pattern could continue all the way up to the Supreme 
Court. I certainly would welcome a favorable verdict from the Supreme 
Court, a decision from the Supreme Court on the unconstitutionality of 
DADT, but I think right now, the Senate is poised in the position to make 
the most immediate change to the law.   
And, as a caveat to this conversation, the legislative repeal language in 
the Defense Authorization Act does not immediately strip DADT off the 
books. The way the legislation works is that three things must happen 
before DADT is stripped off the books. First, the Pentagon working group 
report I talked about, which is due on December 1st, must be received and 
considered by the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Second, the President, Secretary of Defense, and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must provide the Senate Armed 
Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee with a 
certified letter saying that repealing DADT will not hurt military 
effectiveness and the policies and regulations to implement repeal are 
prepared. Sixty days after certification, the law is repealed. 
  
 
2011] DON T ASK, DON T TELL 147 
STEVE VLADECK: I would echo [and] agree with everything Ty just 
said.  The group that can most readily and most quickly repeal DADT is the 
people who put it in place in the beginning [in] [19]93, which is the Senate 
and the Congress in general.  the Senate 
should vote in this [l]ame [d]uck [session] 
to be out in the courts; 
, 
especially the military, like to find themselves subject to the whim of a 
 
reviewing it in the context of the Constitution, but that level of uncertainty 
for the military is not where they want to find themselves and we saw that 
when the injunction was put in place.  The military is excellent at figuring 
out how to implement something and doing it. [T]
the best military in the world, but doing things that quickly and pushing it 
down the bureaucracy that fast poses some challenges. 
appen again on a bigger scale. So 
that begs a related question, , which is
[where] is the Obama administration, in all of this? President Obama, in his 
first State of the Union sa[id] [that] repeal [of] DADT is a priority. At least 
it indicates [that] the administration has been proactive on that front. At the 
same time,  [that the] Justice Department is 
aggressively [litigating the appeals.] 
Judge [Phillips] ruled on the Log Cabin Republicans case [and the 
Justice Department] is aggressively appealing the Witt case. [O]ne way to 
slice that is the [that] Attorney General has a constitutional obligation to 
defend the constitutionality of [a] [f]ederal [l]aw, 
and [then] [all] 
inconsistency in what we see in different parts of the administration dealing 
[with] this issue. 
 
DAVID RITTGERS: [I] think that the Attorney General does have the 
obligation to defend the constitutionality of laws, and I think that if the 
President wants to speak in that matter then he needs to go the Executive 
Order route.  then speak but otherwise I think . . . 
defending the law . . . is part of the role of the Attorney General and 
something they have to do. S  
 
MICHELLE MCCLUER: I actually heard . . . Neil Cattell, the acting 
Solicitor General, speak about his office and the role of his office on a day 
where he had to jet out of the room, because the injunction had just come 
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down, and he needed to go chat with the White House. And it was 
interesting. T
unconstitutional up to that point
. . . political whims are brewing including that of the current 
administration. I thought this was really interesting because my view of the 
, 
 
And so that was an interesting insight to me, a very timely one, but I 
knee-jerk defend every provisio
 
 
TY COBB: I would say the administration has been very consistent at 
being inconsistent. They continuously rely on their duty to defend all laws 
whether 
they continue to defend the constitutionality of DADT and the Defense of 
Marriage Act while opposing the laws.33 In 2009 the President explained 
that DADT weakens national security, which is the basis for which 
Congress actually enacted the law, and one of the basis that Justice 
Department continues to use as a defense to challenges against the 
constitutionality of DADT. There was no rational basis for enacting 
DADT, the President has spoken to this point, but the Justice Department 
continues to defend the law. 
does not have to defend an unconstitutional law, but the Administration has 
been very consistent in defending laws that the Administration opposes. 
 
DAVID RITTGERS: I would just add a couple of points, not to confuse 
Witt decision 
from the Ninth Circuit, which is . . . I think, directly on point here. When 
the Ninth Circuit arti
going to be a burden shift in DADT cases in the Ninth Circuit, at least with 
respect to as applied challenges. That case was not appealed to the Supreme 
, I think, still stands today. 
Circuit, because the law there is just simply better. And with respect to the 
Executive Order issue it would 
be great if it can be done in an Executive Order and done tomorrow
legitimate constitutional questions as to whether or not the President has 
                                                          
33.   Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as 
amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).   
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authority under Stop Loss  to issue an Executive Order. I think it would 
also raise a host of other potentially unexpected consequences with respect 
to divisions of government.  
 
STEVE VLADECK: I have one more question for the panel before we 
turn it over to questions. I come at this from a different perspective, I think, 
than the four of you, which is sort of the top down perspective. This is sort 
of a piece of a larger puzzle and the larger puzzle that I see in teaching 
Constitutional Law is lots of different areas where laws that discriminate on 
the basis of sexual orientation are at the forefront of policy and legal 
debates [such as] the Prop 8 lawsuits in California and the challenges for 
the constitutionality of DOMA.  
[S]ome of you may know [that] on Tuesday, Iowa voted out three of 
o a 
unanimous decision by their Supreme Court that same sex marriage is 
protected by the Iowa Constitution.34 [S] know] if you all 
see DADT as a unique variation on this theme or as part of a much larger 
growing national conversation and whether there are ways in which DADT 
is either a poorer or better vehicle for those who are interested in moving 
ahead on questions of sexual equality in the 21st century. 
 
DAVID RITTGERS
vehicle for moving this discussion forward. In 2003, the Supreme Court in 
Lawrence v. Texas declared unconstitutional all of these [state] laws . . . 
[criminalizing] consensual sodomy between two adults in the comfort of 
their bedroom.  That was once again applied by the Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces to . . . knock out some of the prosecutions this conduct. 
But the same article that I was talking about that it was mostly dead, 
but still partly-alive said that 
by that case means that the sodomy article of the UCMJ is still mostly-
alive, not totally dead. I think that the strong policy considerations in favor 
of discipline of the force just make this a tougher a
litigate. This is a tougher area than other areas. 
I think it was the same week, actually, Judge Philips came down, you 
had a defense of marriage statute partially overruled in Massachusetts. I 
think there was a federal employee who wanted to get benefits for their 
                                                          
34.   See Krissah Thompson, Gay Marriage Fight Targeted Iowa Judges, 
Politicizing Rule on Issue, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2010, 6:39 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/03/AR2010110307058.html. 
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partner, is that correct?35 
 
STEVE VLADECK: Yeah.  
 
DAVID RITTGERS: So, you see the difference. When you have those 
federal agencies but one military, one non-military, this is clearly 
swimming upstream to get things done on DADT. 
 
MICHELE MCCLUER: Maybe because I came from a military 
background
military but there may be a silver lining that makes it a little bit better, 
 
referring to the United States v. Marcum case, which if you want to look it 
04 case. 
My boss argued it. I was there when it was argued; [it was] very, very 
Lawrence v. Texas, that 
pretty much means the end of Article 125 unless you can be quite clever 
 she was or . . . they bought it regardless of 
the argument,  matter as 
much as the briefs. But . . . the military has always gotten traditionally very 
high deference from the courts in particular, which is another reason that 
the courts in my opinion are not the best branch of government to be 
deciding the issue. 
We keep talking about the Ninth Circuit case, the Ninth Circuit case 
gives a little less deference to the military than what you traditionally see
and you see some of that with the cases involving the detainees. 
seeing less deference to the military in the Supreme Court.  That sort of 
swimming upstream, traditional efense of Marriage Act 
Should partners ge [argument]. 
Y
members have always given up some of their rights. 
I mean, military members are not allowed to say thin
writing a letter to the editor and sign your name: So-and-S
same as a lot of other things that we give up the right [to do]. [W]e give up 
the right to refuse immunizations. So that makes it a tougher sell. 
On the other side, you have the history of the military. Because the 
military is used to following orders, if and when policies change, people
whether they agree with the policy or not have been taught and [we] saw 
                                                          
35.   Gill v. Office Pers. Mgmt., 688 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass 2010). 
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this with integration [of] the races as well as the sexes. If individuals are 
 [to it]. 
 
TY COBB: Not to belabor the point, but the courts deal with the military 
as a different type of animal than society-at-large. The way the courts apply 
court decision on DADT would necessarily be a vehicle to advance LGBT 
equality generally in the courts. But like I said, I would certainly welcome 
a favorable decision. 
 
DAVID MCKEAN: L
to DADT would necessarily be translatable to a broader LGBT agenda 
because like Ty said, those things are dealt with by the courts separately. 
The one thing I would like to point out though is that they do seem to be 
dealt with by the public at large somewhat differently in that approval for 
repealing DADT is upwards of seventy-five per
parties that -goers. [I]t is very high
seventy-five percent of all those groups but on average.36 
 
TY COBB: Yeah, it is a very, very high number of people. 
the same thing can be said for other aspects of the LGBT agenda, 
unfortunately. 
 
STEVE VLADECK: [A] question? 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Regarding the filibuster, one of the main 
questions was were there any other express reasons for the filibuster? 
And we say this in terms of it seemed like the main talking point for the 
seems that as Ty and David stated, that [it] in fact did not necessarily have 
anything to do with eventual passage of the Authorization Bill. 
So I guess [this is] a multi-part question. Were there any express reasons 
for the filibuster? Do we expect those reasons to come up again, and if and 
when we see the report, do we feel that the filibuster is still the biggest 
structural obstacle to the repeal of DADT? 
 
                                                          
36.   Aubrey Sarvis, : Getting Repeal Right this Time, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 23, 2008, 07:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aubrey-
sarvis/dadt-getting-repeal-right_b_145874.html. 
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TY COBB: Definitely. Looking back at September . . . when the 
National Defense Authorization Act did not survive a filibuster, people like 
to think it was because of DADT repeal, but like Michelle said, DADT 
repeal is only [a] small, little piece of the National Defense Authorization 
Act. The failed cloture vote had to do with a lot of things going on in 
Congress at the time, including the upcoming mid-term elections and other 
amendments, including the [Development, Relief and Education for Alien 
Act.37 
 
DAVID MCKEAN: And jet engines as well. 
 
TY COBB: Yes, jet engines. 
 
DAVID MCKEAN: I mean, The [DREAM] Act happened, if I recall 
correctly, at least publicly right. Senator Reid
Reid had attached the [DREAM] Act. The [DREAM] Act is an 
immigration reform measure and he attached it rather late, which is not to 
that there was sort of a 
process objection in applying the filibuster. 
 
TY COBB: Right, he wanted to vote on the DREAM Act and other 
senators had opposing views. There were many issues being debated when 
the Defense Authorization Bill failed to move forward. 
DADT repeal. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you feel that a filibuster could come up 
again after December 1st? 
 
TY COBB
until the December 1st report comes out. As I said earlier, the report does 
not talk about whether we should repeal DADT. It looks at what policy 
changes need to be made to implement a repeal. There were several people 
that opposed the moving forward on the Defense Bill, in some part, 
because they did not want to move until this December 1st report comes 
out. 
So obviously once the December 1st report comes out, that talking point 
is gone. I am sure there will be a new talking point, as there always is, but 
that talking point does disappear December 1st, and, going forward, I 
would expect a filibuster, because the Senate has probably filibustered 
                                                          
37.   Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010, S. 3827, 
111th Cong. (2010). 
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movement in the Senate without a filibuster. 
 
STEVE VLADECK: Ty and this is just thinking out loud
y
objection that Senators should not be moving ahead with legislation that 
their replacements probably would not be in support of? 
 
TY COBB t the National 
process issue is what is going to stop the National Defense Authorization 
Act from going forward. 
 
DAVID MCKEAN: So it might affect other legislation but not this? 
 
TY COBB: I think so. Passage of the National Defense Authorization 
Act is something that we expect every year. It is something that has 
happened for almost fifty years at this point. And so it would be strange if 
it was not passed after the midterm elections. 
 
STEVE VLADECK: Which has been done before? 
 
TY COBB: Yes, yes. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Moving more toward the report itself. It was 
mentioned earlier that the United Kingdom and Israel do allow openly gay 
servicemembers. One: is the DOD in this report trying to study these 
[countries] and other international examples? Then two: along those same 
lines, could you speak about how the military will have to change its 
internal policies, if and when, servicemembers are allowed to serve as 
openly gay service members? And specifically, how will this deal with 
issues such as incentivizing marriage? Will they be allowed the same 
marriage benefits as current heterosexual couples?  
 
DAVID RITTGERS: tioned the other 
militaries.  So let me just tease it out, there were like three questions, like 
how will this affect combat readiness. How are we going to . . . implement 
this and I think the second one was the broader legal scope of family law or 
whatever you want to call it. 
disregard right now, is the homophobic nature of the military. 
Of the folks that are listening right now, I think Colin Powell was right, 
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seventeen years ago this was a tougher sell. But I think times have changed 
and kids coming into the military now do not have the hang-ups that were 
in place seventeen years ago.38  generational change in the folks 
that are . . . coming in and enlisting right now. So back to the first 
[question], the British and Israelis have done it. 
 ; 
this has been studied before by the Rand Corporation,39 and other folks 
have already looked at this, and have looked at the personnel policies of 
is going to, in large part, mirror whatever the Brits and Israelis do. 
The reason I focus on the British and Israelis is because they have real 
militaries that really fight. embourg does. Great, if 
they let people serve gay openly, good for them. But we should focus on . . 
. what the question says: [are] the folks who have top notch 
And then I think i the second part of . . . 
Steve 
c  marry, have same sex 
. 
 
DAVID MCKEAN: To pick it up on the back of that, first I do want to 
reemphasize that the first point you made which is the lack of homophobia 
in the military especially with regards to the younger recruit. The Military 
Times where its readership is widely considered to be kind of an older, 
more conservative readership for the first time this year found that . . . 
just over fifty percent of [its] readers . . .  were in favor of, 
whether or not DADT was repealed.40 
And those numbers just climb as you get down to people who are 
ly a generational issue. The people who are 
 lived in a world without DADT. 
This is a seventeen year-old law and the kids signing up right before they 
graduate from high school are often that age, believe it or not, which gives 
                                                          
38.   See Karen DeYoung, Colin Powell Now Says Gays Should be able to Serve 
Openly in the Military, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2010, at A4, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/03/AR2010020302292.html. 
39.   BERNARD D. ROSTKER ET AL., RAND CORP., SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S. 
MILITARY POLICY (1993), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2009/RAND_MR323.pdf. 
40.  See Lisa Leff, Appeals Court: Gay Ban can Stay, for Now, MILITARY TIMES 
(Oct. 22, 2010, 5:55pm), http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2010/10/ap-military-
dont-ask-dont-tell-case-moves-to-appellate-court-102010/.  
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them a birthday of like [19]92.  just not as much of an issue. 
, as it does lots of 
places, but the military is a very, very capable and disciplined organization 
 
With respect to the laws or regulations that may 
be brief here. For a lot of the benefits issues, there may be a DOMA issue 
there as much as anything else. e a
potential work-arounds, 
group is doing right now, which is figuring out exactly what regulations 
would need to be changed. 
The one thing that would not need to be changed, or very little of it 
would need to be changed, is a regulation based on conduct. Most of the 
regulations based on conduct, whether sexual misconduct or other 
misconduct, are sexual-orientation neutral. 
not a man assaults a woman or a straight man assaults a straight woman, 
write them that way. 
 historical 
research to find that when some of the sexual assault provisions were 
written, it was before . . . women were widely serving in the military it 
was in order to prevent same-sex male-on-male sexual assaults. I think 
these are totally applicable and capable of providing any sort of discipline 
that the military needs to enforce and the rest will have to be visited after 
repeal. 
 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Will there be support at all levels? 
 
TY COBB determination 
now,  
discovers in about nine days. ea of where 
service members and their families where the military stands on this 
issue. But something to think about, strong leadership will be required to 
implement a change like this. 
You also talked about looking at foreign armies. The working group is 
looking at foreign armies, re updating the old RAND report, which 
was made back in the 1990 s that evaluated how other militaries made a 
change to open service. And one of the key ways this was done was by 
making the change quickly and exhibiting leadership from the top. 
assume that the report coming out December 1st will find that the military 
is ready for this, and I expect that the leadership within the military will be 
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assertive in implementing these new policies, because the RAND report 
will likely show that this is how other countries have dealt with such a 
change. 
 
DAVID MCKEAN: I think the leadership component cannot be 
understated. Maybe David or Michelle would like to speak on how much of 
a difference leadership, especially within the context of a chain of 
command, really does influence the way people behave in the service. 
 
DAVID RITTGERS
views coming from the Service Chiefs and I think just as late as last week 
or maybe this week, [the] Chief of the Marine Cor
exception policy for the Marines where the Navy would have . . . a certain 
amount of space that each person is supposed to have, and the Marine 
Corps has an expressed exemption to that and they live in austere 
conditions, and so he opposes the change of the policy based on that 
service. 
Requirements with the bottom line, that once the military is told do 
something, and the leadership gets involved[,] makes an order effective, 
 
 
DAVID MCKEAN: It should also just be noted very quickly that there 
are currently  lesbian service people 
today an 
estimated 66,000 [LGBT] servicemembers, which is not the vast majority 
of the services by any stretch, but there are people. You rarely speak to 
somebody who served any length of time who can credibly say that they 
have never served with [or] known somebody in the military who was gay. 
 
STEVE VLADECK: So I guess this leads to my next question which is: 
so what is life after DADT? 
about, as you mentioned in your remarks, the . . . anti-harassment policies. 
And I guess the question is . . . how to adequately balance respect for 
equality with the particular needs of the military? Would you counsel 
leaders in the Pentagon and in the Congress to construct a sort of viable, 
non-discriminatory policy that accounts for . . . the parts of DADT [that 
are] actually . . . sensible the parts of DADT have come from a place that 
. . . are justified? 
 
MICHELLE  MCCLUER: 
have to deal with under new policies. What do you do about [the 
 have been discharged 
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already? How do you reintegrate them and get them back to where they 
and all that? 
Post-homosexual conduct [and what it] means for discharge in the 
military is going to be mainly depend on the leadership.  My dad used to 
 the bosses, beat on [I] know from 
just thinking about my last duty station, even when we had a case where 
there was an allegation of homosexual assault, we dealt very gingerly with 
the individual who was accused, because it is a very sensitive area. 
And this is under the policy where homosexual conduct is not 
compatible 
going to see even more of an emphasis. [W]e already, on a yearly basis, in 
some services in others twice yearly do things like . . . anti-
fraternization briefings, and sexual harassment 
or 
 
Disrespect for your fellow service members detracts from the mission if 
uals who are harassing others. 
would be other new policies. T  
But I really think that for a large number of 
individuals, 
in my performance report, or the assignments that I get. I think the policy 
. . . change may be rapid but it may not be as rapid as we think it will be. 
  
DAVID MCKEAN: If I can just add a couple of things to that. I think 
issues after DADT that I think are worth thinking about. 
The first is an easy one and much easier than the second one. The first is 
what to do inter-military with personnel policies and things like that. That 
can be dealt with. mechanism for dealing with it. 
working group . . . considering it, there are groups like ours who are 
in a fairly straight forward manner. 
The second is what to do with people who are discharged and who have 
been out of the service for some time now, or even just a little bit of time, 
who want to go back in? that are very important there. 
Do you give credit to the people who were discharged for all the time that 
they would have had? Do they go in at the rank that they were or the rank 
that they would have been? 
Do you, if there are no spots open for . . . radar technicians in a certain 
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unit where the person was discharged, . . . create one for them? [I]t will be 
a potentially complicated issue to deal with. 
of us.  It just means that it might take a little longer. The other thing I 
wanted to point out is that a 
things, have the assumption . . . that when DADT is repealed, gay and 
lesbian service members will be known to their counterparts, which may be 
true but it may not be. 
Nobody has to come out on [the] day after DADT is repealed, and if you 
think about the way life works, 
subject to any sort of reprimand or harassment. It might be the case that the 
policy changes and that [the] actual practical matter of the policy is not 
e environment. 
 
STEVE VLADECK: Great. Well thank you to our panelists. We have 
one last closing . . . treat before we leave today. He[re] to give us some 
closing remarks is T
Associate Dean for Faculty and Academic Affairs here at WCL. 
 
TONY VARONA: Thank you so much Steve. I will be very brief 
because I was not able to attend the panel and hear your presentations and 
so ground that you have already covered. I will 
share with you that I had the privilege of working on [the] DADT repeal 
efforts some years back and I can tell you that my experience has been over 
the last few years that nothing much has changed. 
This is a policy problem, a political problem, a legal problem that is of a 
very interesting sort. It seems to us
rights movement, that trusted polls indicate that the American public is on 
the side of repeal. The Congress by and large is on the side of repeal. The 
President has told us that he is in favor of repeal, and the courts are telling 
us that they are in favor of appeal. 
he question, really, becomes one of tactics and 
strategy and repealing in the right way according to the right sequencing, 
whatever that might be. And so the theoretical question of whether repeal is 
the right way to go becomes how to repeal and when. I am certain that 
th the most during this 
panel. So I bring you greetings and thanks from Dean Grossman who is 
very happy that this panel took place and would have been here had the 
Committee Against Torture at the UN had . . . scheduled their proceedings 
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for another time.  He offers you his thanks and his greetings.  
I thank my colleague, Professor Vladeck for doing what I am sure was a 
fantastic job as he always does moderating and I thank Michelle McClure, 
David McKean, Ty Cobb. mpaign. 
a former General Counsel Legal Director there and I 
have crossed.  [A]nd David Rittgers, thank you very much. . . . I also thank 
everybody who put the program together from the [Office of Diversity 
Services], [the] Program on Law and Government, the National Security 
Law Brief, the Labor and Employment Law Forum, [the LAMBDA] Law 
Society, the Legislation Policy Brief, the Modern American, [the] Veterans 
of American University, the Health Law and Justice Initiative and AU 
Queers and Allies.  
Thank you all very much, thank you for a job well done and have a great 
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